Taylor v. Nat'l Invs.
| Decision Date | 02 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | C. A. 17-117 WES |
| Parties | TRENDA TAYLOR, and THE RHODE ISLAND COMMISSION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, Plaintiffs, v. NATIONAL INVESTMENTS, LTD., ET AL. Defendants. |
| Court | United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. District of Rhode Island |
Plaintiff Trenda Taylor, joined by the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, brings claims under the Fair Housing Act and related statutes, [1] alleging that Defendants discriminated against her because of her race, and then retaliated against her when she complained about that discrimination. Am. Compl ¶ 1, ECF No. 2. Before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment, ECF Nos. 47, 50, 52. Specifically Plaintiff has moved for partial summary judgment as to liability on her claims of retaliation (Counts III and IV) and her claim that Defendants violated the regulations implementing 42 U.S.C. 1437f (Count VII). Pl. Mot. Summ. J. 1, ECF No. 47. Defendants deny any wrongdoing. They have moved for summary judgment on all counts and for Plaintiffs to pay their attorneys' fees. Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. 1, ECF No. 52.
For the reasons explained below, Plaintiffs' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment, ECF Nos. 47, 50, are DENIED. Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and for Attorneys' Fees, ECF No. 52, is GRANTED as to Count VII, but otherwise DENIED. I. Background
A. Section 8 Housing Program
Ms. Taylor resides at the Elms Apartments, where her rent is subsidized through the Federal Project-Based Section 8 Rental Assistance Program (Project-Based Program). Pl.'s Statement Undisputed Facts (“Pl.'s SUF”) ¶¶ 1, 15-20, ECF No. 48; Defs.' Statement Further Undisputed Facts ( ) ¶ 234, ECF No. 51-36. As a beneficiary of the program, she must pay a designated percentage of her income or a minimum rent of twenty-five dollars, whichever is higher. 24 C.F.R. §§ 5.628, 5.630 (2022). Under a hardship exemption, her rent can be further reduced to zero. Pl.'s SUF ¶ 89; 24 C.F.R. § 5.630(b). The government then supplements this contribution according to contracts with private property owners, like the corporate Defendants here, making them recipients of federal funds for the purposes of Title VI of the Civil Rights act of 1964. See Pl.'s SUF ¶¶ 17-21.
According to both Plaintiff's lease and the governing regulations, Defendant National Investments, which owns and operates the Elms, must determine her required monthly rent contribution each year through a process called Annual Recertification. Pl.'s SUF ¶¶ 24, 27; Defs.' SFUF ¶ 234; 24 C.F.R. §§ 5.657(b), 880.603(c). Should Plaintiff's income decrease midyear or her family composition change, she is entitled to request an Interim Recertification to adjust her monthly rent contributions. Pl.'s SUF ¶¶ 26-27; Defs.' SFUF ¶ 236; 24 C.F.R. § 5.657(c).
B. Ms. Taylor's Interim Recertification
In 2015, Ms. Taylor's annual recertification established her rent to be $129 per month, beginning March 1 of that year. Pl.'s SUF ¶ 25; Defs.' SFUF ¶ 235. Two months later, she lost her job. Pl.'s SUF ¶ 28; Defs.' SFUF 237. On June 9, 2015, Plaintiff met with Ms. Heather Paschoal, an employee of National Investments, and Defendant Leesa McCarthy, property manager of the Elms, to answer questions and fill out the necessary paperwork for an interim recertification. Pl.'s SUF ¶¶ 35-36, 47; Defs.' SFUF ¶ 247. A dispute arose over Plaintiff's answer as to how she intended to pay rent. Pl.'s SUF ¶¶ 39-51; Defs.' SFUF ¶¶ 249-250. Plaintiff recorded her view of the incident on one of the forms, writing: Pl.'s SUF ¶ 61. Defendants also memorialized their version this meeting in writing through a “Memo to File” written by Ms. Paschoal. Id. ¶ 67. That memo describes Ms. Pachoal's attempt to convince Plaintiff to fill out the form again, without the written comments, as well as Defendants' concern that Ms. Taylor had an undisclosed bank account or other source of income. Id. ¶¶ 69-70; Defs.' Opp'n Pls.' Mot. Summ. J., Ex. E., ECF No. 51-6. Plaintiff refused the new form and submitted a notarized copy of the original the next day, comments included. Pl.'s SUF ¶¶ 70-71. This conflict was only the beginning, as various disputes between the parties continued throughout the summer.[2]
C. Annual Recertification and its aftermath
In November 2015, Plaintiff met with Ms. Pashoal again, this time for her Annual Recertification. Pl.'s SUF ¶ 100; Defs.' SFUF 265. Ms. Tayor's rent had been neither reduced nor paid since June. Pl.'s SUF ¶¶ 34, 109. At the meeting, she again reiterated the claims of racial discrimination, both verbally and on the forms themselves, writing: Id. ¶¶ 103-104. Ms. Paschoal terminated the interview, allegedly after Ms. Taylor attempted to pull paperwork out of her hands while accusing her of color discrimination. Defs.' SFUF ¶¶ 270-271.
