Taylor v. Owens

• Decision Date: 09 March 2021
• Docket Number: No. 20-5648,20-5648
• Citation: 990 F.3d 493
• Parties: Derrick TAYLOR, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Angela M. OWENS, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

990 F.3d 493

Derrick TAYLOR, Petitioner-Appellant,

v.Angela M. OWENS, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 20-5648

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Decided and Filed: March 9, 2021

ON BRIEF: Brandon Sample, BRANDON SAMPLE PLC, Rutland, Vermont, for Appellant. Kevin G. Ritz, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellee.

Before: DAUGHTREY, McKEAGUE, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.

THAPAR, Circuit Judge.

Derrick Taylor robbed a bank at gunpoint. And when police tried to arrest him, he led them on a high-speed chase, killed an innocent driver sharing the road, shot another driver, and abducted a woman and her child. Almost three decades later, he challenged one of the resulting convictions and applied for a writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The district court denied Taylor's application. But Taylor never cleared the jurisdictional bar necessary for a court to adjudicate his claim. See id. § 2255(e). So we vacate the district court's order and remand with instructions to dismiss the application for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

I.

A.

The ability to seek freedom from unlawful government detention is a crucial safeguard of personal liberty, historically secured by the writ of habeas corpus. 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 135 (10th ed. 1786). Congress directs where, when, and how federal courts can grant this relief. See Ex parte Bollman , 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95–96, 99–100, 2 L.Ed. 554 (1807) (Marshall, C.J.). And "[s]ince the founding, Congress has adjusted and readjusted" the statutory scheme many times over. Hueso v. Barnhart , 948 F.3d 324, 326 (6th Cir. 2020). Today, federal law provides two avenues for federal prisoners challenging their confinement.

Section 2241 is the first avenue: It grants federal courts the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus to prisoners whose custody violates federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), (c)(3). Prisoners may file an application for the writ with any district court, circuit judge, or Supreme Court justice exercising personal jurisdiction over the warden. Id. § 2241(a).

But habeas corpus proceedings were not the hallmarks of efficiency. See United States v. Hayman , 342 U.S. 205, 210–19, 72 S.Ct. 263, 96 L.Ed. 232 (1952) ; Nancy J. King & Joseph L. Hoffmann, Habeas for the Twenty-First Century 109–10 (2011). So Congress created a second avenue: section 2255. The key innovation was to direct prisoners’ legal challenges to the sentencing court, which would possess greater knowledge (and records) of the case. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) ; Wright v. Spaulding , 939 F.3d 695, 698 (6th Cir. 2019). Prisoners may file a motion with the sentencing court to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence imposed in violation of federal law or by a court without jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).

Notice some overlap between the two provisions? Both deal with federal-law challenges to a prisoner's custody. But while section 2255 never replaced section 2241 in its entirety, it did severely restrict section 2241 ’s applicability. Wright , 939 F.3d at 698. Indeed, section 2255 now serves as the primary means for a federal prisoner to challenge his conviction or sentence—those things that were ordered in the sentencing court. By contrast, section 2241 typically facilitates only challenges to "the execution or manner in which the sentence is served"—those things occurring within prison. Charles v. Chandler , 180 F.3d 753, 755–56 (6th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).

And Congress has made its preference for section 2255 clear. If a prisoner can file a section 2255 motion in the sentencing court but "fail[s]" to do so or is unsuccessful in his motion, then a court "shall not ... entertain[ ]" his application for a writ of habeas corpus under section 2241. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). There is one exception: where it "appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention." Id. ; Wright , 939 F.3d at 698 (giving examples in which a section 2255 motion may be inadequate or ineffective). Courts commonly call this exception "the saving clause."

B.

With that background in mind, we can turn back to Derrick Taylor. Taylor was convicted of, among other things, killing a person while avoiding an arrest for bank robbery. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e) ; United States v. Poindexter , 44 F.3d 406, 407–08, 410 (6th Cir. 1995) (affirming Taylor's convictions and sentence). Importantly, the district court (and then this court) held that the government did not need to prove Taylor's intent to kill. Poindexter , 44 F.3d at 408–09.

In 2005, Taylor filed a motion to vacate his sentence based on a new Sixth Amendment challenge. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) ; United States v. Booker , 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (holding that the mandatory nature of the Sentencing Guidelines was unconstitutional). The district court denied the motion as time-barred. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). This court denied a certificate of appealability.

