Taylor v. Medtox Diagnostic, Inc.

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Memorandum Opinion by Justice Burgess
• Decision Date: 26 October 2017
• Docket Number: No. 06-17-00032-CV,06-17-00032-CV
• Citation: Taylor v. Medtox Diagnostic, Inc., No. 06-17-00032-CV (Tex. App. Oct 26, 2017)
• Parties: RICHARD OWEN TAYLOR, Appellant v. MEDTOX DIAGNOSTIC, INC., MEDTOX SCIENTIFIC, INC., AND MEDTOX LABORATORIES, INC., Appellees

RICHARD OWEN TAYLOR, Appellant v. MEDTOX DIAGNOSTIC, INC., MEDTOX SCIENTIFIC, INC.,AND MEDTOX LABORATORIES, INC., Appellees

No. 06-17-00032-CV

Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

Date Submitted: August 17, 2017

October 26, 2017

On Appeal from the 202nd District Court Bowie County, Texas

Trial Court No. 12C0709-202

Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Burgess MEMORANDUM OPINION

While serving a forty-year prison sentence, Richard Owen Taylor failed a prison-administered drug test. As a result, the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) demoted his prisoner status and forfeited his good time credit. Taylor thereafter filed a lawsuit against Medtox Diagnostic, Inc., Medtox Scientific, Inc., and Medtox Laboratories, Inc. (Medtox), the alleged manufacturers and distributors of the drug-testing device which revealed positive results for opiates in Taylor's system. Taylor alleged negligence claims against Medtox, as well as claims of fraudulent non-disclosure and misrepresentation. Medtox moved for summary judgment on Taylor's negligence claims, and the trial court granted the motion. On appeal, Taylor claims that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on his claims of fraudulent non-disclosure and misrepresentation. Because the trial court's error in granting summary judgment on the entirety of Taylor's claims was harmless, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

I. Background

Taylor was convicted of murder in January 1998 and was sentenced to forty years' imprisonment. In November 2011, Taylor failed a prison-administered drug test, having tested positive for opiates (Drug Test Offense). As a result, the TDCJ commenced disciplinary proceedings against Taylor, and a hearing was conducted. Taylor was found guilty of the Drug Test Offense and appealed the decision, claiming that the test was faulty. This appeal resulted in a finding that there was sufficient evidence to support the guilty verdict. In a further appeal, Taylor claimed that the test results were inaccurate. A review of this appeal resulted in the finding that"[t]he disciplinary charge was appropriate for the offense and the guilty verdict was supported by a preponderance of the evidence."

Having exhausted his administrative remedies, Taylor sued Medtox, claiming its testing device was faulty, among other things.¹ In his most recent petition, Taylor claimed that Medtox negligently (1) sold and distributed the drug-testing device in the absence of operating contracts, (2) shipped the drug-testing device without climate control, (3) distributed the drug-testing device without requiring TDCJ employees to satisfy the Medtox training and certification program, (4) manufactured and distributed the drug-testing device prior to completing studies regarding the efficacy and accuracy of the device and the reactivity of the device to over-the-counter medications, and (5) generated and distributed package inserts which misrepresent the efficacy and accuracy of the device. Taylor further alleged that Medtox misrepresented that the drug-testing device complied with Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) standards, that it fraudulently concealed information regarding the device's true accuracy, and misrepresented the device's accuracy ratings.²

Medtox filed a motion for traditional and no-evidence summary judgment aimed solely at Taylor's negligence claims.³ In his response to the summary judgment motion, Taylor claimed, among other things, "Defendants filed a hybrid motion for summary judgment challenging only the negligence theories. . . . Defendants do not challenge the misrepresentation and fraud claims made against them." Taylor further complained that the trial court was not permitted to grant summary judgment on grounds not presented in the motion. He therefore claimed that, because the motion for summary judgment only challenged his negligence claims, Medtox was not entitled to summary judgment relief on his remaining claims of misrepresentation and fraud. The trial court granted Medtox's motion for summary judgment, and it "ORDERED that judgment on the claims asserted in Plaintiff's Fourth Amended Petition [be] entered in favor of Defendants, and . . . that Plaintiff, Richard Taylor, take nothing on his claims."

