Taylor v. Ne. Bradford Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 09 October 2014
• Docket Number: No. 125 C.D. 2014,125 C.D. 2014
• Citation: 101 A.3d 144
• Parties: Evelyn M. TAYLOR and Frank Taylor, Appellants v. NORTHEAST BRADFORD SCHOOL DISTRICT.
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

101 A.3d 144

Evelyn M. TAYLOR and Frank Taylor, Appellants

v.NORTHEAST BRADFORD SCHOOL DISTRICT.

No. 125 C.D. 2014

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted on Briefs Sept. 8, 2014.

Decided Oct. 9, 2014.

Shannon M. Pringle, Towanda, for appellant.

Richard A. Polachek, Wilkes–Barre, for appellee.

BEFORE: BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge, MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge, and JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge.

Opinion

OPINION BY Judge LEAVITT.

Evelyn M. Taylor (Taylor) appeals the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County (trial court) granting summary judgment to the Northeast Bradford School District (District) on a personal injury claim. The trial court held that Taylor's lawsuit did not fall within the real property exception to governmental immunity in what is commonly called the “Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act”¹ (Tort Claims Act) because her injury resulted from personalty, not realty. We reverse and remand.

The following facts are not in dispute. On December 20, 2008, Taylor attended a Christmas band concert in the gymnasium of the Northeast Bradford School. Before the concert began, a partition between two sections of the gym was partially opened to allow guests, including Taylor, to get to their seats. Once the concert began, the partition was closed to improve the acoustics in the gym. During the intermission, a door in the partition was opened to allow guests to walk to an area where raffle tickets were being sold. The door did not open to the floor; approximately one foot of the partition crossed the bottom of the doorway opening. This configuration required one to step over the partition to pass through the opening. Taylor, wishing to purchase a raffle ticket, followed a group of guests to the pocket door. Taylor did not make the step and fell, which caused her to suffer two broken front teeth, various facial cuts and bruising.

In a December 5, 2012, deposition, Taylor provided more information about her injury. She testified that she had been to concerts in the District's gymnasium on at least two other occasions, although she could not remember if she had ever walked through the pocket door before. In response to questioning, Taylor explained that “I saw a lady go through this [pocket door], so I followed her.” Reproduced Record (R.R. ____) at 101. When asked if she was “just following traffic,” Taylor responded “[c]orrect.” R.R. 109. Taylor acknowledged that she did not see anyone else trip over the partition wall at the bottom of the pocket door and she had no trouble seeing where she was walking. Taylor also testified that there was no sign warning guests of the step. Counsel for the District then questioned Taylor concerning the particulars of the fall. The following dialogue occurred:

Q: Do you know if your foot came into contact with any portion of the partition below the door?

A: No. I landed on my knees and my face.

Q: Okay. My question is, [d]o you know what specific part of the doorway frame ... your leg or foot came into contact with, causing you to trip?

A: I do not.

Q: Okay. Do you know which leg it was?

A: No, I do not.

R.R. 106.

Taylor filed a negligence claim against the District seeking damages for her injuries. The District moved for summary judgment, asserting governmental immunity and denying that the District was negligent in its care, custody or control of the partition. In her brief opposing the District's motion, Taylor countered that the real property exception to immunity was applicable because the partition constituted a “fixture” as defined by this Court in Blocker v. City of Philadelphia, 729 A.2d 187 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999) (Blocker I ), rev'd, 563 Pa. 559, 763 A.2d 373 (2000). Taylor further argued that the question of whether the partition created a dangerous condition was one of fact for a jury to decide, not the court on a summary judgment motion.

At argument on the District's summary judgment motion, the District informed the trial court that Blocker I, on which Taylor relied, had been overruled by our Supreme Court in Blocker v. City of Philadelphia, 563 Pa. 559, 763 A.2d 373 (2000) (Blocker II ). It further argued that “under the Supreme Court ruling, the partition would remain a personalty, and therefore would not meet the exception to the [Tort Claims Act].” R.R. 169. In any case, even if the partition were a fixture, Taylor would be unable to show that the partition represented a dangerous condition of its real estate. Taylor responded that determining whether the partition was a fixture or personalty and whether it created a dangerous condition were questions of fact for a jury to decide.

