Taylor v. Otter Tail Corp.

• Decision Date: 10 April 2007
• Docket Number: No. 06-2589.,06-2589.
• Citation: 484 F.3d 1016
• Parties: Gregory TAYLOR, Appellant, v. OTTER TAIL CORPORATION, et al., Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

484 F.3d 1016

Gregory TAYLOR, Appellant, v. OTTER TAIL CORPORATION, et al., Appellee.

No. 06-2589.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: January 12, 2007.

Filed: April 10, 2007.

Michael R. Hoffman, argued, Bismarck, ND, for appellant.

Linda E. Bata, argued, Grand Forks, ND, for appellee Midcontinent Cable Company.

Thomas R. Olson, argued, Fargo, ND, for appellee Otter Tail Corporation.

Before WOLLMAN and MELLOY, Circuit Judges, and NANGLE,¹ District Judge.

NANGLE, District Judge.

This appeal arises from the district court's reduction of a jury verdict in a personal injury case. While the district court's order is unclear as to the procedural vehicle it used to reduce the award, we conclude that the court remitted past and future economic damages. In accordance with the remittitur standard, we hold that the past and future economic damages awards were not so excessive as to shock the conscience, and reinstate the jury's original awards.

I. BACKGROUND

Appellant Gregory Taylor brought this suit against Appellees Otter Tail Corporation and Midcontinent Media, Inc. ("Appellees"),² seeking compensation for injuries he sustained during an on-the-job fall. Taylor was a lineman employed by Cable System Services ("CSS"), a contractor hired by Midcontinent Media, Inc., to rebuild the cable television system in Cooperstown, North Dakota. While working on this project, on August 19, 1998, Appellant, who was thirty-five years of age at the time, was seriously injured when the utility pole he was strapped onto broke. Appellant fell to the ground, and the pole fell on top of him; the pole then bounced up and landed on him again.

Appellant suffered severe injuries as a result of the fall, and was hospitalized for two weeks. He broke both his pelvis and sacrum, had an epidural hematoma, and suffered damaged nerves and two dislocated discs; he also suffers from chronic hip and leg pain, and his bladder does not function properly. By the end of 1998, because Taylor could no longer climb poles, he went to work as a supervisor for CSS in Langdon, North Dakota. In 2002, CSS was no longer engaged in any ongoing projects in North Dakota. Therefore, continued employment with the company required extensive travel. Taylor was experiencing difficulty traveling long distances due to his chronic pain, and therefore felt he could not remain employed with CSS. In 2002, Taylor received a $42,000.00 Worker's Compensation settlement, which he used to start an unsuccessful snow-blowing business.

In 2004, Taylor brought this suit against Appellees, which was properly removed to the court below,³ and proceeded to jury trial. At the close of the evidence, Appellees argued that no evidence was adduced at trial in support of an award for future economic damages, and that, consequently, the court should not instruct the jury regarding future economic damages. The court took the arguments under advisement, and submitted the case to the jury with a future damages instruction. In accordance with North Dakota's law of comparative fault,⁴ the jury determined the percentage of fault attributable to each of the parties, assessing fault as follows: (1) Appellee Otter Tail, the owner of the pole, forty-nine percent; (2) Appellant, thirty-one percent, presumably for climbing the pole without performing the precautionary safety tests recommended by the Occupational Safety and Hazard Administration guidelines; and (3) twenty percent to "other."⁵ The jury awarded Appellant the following damages: (1) $190,523.00 for past economic damages; (2) $893,200.00 for future economic damages; and (3) $564,000.00 in non-economic damages.

Thereafter, the district court instructed the parties to submit post-verdict letter briefs regarding the motions made at trial and at the close of the evidence. In the letters, Appellees asked that the court grant judgment as a matter of law in their favor, or remit the past and future economic damages. After receipt of the letters, the court issued an order reducing the award as set forth in Table I, and entered judgment accordingly. Taylor then filed this appeal seeking to reinstate the jury verdict.

                Table I6
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                                                District
                Jury Award Court Award Difference
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                Past
                Economic
                Damages $190,523.00    $30,523.56     $159,899.44
                Future
                economic
                Damages $893,200.00    $27,440.00     $865,760.00
                Non-economic
                Damages $564,000.00   $564,000.00          0
                ----------------------------------------------------------------
                

II. DISCUSSION

Appellant argues that the applicable standard of review in this case is one of rigorous review. He bases his discussion of the standard of review, however, on the erroneous assumption that the trial court granted judgment as a matter of law. Contrary to Appellant's view, the procedural history indicates that the district court employed the mechanism of remittitur to reduce the amount of the jury award, and did not grant judgment as a matter of law. The district court did not hold that, as a matter of law, there was no evidence to support an award of past and future economic damages. Rather, the court found that the evidence supported an award of economic damages for medical expenses, and remitted the jury's awards for past and future economic damages from $190,523.00 to $30,523.56 and $893,000.00 to $27,440.00, respectively.

The fact that the district court reduced the damages via remittitur rather than by entering judgment as a matter of law is relevant because it impacts the governing law and standard of review. A decision to grant remittitur "is a procedural matter governed by federal, rather than state law." Parsons v. First Investors Corp., 122 F.3d 525, 528 (8th Cir.1997) (internal citation omitted). The scope of review of a district court's damage award "is extremely narrow" and the district court's award may not be reversed "except for a manifest abuse of discretion." Peoples Bank and Trust Company of Mountain Home v. Globe Int'l Publishing, Inc., 978 F.2d 1065, 1070 (8th Cir.1992). In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering a remittitur, we analyze "whether the remittitur was ordered for an amount less than the jury could reasonably find." Slatton v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., Inc., 506 F.2d 505, 508-09 (8th Cir.1974) (internal citations omitted).

"A verdict is not excessive unless the result is monstrous or shocking." Thorne v. Welk Investment, Inc., 197 F.3d 1205, 1212 (8th Cir.1999). "We are guided by the law of the forum state in weighing the excessiveness of a verdict." Globe Int'l Publishing, Inc., 978 F.2d at 1070. The definition of excessiveness stated in Thorne mirrors the North Dakota law on the issue, which holds that a verdict is excessive when "the amount is so unreasonable and extreme as to indicate passion or prejudice on the part of the jury; the award is so excessive as to be without support in the evidence; or the jury verdict is so excessive as to appear clearly arbitrary, unjust, or such as to shock the judicial conscience." Dahlen v. Landis, 314 N.W.2d 63, 67 (N.D.1981) (internal citation omitted).

In its order remitting the damages, the district court ultimately concluded that, beyond some allowance for medical expenses, "the award for future economic damages is not supported by any evidence . . ." and "the evidence [is] insufficient to support any award for future loss of earnings or diminution of earning capacity." The district court stated that it was viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, a standard that is in accord with the general principle that "the matter of damages rests largely in the sound discretion of the jury." Stoner v. Nash Finch, Inc., 446 N.W.2d 747, 753 (N.D. 1989). However, the court made several findings of fact which deviated from this standard. Both Taylor and his mother provided testimony which contradicted the court's findings that:...