Four days after the unsuccessful Annual Recertification, National Investments sent Plaintiff a Notice of Non-compliance which gave her thirty days to cure various purported lease violations, lest she be evicted. Pl.'s SUF ¶¶ 110-111; Am. Compl. Ex. Q, ECF No. 2-1. Those listed violations included writing “irrelevant and inappropriate comments on various HUD-mandated forms, ” problems with the repair and cleanliness of her apartment revealed by a recent inspection, and an illicitly kept pet cat. Am. Compl. Ex. Q. On November 18, 2015, National Investments filed an eviction action based on the November Non-compliance notice and previous demand letter. Pl.'s SUF ¶ 112.
On December 4, 2015, Ms. Taylor entered the Elms Apartment's management office without an appointment seeking to complete the paperwork for her Annual Recertification and inquiring as to why her rent had never been reduced after she lost her job. Id. ¶ 118.
She secretly recorded a portion of the interaction. Id. ¶ 199. In the conversation, Defendant Leesa McCarthy made clear she would not be allowed to complete her paperwork so long as she was accusing the staff of racial harassment and discrimination, and eventually convinced Plaintiff to leave on the promise that she would call her to schedule a later appointment. Pl.'s SUF, Ex. 14, ECF No. 48-15. After Plaintiff left, Ms. McCarthy called the police, complaining of trespass and describing Plaintiff's behavior as “volatile and threatening.” Pl.'s SUF, Ex. 15, ECF No. 48-16. She sought a temporary restraining order which would bar Plaintiff from the management office. Id.
On January 19, 2016, Plaintiff filed a “housing discrimination charge” with the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights (RICHR). Pl.'s SUF ¶ 135. Six months later, RICHR sent a probable cause letter outlining its preliminary findings to Defendants and seeking evidence from them. Amend. Compl. Ex. W, ECF No. 2-1. On August 12, 2016 RICHR issued a determination concluding “the evidence submitted to the Commission supports the complainant's allegations that she was treated in a less favorable manner than similarly-situated white tenants” and that Plaintiff “is now in danger of losing her housing as a result of discrimination and retaliation by the [Defendants].” Pl.'s SUF Ex. 19 at 7-8, ECF No. 48-20. It also concluded that Defendant McCarthy's account of the December 4 incident “is false, ” and that “Ms. McCarthy obtained a no contact order under false pretenses.” Id. at 7-8. RICHR joins this suit as a Plaintiff. Am. Compl. 1.
Defendants first two eviction actions against Plaintiff were consolidated and prosecuted for three years. Pl.'s SUF ¶¶ 112, 151, 170. On August 23, 2018, they were dismissed with prejudice by the Rhode Island District Court. Id. ¶ 170. Defendants' appeal from that decision was dismissed by the Rhode Island Superior Court on January 4, 2019. Id. ¶ 173. On December 21, 2020, Defendants filed a third eviction action against Plaintiff for non-payment of rent; it was dismissed with prejudice on February 18, 2021. Id. ¶¶ 175-176. II. LEGAL STANDARD
The Court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). An issue is “genuine” for purposes of the summary judgment standard “if the evidence of record permits a rational factfinder to resolve it in favor of either party.” Borges ex rel. S.M.B.W v. Serrano-Isern, 605 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2010). Similarly, a fact is “material” if its “existence or nonexistence has the potential to change the outcome of the suit.” Id. at 5.
The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis for its motion for summary judgment and identifying the portions of the pleadings, depositions answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits, if any, that demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The burden shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, with respect to each issue on which it would bear the burden of proof at trial, demonstrate that a trier of fact could reasonably resolve that issue in its favor. Id. at 325; DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 306 (1st Cir. 1997). On cross-motions the Court performs this analysis in both directions, asking “whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law on facts that are not disputed.” Barnes v. Fleet Nat'l Bank, N.A., 370 F.3d 164, 170 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting ...
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