Taylor v. Maryland

• Decision Date: 30 October 2020
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. GLR-13-371
• Parties: DERRICK TAYLOR, Petitioner, v. STATE OF MARYLAND, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

DERRICK TAYLOR, Petitioner, v. STATE OF MARYLAND, Respondent.

CIVIL ACTION NO. GLR-13-371

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

October 30, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Petitioner Derrick Taylor's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Petition") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (ECF No. 1). Having reviewed the Petition as supplemented (ECF Nos. 1, 3, 39), Respondent's responses and supplements thereto (ECF Nos. 46, 54), and Taylor's reply as supplemented (ECF Nos. 52, 59),¹ the Court finds no need for an evidentiary hearing. See R. Govern. § 2254 Cases U.S. Dist. Ct. 9(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny the Petition and decline to issue a Certificate of Appealability.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 10, 2005, Taylor and an accomplice broke into a house for recovering addicts to retrieve money allegedly owed to him by Antwon Arthur. (Taylor v. State, Sept. Term 2007 No. 412 (Md.Ct.Spec.App. 2009) ["CSA Op."] at 3-4, ECF No. 46-4). Before leaving with money provided by another resident, Taylor shot and killed Arthur. (Id. at 4).Steven Matthews and Nathan Gulliver, residents who witnessed Taylor shoot Arthur, were also shot and killed. (Id. at 6). Another resident "blacked out" during the incident and was unable to identify the assailants. (Id. at 5). A fifth resident, who was shot but not killed, unequivocally identified Taylor as the person who shot and killed Arthur. (Id. at 7). None of the witnesses saw whether it was Taylor or his accomplice who shot Matthews and Gulliver. (Id. at 9).

Taylor was charged with three counts of first-degree murder, two counts of attempted first-degree murder, two counts of first-degree assault, two counts of second-degree assault, one count of conspiracy to commit murder, one count of conspiracy to rob, five counts of use of a handgun in a felony or crime of violence, and five counts of wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun. (Id. at 2).² Following a trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, a jury convicted Taylor of three counts of felony murder, five counts of use of a handgun in a felony or crime of violence, five counts of wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun, and one count of murder in the second degree. (Id.) The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the remaining charges, which were later abandoned upon the issuance of a nolle prosequi.³ (Id. at 2).

Taylor's motion for a new trial was denied, and he was sentenced to three consecutive prison terms of life without the possibility of parole for the felony murder convictions, five consecutive twenty-year prison terms (to be served consecutively to thelife sentences) for the convictions for use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, and five concurrent three-year prison terms for the convictions of wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun. (Id.). The conviction for second-degree murder was merged into the felony murder convictions for sentencing purposes. (Id.).

On direct appeal, Taylor raised the following claims:

1. the trial court erred in declining to propound two requested voir dire questions;

2. the trial court committed plain error in failing to instruct the jury on the elements of robbery with a deadly weapon, which was the underlying felony in the felony murder charge;

3. the jury rendered inconsistent verdicts by finding him guilty of using a handgun during the commission of a crime of violence with respect to victims Brown and Moreland, where it was unable to reach a verdict as to the underlying crimes of violence relating to those victims;

4. the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for felony murder;

5. the trial court erred in failing to suppress or exclude victim Brown's in-court identification; and

6. he should have been convicted of only one count of wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun, and that conviction should be merged for sentencing purposes.

(Id. at 2-3). The Court of Special Appeals merged the sentences for several of the handgun offenses but otherwise affirmed the judgment in an unreported opinion filed on April 23, 2009. (Id. at 41-43). The Court of Appeals declined further review on August 24, 2009. (Taylor v. State, Sept. Term 2009 Pet. No. 166 (Md. Aug. 24, 2009) ["Cert. Denial"] at 1, ECF No. 46-5).

