Taylor v. E. Mich. Univ.

Decision Date30 November 2020
Docket NumberCASE NO. 18-10268
PartiesINDIA TAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. EASTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

HONORABLE DENISE PAGE HOOD

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [#28]
I. INTRODUCTION
A. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 23, 2018, Plaintiff India Taylor ("Taylor") filed a Complaint of Employment Discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972) and the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act ("ELCRA"), in which she alleged that she was wrongfully terminated on the basis of race and religion. Taylor also filed a retaliation claim based on her activities with the Michigan Department of Civil Rights ("MDCR") and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). This Court consolidated both lawsuits into the instant matter on July 2, 2019. [ECF No. 25] Before the Court is Defendant Eastern Michigan University's ("Defendant")Motion for Summary Judgment. [ECF No. 28] On October 30, 2019, the Court extended Taylor's time to file a response. Taylor filed a Response to this Motion on November 1, 2019. [ECF No. 32] In this Motion, Defendant argues that there are no genuine issues of material fact because Defendant's actions were for "legitimate non-discriminatory and non-retaliatory business reasons."

B. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Defendant is a public, mid-size research university, located in Ypsilanti, Michigan. Taylor began working at Eastern Michigan University ("EMU") in 2010. Taylor is an African-American, Christian woman who was previously employed by EMU. She held various positions at EMU from March 2010 to March 2018. Taylor was first enrolled as a Senior Secretary, which is a CS05 level position. All of Taylor's employment roles were clerical positions at the CS05 level. Taylor's employment at EMU was governed by EMU's Employee Work Rules and the Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") between EMU and UAW Local 1975 (the "Union"), which was effective from July 1, 2016-June 30, 2019.

In 2015, Taylor went on educational leave. In November 2016, Taylor returned to EMU upon successfully applying and interviewing for an Admissions Processor Position in the Department of Special Education. [ECF No. 32, Pg.ID 271] While in this position Taylor repeatedly clashed with the Department Head,Dr. Janet Fisher ("Dr. Fisher") and the office secretary, Dawn Leighton ("Leighton"). [Id.] Taylor alleges that Leighton and her did not get along because "she was always speaking under her breath" and "emailed [Taylor] a link" to watch President Trump's inauguration. [Id. at 293] Taylor further asserts that Dr. Fisher and Leighton "nitpick[ed]" her work and claimed it was "unacceptable." [Id. at 273] On February 17, 2017, Taylor had an incident involving Dr. Fisher. [Id. at Pg.ID 272] Dr. Fisher and Taylor had a disagreement about Taylor's timesheet. [Id.]

The facts alleged by Taylor are as follows. Taylor alleges that Dr. Fisher asserted that Taylor's time entries conflicted with Leighton's recollection. Taylor asked, "are you going to take Dawns [sic] word over mines [sic]?" [Id.] Dr. Fisher alerted Taylor that she would not sign her paycheck unless Taylor edited her entries. [Id.] Taylor subsequently realized she would not get paid without Dr. Fisher's signature and exclaimed, "the Devil Is A Liar." [Id.] Upon hearing Taylor's statement, Dr. Fisher suggested that Taylor leave Dr. Fisher's office and return to her desk. [Id.]

When Taylor returned to her desk she began playing gospel music. [Id.] Dr. Fisher told Taylor that her music was too loud. [Id.] Taylor acknowledges that Dr. Fisher admitted that it was "nice music" but that it could not be played in the office. [Id.] As Taylor moved to turn down the music, Dr. Fisher stated that shewould call campus security if she did not turn the music down faster. [Id. at 273] When Dr. Fisher went to her office to call campus security, Taylor told Dr. Fisher that she "was going to the union." [Id.]

According to Defendant, Taylor had accumulated three disciplinary points through February 2017. [ECF No. 28, Pg.ID 116] Two points resulted from excessive tardiness and attendance issues and the other resulted from past employment issues. [Id.] Following Defendant's investigation into the February 2017 incident with Dr. Fisher, Taylor accumulated two additional disciplinary points, which led to five total points. [Id. at 116-17] Under the CBA, five points results in an automatic dismissal. However, by working with the Union, Taylor was able to reduce her points from five to three and was placed on "involuntary recall status for recall to a different position when available." [ECF No. 28, Pg.ID 118] After the investigation, Taylor asserts that she received an email "telling [her] to resign or retire." [ECF No. 32, Pg.ID 275]

Taylor's next position at EMU was in the School of Business with Dr. Hershey. Taylor asserts that Dr. Hershey made her life difficult by "focusing on [her]" and incorrectly claimed that she was not punctual. [Id. at 276] Taylor further claims that Dr. Hershey was "busy focusing on social media." [Id.] According to Defendant, Taylor was eventually removed from Dr. Hershey's staff because of issues she had computing and inputting lecturers' time. [ECF No. 28, Pg.ID 120]During Taylor's deposition she admitted that EMU "disqualified [her] for the position . . . because . . . the lecturers weren't going to get the correct pay." [Id.] Upon leaving Dr. Hershey's staff, Taylor was returned to recall status because there were no open positions available for her in other departments. [Id.]

In October 2017, Taylor received notice that she was being recalled to a CS05 position as an Admissions Processor. Taylor responded within the required three-day period. However, EMU rescinded the offer because EMU was considering switching the role from CS05 to CS06. EMU also asserts that the employee designated to train Taylor went on a leave of absence. Had EMU hired Taylor, there would have been no one available to train her. Following EMU's rescission, Taylor met with EMU's Office of Diversity and Affirmative Action to discuss the offer revocation.

Taylor was later recalled again on Friday, March 2, 2018, for a CS05 Admissions Processor position. Taylor failed to respond to the offer within the three-day period proscribed by the CBA. Taylor did respond on March 8, 2018. Taylor claims that the U.S. post office did not deliver the letter until March 7, 2018, and that EMU sent the letter on a Friday to intentionally ensure she would not respond in time. Taylor now brings her claims alleging racial and religious discrimination under Title VII and the ELCRA.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review

Pro se complaints are held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). However, the Supreme Court has "never suggested procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel." McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113, 113 S.Ct. 1980, 124 L.Ed.2d 21 (1993). Indeed, a pro se litigant "must conduct enough investigation to draft pleadings that meet the requirements of the federal rules." Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 50, 104 S.Ct. 2924, 82 L.Ed.2d 36 (1984). Courts have refused to excuse pro se litigants who failed to follow basic procedural requirements such as meeting "readily comprehended" court filing deadlines. E.g., Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir.1991); Eglinton v. Loyer, 340 F.3d 331, 335 (6th Cir.2003). Likewise, courts have also refused to grant special or preferential treatment to pro se parties in responding to summary judgment motions. Brock v. Hendershott, 840 F.2d 339, 343 (6th Cir.1988).

Summary judgment is appropriate in cases where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact andthat the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is appropriate. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F.2d 1086, 1093 (6th Cir. 1974). The Court must consider the admissible evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Sagan v. United States of Am., 342 F.3d 493, 497 (6th Cir. 2003).

Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures provides that the court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The presence of factual disputes will preclude granting summary judgment only if the disputes are genuine and concern material facts. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" only if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. Although the court must view admissible evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, where "the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Summaryjudgment must be entered against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to any material fact," since a complete failure of proof concerning an...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT