Taylor v. Mitchell
| Decision Date | 03 March 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:O1CV601.,1:O1CV601. |
| Citation | 296 F.Supp.2d 784 |
| Parties | Michael TAYLOR, Petitioner v. Betty MITCHELL, Warden, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
Jennifer P. Hite, Pamela J. Prude-Smithers, Office of the Public Defender, State of Ohio, Columbus, OH, for Michael Taylor, Petitioner.
Carol A. Ellensohn, Heather L. Gosselin, Office of the Attorney General, State of Ohio, Columbus, OH, Michael L. Collyer Office of the Attorney General, State of Ohio, Cleveland, OH, for Margaret Bagley, Respondent.
This is a capital habeas corpus case arising from the petitioner's conviction of one count of aggravated murder with specifications. The petitioner has exhausted his state court remedies.
For the reasons that follow, I find that all but one of the petitioner's contentions is without merit. With regard to his contention that the evidence was insufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated murder, I, however, agree. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus shall, accordingly, be granted.
The following summary of the evidence from the petitioner's trial is taken from the opinion of the Ohio Supreme Court affirming the petitioner's conviction on direct appeal. State v. Taylor, 78 Ohio St.3d 15, 15-17, 676 N.E.2d 82 (1997).
On November 24, 1992, defendant-appellant, Michael N. Taylor, shot and killed Marion "Donny" Alexander in a bar. Despite appellant's self-defense claims, the jury found prior calculation and design, convicted appellant of aggravated murder, and recommended the death penalty.
Between 10:00 and 11:00 p.m. on November 24, 1992, appellant, his girlfriend, Sandra Paul, and David Roseborough arrived at the Club Seville, a bar in Garfield Heights, Ohio. Shortly thereafter, Marion "Donny" Alexander came in. Alexander, a regular in the bar, greeted Darlene Young-blood and Debra Lymore, who both worked at the bar, as well as Denise Shephard, another regular. They all sat around the main bar, but Alexander later took a seat alone at the nearby piano bar. Alexander did not talk with Paul, whom he had formerly dated, nor to appellant, whom he had previously met.
According to Shephard, Alexander acted quietly, and did not complain to or argue with appellant that night. However, appellant, Paul, and Roseborough described Alexander as loud and boisterous. Appellant and Paul claimed Alexander stared at them when they were dancing that night soon after they arrived at the club. According to Roseborough, Alexander flashed a large roll of bills and said, "If a nig* * * ain't getting it like this, he ain't suppose[d] to be in here." Paul recalled Alexander saying, "Any nig* * * [who] did not have any money, wasn't shit." Appellant believed Alexander was trying to humiliate him.
Later, some twenty to thirty minutes after appellant, Paul, and Roseborough had arrived, Paul went to the jukebox to play music. Alexander asked her to play a song for him. Appellant, still seated at the main bar, objected to Alexander's request. Youngblood testified that appellant told Alexander, Roseborough recalled appellant said,
According to Youngblood, Alexander replied, According to Lymore, Alexander replied, Appellant again told Alexander, "Put your own goddamn dollar in there." Alexander and appellant glared at each other for a "couple of seconds," but did not approach each other. Then Paul walked back to where appellant was sitting.
According to appellant's friends, Alexander told appellant after the jukebox incident that "this is his bar, and he do[es] what * * * he wants to do, [and] says what * * * he wants," and if appellant had "a problem with anything, I'm saying you can see me today, tomorrow." Alexander also allegedly cursed appellant as a "punk, hip mother fucker." It was asserted by the defense that when Paul was leaving the bar, Alexander said, "Bitch, * * * [I told] you not to bring this mother fucker up here to my bar."
When Paul got back to her seat, appellant told her, Paul asked, "Can I drink my drink first * * * [and] hear my music." Appellant told her he did not "have time for this `Kid's shit,' Let's go." Paul put her coat on and left the bar. Roseborough and appellant started to follow her, but Roseborough changed direction and walked over behind Alexander to the jukebox. Appellant stopped a little past Alexander. Roseborough said to appellant, "Look out," and Alexander stood up and raised his hands. Alexander told appellant, "Don't start no shit and it won't be no shit."
Appellant replied, "What did you say, mother fucker," pulled out a semiautomatic 9 mm pistol, and shot Alexander several times. After being shot three times, Alexander fell face down and tried to crawl away. Then appellant walked closer to Alexander and fired three or four more shots into his back. He left the scene in a taxi, calling out, "Self-defense." Later he surrendered voluntarily to the Garfield Heights Police.
The single Count in the indictment charged aggravated murder, defined as a purposeful killing with prior calculation and design. The Count contained three death specifications: 1) the offender had a firearm on or about his person or under his control while committing the offense charged; 2) the offender was convicted on April 8, 1974, of the purposeful killing or purposeful attempt to kill another; and, 3) the offender had previously been convicted of or pleaded guilty to an aggravated felony, to wit, murder.
Trial lasted from April 20 through April 26, 1993. On April 27, 1993, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as to the sole count and also found that the three specifications under Count One had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
At the mitigation hearing the petitioner presented evidence that he suffers from paranoid personality disorder. The petitioner also presented evidence from his minister, family members and a co-worker. Petitioner made an unsworn statement explaining his involvement in the crime. On April 29, 1993, the jury returned with a recommendation that petitioner be sentenced to death. The court followed the jury's recommendation, making an independent finding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Petitioner was sentenced to death on May 28, 1993.
The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. State v. Taylor, 78 Ohio St.3d 15, 676 N.E.2d 82 (1997). The United States Supreme Court denied the petitioner's petition for a writ of certiorari. Taylor v. Ohio, 522 U.S. 851, 118 S.Ct. 143, 139 L.Ed.2d 90 (1997).
On September 23, 1996, the petitioner filed a post-conviction relief petition in the trial court. That court found that many of petitioner's claims had been raised on direct appeal and that petitioner had received a fair trial and was properly convicted. The trial court dismissed the petitioner's post-conviction petition on February 2, 1998.
Petitioner appealed the denial of his post-conviction petition to the court of appeals, which affirmed the trial court's decision on November 19, 1999. On March 15, 2000, the Ohio Supreme Court declined to accept petitioner's appeal for review on the basis that the petitioner had presented no substantial constitutional question.
On January 19, 2001, the petitioner filed a second post-conviction relief petition. Finding that petitioner was not unavoidably delayed from discovering the facts asserted in the petition, the trial court dismissed the petition on August 24, 2001.
Petitioner appealed the denial of his second post-conviction petition. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision on May 30, 2002. On October 2, 2002, the Ohio Supreme Court declined to accept petitioner's appeal for review on the basis that it did not involve any substantial constitutional question.
The petitioner's habeas corpus petition asserts nine claims for relief, which will be discussed in the order in which they appear in the petition.
The petitioner first claims that counsel were ineffective for failing to obtain a ballistics expert during the guilt phase of trial. A ballistics expert, petitioner claims, would have been able to corroborate petitioner's self-defense testimony during trial by demonstrating that the wounds petitioner inflicted on Alexander were consistent with petitioner's account of the murder.
This claim is procedurally defaulted. Petitioner first raised this issue as his eighth claim in the amended successor post-conviction petition. Because this issue involves evidence dehors or outside the record, it should have been raised in the first post-conviction relief petition. State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967). Petitioner's attempt to raise this issue in his amended successor post-conviction petition was denied on the procedural ground that he could not meet any of the requirements enabling him to comply with Ohio's second or successive post-conviction petition statute, O.R.C. § 2953.23. Thus, that court did not address the merits of this claim.
Petitioner alleges he may overcome the procedural default...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
White v. Warden
...with Ohio law, in that a jury may consider flight as indicative of consciousness of guilt.Id. at *7; see also Taylor v. Mitchell, 296 F. Supp. 2d 784, 809-10 (N.D. Ohio 2003), declined to follow on other grounds by Williams v. Anderson, 460 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 2006). Claim three fails to pro......
-
Moreland v. Bradshaw
... ... from those in a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from Supreme Court precedent. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). A state court's decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established ... Mitchell, 492 F.3d 680, 698 (6th Cir.2007), citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968). The Sixth Amendment's guarantee ... ...
-
Williams v. Anderson
...Davis v. Mitchell, 318 F.3d 682 (6th Cir.2003). Hartman v. Bagley, 333 F.Supp.2d 632, 671 n. 16 (N.D.Ohio 2004); Taylor v. Mitchell, 296 F.Supp.2d 784, 813-14 (N.D.Ohio 2003). Should Ohio again choose to seek the death penalty against Petitioner, they should be equipped to impose it in a ma......
-
Brinkley v. Houk
...2004), aff'd,474 F.3d 236 (6th Cir.2007), cert. denied,552 U.S. 1028, 128 S.Ct. 626, 169 L.Ed.2d 404 (2007).; Taylor v. Mitchell, 296 F.Supp.2d 784, 814 (N.D.Ohio, 2003). The court's jury instruction on reasonable doubt was not improper.Tenth Ground for Relief In his tenth ground for relief......