On November 12, 2013, the trial court granted the District's motion for summary judgment. The trial court explained that our “Supreme Court's interpretation [of the real property exception] is starkly different from the argument that [Taylor] sets forth in her brief.” Trial Court opinion at 5. Quoting Blocker II, the trial court explained as follows:

Chattels used in connection with real estate are of three classes: First, those which are manifestly furniture, as distinguished from improvements, and not peculiarly fitted to the property with which they are used; these always remain personalty. Second, those which are so annexed to the property that they cannot be removed without material injury to the real estate or to themselves; these are realty, even in the face of an expressed intention that they should be considered personalty.... Third, those which, although physically connected with the real estate, are so affixed as to be removable without destroying or materially injuring the chattels themselves, or the property to which they are annexed; these become part of the realty or remain personalty, depending upon the intention of the parties at the time of the annexation; in this class fall such chattels as boilers and machinery affixed for the use of an owner or tenant but readily removable.

Id. at 5 (quoting Blocker II, 763 A.2d at 375 ) (second emphasis added). The trial court then concluded that

[t]he gymnasium partition clearly falls into the third category. Therefore, since the [Pennsylvania] Supreme Court decision in Blocker [II ] effectively defines what attached personalty becomes part of the realty ... [the District] is correct in stating that [Taylor] has failed to establish a viable claim for negligence under the ‘Real Property’ exception of § 8542(b)(3).

Id. at 5–6.

On appeal,² Taylor argues, first, that the trial court erred in “finding that the partition through which [Taylor] fell was ‘personalty’ ” because that was a factual question for a jury, and, further, the trial court got it wrong. Appellant's Brief at 4–5. Second, Taylor argues that the trial court usurped the role of the jury by finding that the partition did not create a dangerous condition in the gymnasium. The District maintains that summary judgment was appropriate because Taylor failed to state a viable claim for negligence that fits within the real property exception to governmental immunity.

Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act

Pennsylvania's local governments are granted immunity by Section 8541 of the Tort Claims Act, which states:

Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, no local agency shall be liable for any damages on account of any injury to a person or property caused by any act of the local agency or an employee thereof or any other person.

42 Pa.C.S. § 8541. School districts are considered “local agencies” for purposes of the Tort Claims Act. Repko v. Chichester School District, 904 A.2d 1036, 1040 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006). However, this grant of immunity is waived for certain categories of tort claims. Section 8542 states:

(a) Liability imposed.—A local agency shall be liable for damages on account of an injury to a person or property within the limits set forth in this subchapter if both of the following conditions are satisfied and the injury occurs as a result of one of the acts set forth in subsection (b):

(1) The damages would be recoverable under common law or a statute creating a cause of action if the injury were caused by a person not having available a defense under section 8541 (relating to governmental immunity generally) or section 8546 (relating to defense of official immunity); and

(2) the injury was caused by the negligent acts of the local agency or an employee thereof acting within the scope of his office or duties with respect to one of the categories listed in subsection (b). As used in this paragraph, “negligent acts” shall not include acts or conduct which constitutes a crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct.

(b) Acts which may impose liability.—The following acts by a local agency or any of its employees may result in the imposition of liability on a local agency: ...

(3) Real property.—The care, custody or control of real property in the possession of the local agency ...

42 Pa.C.S. § 8542. When invoking the real property exception in Section 8542(b)(3), the injured party must show that (a) the injury resulted from a dangerous condition that (b) stemmed from the care, custody or control of real property, not personalty. Mellon v. City of Pittsburgh Zoo, 760 A.2d 921, 924 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000).

The Partition: Personalty or Realty

In her first issue, Taylor asserts that “whether or not a chattel used in connection with real estate is a fixture or personalty is a question for the jury.” Appellant's Brief at 7. In any case, she contends that the partition and door, which were permanently fixed to the gymnasium, were realty.

Whether chattel is personalty or a fixture is a question of law for the court to decide. LoFurno v. Garnet Valley School District, 904 A.2d 980, 983 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006). Bioni v. Canon–McMillan School District, 521 Pa. 299, 555 A.2d 901 (1989), is instructive on this point. In that case, a student was injured in school while working with a wooden lathe. Over the objection of the school district, the trial court submitted to the jury the question of...