II. Standard of Review

"We review a grant of summary judgment de novo." Nall v. Plunkett, 404 S.W.3d 552, 555 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam). In a traditional motion for summary judgment, the movant must state specific grounds for the motion. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). Where the movant for a traditional summary judgment motion is a defendant, the movant must conclusively negate at least one essential element of the plaintiff's cause of action. KCM Fin. LLC v. Bradshaw, 457 S.W.3d 70, 80 (Tex. 2015). In a no-evidence summary-judgment motion, the movant contends that noevidence supports one or more essential elements of a claim for which the non-movant would bear the burden of proof at trial. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). "The motion must state the elements as to which there is no evidence." Id. Unless the non-movant raises a genuine issue of material fact on each challenged element, the trial court must grant the motion. Hamilton v. Wilson, 249 S.W.3d 425, 426 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i)).⁴

III. Analysis

Because summary judgment may only be granted on grounds expressly asserted in the summary-judgment motion, TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c), it is reversible error, as a general rule, to grant summary judgment on a claim not addressed in the motion. G & H Towing Co. v. Magee, 347 S.W.3d 293, 297 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam). We have recognized a limited exception to this rule when a reversal of "the summary judgment would be meaningless because the omitted cause of action is precluded as a matter of law." Withrow v. State Farm Lloyds, 990 S.W.2d 432, 438 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, pet. denied). As summarized by the Texas Supreme Court,

Several appellate courts have recognized a limited exception to this general rule. These courts have affirmed summary judgments, even though the underlying motion omitted one of multiple causes of action, when the omitted ground was intertwined with, and precluded by, a ground addressed in the motion. See, e.g., Zarzosa v. Flynn, 266 S.W.3d 614, 621 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2008, no pet.) (holding reversal would be meaningless because questioned recovery precluded as a matter of law); Withrow, (same); Vogel v. Travelers Indem. Co., 966 S.W.2d 748, 754-55 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (same); Cissne v. Robertson, 782 S.W.2d 912, 918 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, writ denied) (same). One authority states the exception as follows: "If the defendant has conclusively disproved an ultimate fact or element which is common to all causes of action alleged, or the unaddressed causes of action are derivative of the addressed cause of action, the summary judgment may be affirmed." TIMOTHYPATTON, SUMMARY JUDGMENTS IN TEXAS: PRACTICE, PROCEDURE AND REVIEW § 3.06[3] at 3-20 (3d ed. 2010) (collecting cases).

Magee, 347 S.W.3d at 297.

In recognizing this general exception, the court held that error in granting summary judgment on a claim not addressed in a summary judgment motion is harmless "when the omitted cause of action is precluded as a matter of law by other grounds raised in the case." Id. at 297-98. We must, therefore, determine whether the trial court's error in granting summary judgment on grounds not addressed in the motion was harmless.⁵ See id. In this regard, we recognize that "a very tight fit" is required "between what was proved or disproved in the motion and what elements the unaddressed claim, as it was alleged, required: otherwise, the exception could swallow the rule." Wilson v. Davis, 305 S.W.3d 57, 73 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (citations omitted).

To determine whether Taylor's fraud-by-nondisclosure and misrepresentation claims are precluded as a matter of law by the trial court's determination that Medtox was not negligent, we initially compare the elements of negligence and the elements of the unaddressed claims. A negligence cause of action consists of "the existence of a legal duty, a breach of that duty, and damages proximately caused by the breach." HIS Cedars Treatment Ctr. of DeSoto, Tex., Inc. v. Mason, 143 S.W.3d 794, 798 (Tex. 2004). The trial court necessarily found that one or more ofthese elements was without evidentiary support, or that Medtox conclusively negated at least one of these elements.⁶ We turn next to the unaddressed claims.

A. Fraud by Nondisclosure

To prove a claim for fraud by nondisclosure, the claimant must prove the following elements: (1) a failure by the defendant to disclose facts to the plaintiff, (2) a duty on the part of the defendant to disclose those facts, (3) that the facts were material, (4) that the defendant knew the plaintiff was ignorant of the facts and the plaintiff did not have an equal opportunity to discover the facts, (5) that the defendant was deliberately silent in the face of a duty to speak, (6) that by failing to disclose the facts, the defendant induced the plaintiff to take some action or refrain from acting, (7) that the plaintiff relied on the nondisclosure, and (8) that the plaintiff was injured as a result of acting without that knowledge. Bazon v. Munoz, 444 S.W.3d 110, 119 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.).

Taylor's fraud-by-nondisclosure claim is not derivative of the negligence claim, as was true in Magee. There, the Texas Supreme Court found that the appellate court "erred in remanding the vicarious liability claim while simultaneously holding that the [co-worker] had not committed a tort." Magee, 347 S.W.3d at 295. It also does not appear that the elements of Taylor's fraud-by-nondisclosure claim are sufficiently intertwined with the elements of his negligence claim suchthat the non-disclosure claim is precluded. See id...