Taylor v. Prairie Pebble Phosphate Co.

• Court: Florida Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: WHITFIELD, C.J.
• Citation: Taylor v. Prairie Pebble Phosphate Co., 61 Fla. 455, 54 So. 904 (Fla. 1911)
• Decision Date: 28 March 1911
• Parties: TAYLOR v. PRAIRIE PEBBLE PHOSPHATE CO.

54 So. 904

61 Fla. 455

TAYLOR v. PRAIRIE PEBBLE PHOSPHATE CO.

Florida Supreme Court, Division A.

March 28, 1911

Error to Circuit Court, Polk County; J. B. Wall, Judge.

Action by J. B. Taylor against the Prairie Pebble Phosphate Company. Judgment of dismissal, and plaintiff brings error. Reversed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

A corporation or company engaged in phosphate mining, and as an incident thereto operates trolley engines and cars for hauling the phosphate, is not 'a railroad company' within the terms and meaning of sections 3148, 3149, and 3150, General Statutes of 1906.

It is within the province of the Legislature to modify the common-law rules regulating employer's liability, and a wide discretion is accorded the lawmaking power in determining the subjects as well as the character and extent of regulations designed to promote the general welfare; the limitations imposed by the federal Constitution being designed merely to prevent arbitrary abuses of state authority.

The statutory provisions modifying the common-law rules regulating employer's liability for injuries to employés caused by the negligence of fellow servants should be fairly construed to accomplish the legislative intent, but the terms of the statute should not be extended beyond the real meaning and import as determined from the subject and object of the law.

The master is required to exercise reasonable care in the selection of employés who are to work with others, and injury proximately resulting to an employé from the breach of this duty renders the master liable unless the injured employé knew, or should have known, of the master's negligence and assumed the risk accruing therefrom.

Contributory negligence and assumed risk are matters of affirmative defense, and should be pleaded and proven by the defendant unless they appear in the case made by the plaintiff.

Allegations that the defendant negligently and carelessly put in charge of an engine an engineer who was careless, reckless, and negligent of defendant's duty to plaintiff, that the engineer was incompetent, negligent, and careless, which fact was known or should have been known to defendant and was unknown to plaintiff, and that said engineer carelessly negligently, and wrongfully caused the engine to suddenly and unexpectedly jerk forward whereby plaintiff, an employé, was injured, states a breach of defendant's duty.

COUNSEL J. W. Brady, for plaintiff in error.

Wilson & Swearingen, for defendant in error.

OPINION

WHITFIELD C.J.

This writ of error was taken to a judgment dismissing an action upon sustaining a demurrer to an amended declaration claiming damages for personal injuries received by J. B. Taylor in having a leg crushed by a trolley engine while acting as switchman thereon.

It does not appear that the defendant corporation was or is a railroad company, but the inference drawn from the pleading is that the defendant is not a railroad company, though it operates a trolley engine and cars in hauling phosphate incident to mining operations.

Sections 3148, 3149, 3150, originally chapter 4071, Acts of 1891 modifying to some extent the common-law rules regulating the liability of employers for injuries to employés, apply only to 'a railroad company.' A corporation or company engaged in phosphate mining, and as an incident thereto operates trolley engines and cars for hauling the phosphate, is not 'a railroad company' within the terms and meaning of the sections referred to. See McKivergan v. Alexander & Edgar Lumber Co., 124 Wis. 60, 102 N.W. 332; Railey v. Garbutt & Co., 112 Ga. 288, 37 S.E. 360; Bradford Const. Co. v. Heflin, 88 Miss. 314, 42 So. 174, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1040, 8 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 1077. Contrary authorities are predicated upon differently worded statutes. Schus v. Powers-Simpson Co., 85 Minn. 447, 89 N.W. 68, 69 L. R. A. 887; Kline v. Minnesota Iron Co., 93 Minn. 63, 100 N.W. 681; Kibbe v. Stevenson Iron Min. Co., 136 F. 147, 69 C. C. A. 145; Bird v. U.S. Leather Co., 143 N.C. 283, 55 S.E. 727; Hemphill v. Buck Creek Lumber Co., 141 N.C. 487, 54 S.E. 420; Powell v. Sherwood, 162 Mo. 605, 63 S.W. 485; Lodwick Lumber Co. v. Taylor, 39 Tex.Civ.App. 302, 87 S.W. 358; Mounce v. Lodwick Lumber Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 91 S.W. 240.

It is within the province of the Legislature to modify the common-law rules regulating employer's liability, and a wide discretion is accorded the lawmaking power in determining the subjects as well as the character and extent of regulations designed to promote the general welfare; the limitations imposed by the federal Constitution being designed merely to prevent arbitrary abuses of state authority. Stearns & Culvee Lumber Co. v. Fowler, 58 Fla. 362, 50 So. 680, and cases there cited; State v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 60 Fla. ----, 54 So. 900; Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Simon, 56 Fla. 545, 47 So. 1001, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 126; King Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 58 Fla. 292, 50 So. 509; Mobile, Jackson & K. C. R. Co. v. Hicks, 91 Miss. 273, 46 So. 360, 124 Am. St. Rep. 679; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Melton, 218 U.S. 36, 30 S.Ct. 676, 54 L.Ed. 921; Mobile, Jackson & K. C. R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 31 S.Ct. 136, 55 L.Ed. 78. See useful rules formulated by Mr. Justice Van Devanter and incorporated in the opinion of the court in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 31 S.Ct. 337, 55 L.Ed. 369, decided March 13, 1911.

The statutory provisions modifying the common-law rules regulating employer's liability for injuries to employés caused by the negligence of fellow servants should be fairly construed to accomplish the legislative intent, but the terms of the statute should not be extended beyond their real meaning and import as determined from the subject and object of the law. See Beeson v. Busenbark, 44 Kan. 669, 25 P. 48, 10 L. R. A. 839. If the Legislature had...