Then, in 2018, Taylor filed the instant application for a writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He relied on intervening caselaw both to establish the inadequacy and ineffectiveness of section 2255 relief and to establish his eligibility for habeas relief under section 2241. See Elonis v. United States , 575 U.S. 723, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 192 L.Ed.2d 1 (2015) ; United States v. Parks , 583 F.3d 923 (6th Cir. 2009). This caselaw, he said, vindicated his earlier contention that proof of intent to kill was necessary for conviction. And because he did not have such intent, Taylor claimed actual innocence. See Bousley v. United States , 523 U.S. 614, 623–24, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998). The district court denied the application and dismissed it with prejudice. Taylor appealed, arguing that he satisfied the saving clause or, in the alternative, that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the application.¹

II.

The parties asked us to decide whether Taylor satisfied section 2255(e) ’s saving clause. But we must first consider an antecedent question: Is that section a limitation on the district court's subject-matter jurisdiction? It is.

Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to "the classes of cases" that fall "within a court's adjudicatory authority." Kontrick v. Ryan , 540 U.S. 443, 455, 124 S.Ct. 906, 157 L.Ed.2d 867 (2004). A court that lacks subject-matter jurisdiction has no power but to dismiss the case; it may not address the merits. Ex parte McCardle , 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1868). Such a dismissal is without prejudice and leaves the parties free to seek relief in another forum (subject to any rules of preclusion). We have an independent obligation to check both our own jurisdiction and the district court's. So we begin by asking whether section 2255(e) is a jurisdictional bar.

Not all commands that purport to limit judicial proceedings are jurisdictional.

Many are claim-processing rules. These commands are rigid and must be applied whenever invoked by a party. But they may be waived or forfeited. (Picture a statute of limitations.) Kontrick , 540 U.S. at 456, 124 S.Ct. 906. Other commands are merits requirements. (Picture a statute allowing lawsuits for one type of contract but no others.) Winnett v. Caterpillar, Inc. , 553 F.3d 1000, 1007 (6th Cir. 2009).

Where does section 2255(e) fit into all this? We have suggested in the past that it is a jurisdictional rule. See Wooten v. Cauley , 677 F.3d 303, 311 (6th Cir. 2012) ; Capaldi v. Pontesso , 135 F.3d 1122, 1123–24 (6th Cir. 1998) (order) (affirming the district court's "dismiss[al] ... without reaching the merits"). But time and again, the Supreme Court has warned that "drive-by jurisdictional rulings" are not "precedential" and should not be followed blindly. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't , 523 U.S. 83, 91, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998). So we approach the question anew.

The key is the statutory text. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki , 562 U.S. 428, 435–36, 131 S.Ct. 1197, 179 L.Ed.2d 159 (2011). Only "a clear statement" from Congress will render a command jurisdictional. United States v. Kwai Fun Wong , 575 U.S. 402, 409–10, 135 S.Ct. 1625, 191 L.Ed.2d 533 (2015). Section 2255(e) has such a clear statement.²

The Audience. Start by noting to whom the statute is directed—the courts. Claim-processing rules tend to regulate action by litigants. See, e.g. , United States v. Marshall , 954 F.3d 823, 827 (6th Cir. 2020) (describing a provision that "speaks to what parties, not courts, must do"). Or they may describe claims in the abstract. See, e.g. , Kwai Fun Wong , 575 U.S. at 411 & n.4, 135 S.Ct. 1625 (analyzing 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) ("A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is presented ... within two years.")). Statutes prescribing merits requirements oftentimes condition the grant of a remedy. See, e.g. , 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (requiring a prisoner to meet certain criteria or else the "writ of habeas corpus shall not extend" to him); Hoogerheide v. I.R.S. , 637 F.3d 634, 636–38 (6th Cir. 2011) (considering 26 U.S.C. § 7433(d) ("A judgment for damages shall not be awarded ... unless the court determines that the plaintiff has exhausted the administrative remedies.")). So section 2255(e) ’s focus on courts favors treating the command as jurisdictional.

The Command. The statute tells courts not to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus. A court entertains an application when it "receive[s]," "deal[s] with," or "consider[s]" it. Webster's New International Dictionary 853 (2d ed. 1950); Funk and Wagnalls College Standard Dictionary of the English Language 390 (1943). If the command seems broad, that's because it is.

Entertaining a legal claim—declaring the law, applying the law to the facts, and issuing a judgment—is exactly what it means to exercise jurisdiction. See Steel Co. , 523 U.S. at 101–02, 118 S.Ct. 1003 ; McCardle , 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 514....