On November 3, 2010, Taylor filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, which was scheduled for a hearing on March 4, 2013 but was withdrawn on February 4, 2013. (Post-Conviction Pets. & Ops. ["Post-Conv. Filings"] at 3, ECF No. 46-6). On February 1, 2013, Taylor filed correspondence seeking "a stay on my federal habeas corpus review." (Pet. Writ Habeas Corpus ["Pet."] at 1, ECF No. 1). Taylor alleged that counsel representing him at state post-conviction proceedings in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City had withdrawn his petition due to counsel's medical recovery. (Id.). In his court-ordered supplement, Taylor outlined the history of his case and the grounds he intended to raise in this Court. (Suppl. Pet., ECF No. 3). On March 4, 2013, this Court granted a stay and abeyance in this case to permit Taylor to promptly refile his state post-conviction petition and provide regular reports to this Court concerning progress in that matter. (Mar. 4, 2013 Order at 4, ECF No. 5).

As outlined by the Circuit Court, on March 13, 2015, Taylor submitted a state post-conviction petition, which raised the following issues:

1. Trial counsel failed to file a motion for modification or reduction of sentence;

2. Trial counsel failed to inform the court of Petitioner's election to testify;

3. Trial counsel failed to object and request that the venire panel be questioned regarding racial bias;

4. Trial counsel failed to object to incomplete felony murder instructions;

5. Trial counsel failed to object to the non-unanimous verdict; and

6. Appellate counsel failed to raise the issue of the invalid verdict.

(Post-Conv. Filings at 3). The post-conviction court further noted that on July 13, 2015, Taylor filed an amended petition, raising the following additional arguments:

1. Trial counsel failed to object to omitted instructions;2. Appellate counsel failed to raise allegations concerning the omitted instructions;

3. Trial counsel failed to secure the presence of Petitioner during jury communications; and

4. The cumulative effect of counsel's errors prejudiced his defense.

(Id.).

During a post-conviction hearing held on August 17, 2015, Taylor proceeded with these ten claims and argued ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to request an Allen charge.⁴ (Aug. 17, 2015 Post-Conviction Tr. at 5-8, ECF No. 50-1). The parties stipulated to a belated filing of a motion for modification of sentence. (Id. at 59-60). On January 29, 2016, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City denied post-conviction relief. (Post-Conv. Filings at 13). Taylor sought leave to appeal the adverse ruling on the ten issues raised above. (Id. at 14-16).

The Court of Special Appeals granted Taylor's application for leave to appeal for the limited purpose of remanding the case to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for resolution of whether counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the court's failure to instruct the jury on the unanimity requirement and the duty to deliberate. (Id. at 40). On November 22, 2016, the Circuit Court issued an opinion and order denying relief as to that issue. (Id. at 40-48). On May 1, 2017, Taylor's application for leave to appeal this ruling was summarily denied. (Id. at 63).

On May 12, 2017, Taylor signed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, which was received for filing in this Court on May 19, 2017. (Am. Pet. Writ Habeas Corpus ["Am. Pet."], ECF No. 39). Those grounds for relief, covering five categories and encompassing issues presented in his original Petition, as supplemented, are:

1. The trial court erred by failing to:

a. ask prospective jurors two requested voir dire questions;

b. instruct the jury on the elements of robbery with a deadly weapon, essential to consideration of the underlying felony for felony murder;

c. suppress in-court identification by witness/victim Brown.

2. The evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction of felony murder.

3. Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to:

a. object to an incomplete felony murder instruction;

b. inform the court that Taylor wanted to testify;

c. request a voir dire question concerning racial bias;

d. object when the foreperson was not polled and the entire jury was not harkened following the verdict;

e. object to omitted instructions requiring a unanimous verdict;

f. object to the jury's announcement of a non-unanimous verdict;

g. secure Taylor's presence at bench conferences discussing jury communications;

h. file a motion seeking modification or reduction of sentence.

4. Appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to:

a. question the validity of the verdict;

b. raise an issue as to the omitted jury instructions.

5. The cumulative effect of all these errors led to Taylor's wrongful conviction.

(Am. Pet. Writ Habeas Corpus ["Am. Pet."] at 5-6, 8, ECF No. 39).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended, sets forth a "highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings." Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7 (1997); see also Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 455 (2005). The standard is "difficultto meet" and requires courts to give state court decisions the benefit of the doubt. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011) ("If this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be.").

A federal court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus unless the state's adjudication on the merits: (1) "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as...