Taylor v. Marshall

• Decision Date: 26 October 1912
• Citation: 255 Ill. 545,99 N.E. 638
• Parties: TAYLOR v. MARSHALL et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

255 Ill. 545

99 N.E. 638

TAYLOR

v.MARSHALL et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 26, 1912.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; Kickham Scanlan, Judge.

Bill by Julius F. Taylor against Frank Marshall and others. From a decree for defendants, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.A. D. Gash, of Chicago, for appellant.

Edward H. Morris, Park Phipps, and John L. Bolen, all of Chicago (Martin J. Isaacs, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellees.

COOKE, J.

Julius F. Taylor, the appellant, filed his bill in the circuit court of Cook county against Frank Marshall, William Marshall, Myrtle Ryan, and Charles Leight to enjoin them from conducting a house of ill fame in certain premises in the city of Chicago, known as 171, 173, and 175 Twenty-First street. By his bill he alleged that Elnoria H. Fowler was the owner in fee of the real estate, and that on July 15, 1905, she leased the premises to Pony Moore for a term ending on April 30, 1915, for a rental of $100 per month; that on November 18, 1905, Moore leased the entire premises to Joseph Marshall until April 30, 1915, the full term of his leasehold, for a monthly rental of $150; that Joseph Marshall thereafter assigned his lease to Frank Marshall; that on January 17, 1907, appellant secured a judgment in the circuit court of Cook county against Pony Moore, upon which an execution was issued and levied upon the interest of Moore in the real estate in question; that the premises were sold under such execution, and a sheriff's deed issued to appellant, and that he is now the owner of the leasehold interest of Moore; that the property is in the possession of the Marshalls, and is being used as a house of ill fame, and will continue to be so used unless the defendants are restrained. Elnoria H. Fowler by leave of court became a party defendant and filed her answer, alleging that the sheriff's deed to appellant was void and created a cloud on her title; that there had been a default in the payment of the rent reserved in her lease to Moore in the months of March and April, 1910; that she had declared a forfeiture of the lease and obtained possession on April 15, 1910, and afterwards leased the premises to Charles Leight. She also filed her cross-bill, setting up the same matter contained in her answer, and asked to have the sheriff's deed to Taylor set aside and removed as a cloud on her title. Issues were joined on the answers to the bill and cross-bill, and upon a hearing the court found that there had been a default in the payment of rent for the months of March and April, 1910, that a forfeiture had been declared, and that Mrs. Fowler had regained possession of the premises by reason of the forfeiture, and entered a decree dismissing appellant's bill for want of equity, and granting the relief prayed by Mrs. Fowler in her cross-bill. This appeal followed.

[1][2][3][4] A number of grounds for reversal have been assigned, but it will not be necessary to consider them, for a determination of one question, which lies at the very threshold of the case, is decisive of the whole matter. That question is whether Pony Moore had such an interest in the premises as was subject to levy and sale under execution.

Section 1 of the act relating to judgments and decrees (Hurd's Rev. St. 1911, c. 77) provides that a judgment of a court of record shall be a lien on the real estate of the person against whom it is obtained. Section 3 of the act contains a definition of real estate, in which a leasehold estate, when the unexpired term exceeds five years, is defined as real estate, as that term is used in the act. In legal contemplation, a leasehold estate is an interest in or concerning lands....