Taylor v. Pennycuff
| Decision Date | 28 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 4:19-cv-236 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia |
| Parties | JIMMY L. TAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. SGT. GREG PENNYCUFF; and DEP. TRAVIS ROBILLARD, Defendants. |
Plaintiff Jimmy L. Taylor, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, alleges Defendants Sgt. Greg Pennycuff and Dep. Travis Robillard violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they conducted a search of his vehicle and arrested him on April 11, 2018. (See doc. 51.) Defendants have moved for summary judgment as to the claim against them. (Doc. 87.) For the reasons explained below, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (Id.)
This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action arises out of a 2018 investigation by the Houston County Sheriff's Office into allegations that Plaintiff provided unlicensed medical treatment to Annette Johnson. (See doc. 87-2.) Plaintiff initially named twenty-six Defendants and sought $96 million in damages. At the screening stage, the Court dismissed all claims and Defendants except the sole remaining claim that Sgt. Greg Pennycuff and Dep. Travis Robillard of the Houston County Sheriff's Office violated Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights by searching his vehicle and arresting him without probable cause. (Doc. 36, p. 15.) Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on October 1, 2020. (Doc. 51.) Defendants moved for summary judgment on March 18, 2021. (Doc. 87.) Plaintiff filed four response briefs, (docs. 92, 96, 103, 110), large portions of which are redundant. (Compare doc. 92 with doc. 96 with doc. 103, pp. 50-57.) Defendants filed two replies. (Docs. 95, 109.) One of Plaintiff's response briefs is fifty-nine pages long, well over the twenty-six page limit allowed by Local Rule 7.6.
In accordance with Local Rule 56.1, Defendants submitted a Statement of Material Facts and Conclusions of Law along with two interrogatories, (docs. 87-5, 87-9), and five exhibits including dash camera footage, (docs. 87-3, 87-6 to 87-8). Plaintiff did not file a response to the statement. Nor did he submit any evidence or exhibits supporting the factual assertions in his briefs. The Court deems admitted all portions of Defendants' statements having evidentiary support in, and not otherwise contradicted by, the record and which are not properly opposed by Plaintiff as contemplated under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.[1] See Loc. R. 56.1; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see also Williams v. Slack, 438 Fed.Appx. 848, 849-50 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (); Scoggins v. Arrow Trucking Co., 92 F.Supp.2d 1372, 1373 n.1 (S.D. Ga. 2000) (same). Defendants continue to shoulder the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, and the Court will review the entire record “to determine if there is, indeed, no genuine issue of material fact.” Mann v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1303 (11th Cir. 2009).
Connie Potter, the fiancée of Annette Johnson's son, called the Houston County Sheriff's Office in April 2018 and told Captain John Holland that Plaintiff had no Georgia medical license yet for some time had been treating Ms. Johnson for cancer in her big toe. (Doc. 87-2, pp. 2-3; doc. 87-5, pp. 9-11.) Acting on this tip, Sgt. Greg Pennycuff visited Ms. Johnson in the hospital on the morning of April 11, 2018. (Doc. 87-2, p. 3.)
Ms. Johnson explained she reached out to Plaintiff for treatment in 2017. (Doc. 87-5, p. 10.) Plaintiff told Ms. Johnson he was a physician specializing in stem cell research who earned his medical degree in Puerto Rico and operated a stem cell research and therapy clinic in Cancun, Mexico. (Id.) Beginning in May 2017, Plaintiff visited Ms. Johnson at her home every two weeks and brought with him stem cell medication in prepackaged syringes, which Ms. Johnson received by nebulizer. (Id.) Plaintiff supervised the treatment and provided Ms. Johnson with instructions, and he also administered pain medication. (Id.) Ms. Johnson paid Plaintiff approximately $1, 500 per visit, making the checks payable to him, which Plaintiff would initial “JT.” (Id.) The total paid to Plaintiff was approximately $33, 000. (Id.) Ms. Johnson's statements were consistent with Ms. Potter's tip. (See id. at 9-12.) Plaintiff does not contest most of these facts in his response briefs and instead merely contends Ms. Johnson administered the treatments herself during their visits, and he only provided instructions, medications, and equipment. (See doc. 103, pp. 26, 53- 55; doc. 110, p. 3.)
