Taylor v. Meek, A-4853

CourtSupreme Court of Texas
Citation154 Tex. 305,276 S.W.2d 787
Docket NumberNo. A-4853,A-4853
PartiesEdith Atha TAYLOR et vir., Petitioners, v. Lenton MEEK, Respondent.
Decision Date12 January 1955

G. C. Harris, Greenville, for petitioners.

Martin & Bailey, Dallas, for respondent.

WILSON, Justice.

This is a suit brought by a father as plaintiff against maternal grandparents as defendants to change the custody of a girl four years old. The mother has remarried and does not seek custody, apparently agreeing to her parents having custody. Prior to this suit the parents of the child were divorced in Dallas County and custody was then awarded to the maternal grandparents who were not parties to that divorce case. That judgment became final. Subsequently, this suit was filed in Dallas County and then moved by plea of privilege to Hunt County. The judgment on the plea of privilege was not appealed.

The trial court submitted this case to a jury which found in answer to Special Issue No. 1 that subsequent to the divorce decree 'there had been a material change in the condition of' the father 'affecting his suitability to have the care and custody of the minor child.' In Special Issue No. 2 the jury found that the 'best interest of the child would be best subserved by awarding her care and custody to the plaintiff.'

The trial judge then entered a judgment reciting that he was 'wholly in disagreement with the jury's verdict' and since he was 'not bound thereby' he was making and filing his own finding of fact 'based upon the evidence, wholly independent of any such answers and findings of the jury.' He then found that the interest and welfare of the minor child would be best served by 'awarding its custody' to the maternal grandparents. The father's motion for judgment was overruled.

The father appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals and secured a reversal and rendition of the trial court's judgment in his favor, 269 S.W.2d 545, 547. The reasoning of the Court of Civil Appeals is as follows:

(1) '* * * it is the burden of a parent seeking custody of his minor child to show a change of conditions such as would require modification of the prior decree if the best interests of the child are not to be injuriously affected. * * *'

(2) There is a presumption that it is to the best interest of the child for a parent to have custody unless 'it is affirmatively demonstrated that the best interests of the child require that the parent be deprived of its custody.'

(3) The natural parent need only show 'any change of circumstances demonstrative of the parent's improved condition or fitness as a custodian, any change of circumstances demonstrative of the fact that the other person is less well fitted or situated as custodian, or any change of circumstances relating to the existing custody which is injurious to the best interest of the child.'

(4) The establishment of any one of these changes of condition 'reopens' the case and it is then tried as though there had been no other decree.

(5) Thereupon the burden shifts to the party contesting the natural parent to 'demonstrate that the best interests of the child require that the parent be deprived of the custody' which in turn requires a finding that the natural parent is unfit to have custody; and, therefore,

(6) In the case at bar, the facts establishing changed conditions as a matter of law and there being no finding that the father was unfit, the father was entitled to custody as a matter of law.

The effect of this holding is that after custody has been adjudicated to someone other than a natural parent, the natural parent need only prove a change of conditions and that he is a fit person. Upon doing so, the natural parent becomes entitled as a matter of law to the custody. We do not believe this statement of the law correctly interprets the reasoning of the following line of cases: Dunn v. Jackson, Tex.Com.App., 231 S.W. 351; Duckworth v. Thompson, Tex.Com.App., 1931, 37 S.W.2d 731; Sawyer v. Bezner, Tex.Civ.App., 204 S.W.2d 19, writ of error refused, n. r. e.; Taylor v. Taylor, Tex.Civ.App., 1931, 42 S.W.2d 455, no writ history; Robinson v. Wampler, Tex.Civ.App., 1947, 202 S.W.2d 500, no writ history; Miller v. Banks, Tex.Civ.App., 1926, 280 S.W. 301, writ of error dism.; Cecacci v. Martilli, Tex.Civ.App. Galveston, 1921, 235 S.W. 951, writ of error refused.

Here the trial court filed findings of fact in which he found:

(1) The child had resided in the home of her grandparents for three years and four months, the greater part of her life.

(2) Since the entry of the divorce decree 'there has been no material change in the conditions, surroundings and circumstances of said child or in the home of the defendants.'

(3) Since the entry of the divorce decree 'there has not been a material change in plaintiff's condition such as to warrant a change of custody.'

(4) The grandparents, each forty two years of age, had an eight-year-old daughter in their home in addition to the custody of the child at issue at bar.

(5) The child 'is well adapted to the home of the defendants' and 'is happy and well cared for in all respects.'

(6) The father is a single man living with his mother. His work keeps him away from home during a great portion of the daylight hours, and during this time the care of the child would fall to his mother (the child's paternal grandmother).

The question of whether a trial court has abused its discretion is one of law requiring an appraisal of the facts. 'The trial court must look, in the light of all the circumstances, to the best interest of the child. With the opportunity to observe the appearance and demeanor of the witnesses, to weigh their testimony, and evaluate the virtues of parties, no one is in a position to do this better than the trial court.' Valentine v. Valentine, Tex.Civ.App., 1947, 203 S.W.2d 693, 696.

It is undisputed that subsequent to the first judgment plaintiff has established a home with his mother, and under Classic v. Burgess, Tex.Civ.App., 1953, 258 S.W.2d 339, no writ history, this proof seems to require as a matter of law a finding of changed conditions upon the part of plaintiff where at the first trial he did not maintain a home. But whether or not such a change warrants a change of custody is a question within the discretion of the trial court, Son v. McConnell, Tex.Civ.App., 1950, 228 S.W.2d 290, error refused; Wade v. Shaughnessy, Tex.Civ.App., 1950, 231 S.W.2d 494, error refused; and we find no abuse of discretion here.

The father's point one in the Court of Civil Appeals attacks the trial court's finding that it was to the child's best interests for her to remain with her...

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145 cases
  • In re Lee
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • September 27, 2013
    ...testimony, and evaluate the virtues of parties, no one is in a position to do this better than the trial court.” Taylor v. Meek, 154 Tex. 305, 276 S.W.2d 787, 790 (Tex.1955) (quoting Valentine v. Valentine, 203 S.W.2d 693, 696 (Tex.Civ.App.–Amarillo 1947, no writ)). We must not second-guess......
  • Tracie F. v. Francisco D.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US
    • September 21, 2015
    ...v. Wade, 273 Ga. 587, 544 S.E.2d 99 (2001) ; Matter of Guardianship of W.L., 2015 Ark. 289, 467 S.W.3d 129 (2015) ; Taylor v. Meek, 154 Tex. 305, 276 S.W.2d 787 (1955). However, this presumption may be rebutted generally by unfitness, a showing that custody in the natural parent would bring......
  • In re C.J.C.
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • June 26, 2020
    ...asserts that we previously rejected requiring such a presumption in modification proceedings, relying on two cases: In re V.L.K.63 and Taylor v. Meek .64 Neither case, however, involved a modification proceeding in which a fit parent had been named the child's managing conservator in the or......
  • In re T.D.C.
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • November 21, 2002
    ...not provide for a parental presumption in modification suits as in original custody suits. Id. at 342-43; see also Taylor v. Meek, 154 Tex. 305, 276 S.W.2d 787, 790 (1955) (holding parental presumption does not control in modification suits). According to the Supreme Court of Texas, the pub......
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