During the hospital interview, Ms. Johnson told Sgt. Pennycuff that Plaintiff was scheduled to make his next medical visit that same day at noon, and Sgt. Pennycuff drove to Ms. Johnson's residence to wait for Plaintiff.[2] (Doc. 87-2, p. 4.) At 1:35 pm, Plaintiff arrived in a truck and parked in the driveway. (Id. at p. 5.) Sgt. Pennycuff approached the truck, and, presumably upon request, Plaintiff produced his driver's license. (Id.) In response to Sgt. Pennycuff's questions, Plaintiff explained he was there to administer stem cell therapy to Ms. Johnson and handed Sgt. Pennycuff a bag marked “Annette Johnson” containing twelve syringes of yellow liquid. (Id.; doc. 87-5, p. 12.) Sgt. Pennycuff asked whether Plaintiff was a licensed physician certified to practice in Georgia and the United States, and Plaintiff stated he was but his credentials were at his office. (Doc. 87-5, p. 12.) Sgt. Pennycuff continued to question Plaintiff, who remained seated in the truck, concerning his education and medical practice. (Id.) When Sgt. Pennycuff asked a second time, Plaintiff admitted he was not licensed in Georgia or the United States but was licensed in Mexico. (Id. at pp. 12-13.) Plaintiff contended he was not practicing medicine because he merely delivered medication to Ms. Johnson, who administered it herself. (Id. at p. 13; doc. 103, p. 26.) Sgt. Pennycuff disagreed with this legal argument. (Doc. 87-5, p. 12; doc. 103, p. 26; doc. 110, p. 3.)
Dep. Travis Robillard then arrived to assist Sgt. Pennycuff, and his dash camera recorded the rest of the encounter. (See doc. 87-7 (“DC”); doc. 87-2, p. 5.) Sgt. Pennycuff ended his conversation with Plaintiff, updated Dep. Robillard on the situation, called the District Attorney's office from his patrol car, and returned to Plaintiff to ask for permission to search the truck. (DC 02:28-13:58.) Plaintiff's response is unintelligible but, within a few seconds, Plaintiff stepped out of the vehicle and was directed where to stand as Sgt. Pennycuff conducted a search. (Id. at 13:59- 14:06.) In sworn interrogatory responses, Defendants aver Plaintiff verbally consented to a vehicle search. (Doc. 87-5, p. 12; doc. 87-9, p. 9.) In unsworn statements within his response briefs, Plaintiff claims he did not consent and instead responded, “You need a warrant to search my car there.” (Doc. 87-1, pp. 9, n.2; doc. 103, p. 27.) Sgt. Pennycuff conducted a twenty-five minute search of Plaintiff's vehicle, finding medical documents, medical supplies, medication, and cannabis oil. (See doc. 87-2, pp. 6-7; doc. 87-5, p. 12; DC 14:17-38:49.) Plaintiff answered all questions Defendants asked regarding items found in the vehicle. (See DC 14:17-38:49.)
After the search, dispatch informed Sgt. Pennycuff that Plaintiff's driver's license had been suspended for several months. (Id. at 39:51-40:54.) Sgt. Pennycuff told Plaintiff he intended to seize the items found in the truck. (Id. at 40:55-41:32.) When explaining why, Sgt. Pennycuff stated Plaintiff had given him permission to search the vehicle. (Id. at 41:05-41:08.) Plaintiff did not express any disagreement with this statement. (See id.) Sgt. Pennycuff told Plaintiff he was under arrest for driving on a suspended license, and Dep. Robillard handcuffed Plaintiff and escorted him to the patrol car. (Id. at 41:49-47:20.) After execution of search warrants for Plaintiff's home and office, Plaintiff was charged with exploitation and intimidation of an elder or disabled person, practicing medicine without a license, and driving on a suspended license. (Doc. 87-1, p. 7.) Ms. Johnson died on April 18, 2018, one week after the at-issue search of Plaintiff's vehicle and arrest of Plaintiff. (Doc. 87-6.)
Summary judgment “shall” be granted if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” FindWhat Inv'r Grp. v. FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1307 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A dispute is “genuine” if the “evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.
The moving party bears the burden of establishing there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1298 (11th Cir. 2003).
Specifically the moving party must identify the portions of the record which establish that there are no “genuine dispute[s] as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Moton v. Cowart, 631 F.3d 1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2011). When the nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may discharge his burden by showing the record lacks evidence to support the nonmoving party's case or that the nonmoving party would be unable to prove his case at trial. See id. (citing ...
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