Taylor v. Ridley

• Decision Date: 19 October 2012
• Docket Number: No. CV–10–5655 (SJF)(WDW).,CV–10–5655 (SJF)(WDW).
• Citation: 904 F.Supp.2d 222
• Parties: Trent TAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. P.O. Leroy RIDLEY, Shield No. 1214, P.O. James Johnson, Shield No. 1205, and Town of Hempstead [sic], Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

904 F.Supp.2d 222

Trent TAYLOR, Plaintiff,

v.P.O. Leroy RIDLEY, Shield No. 1214, P.O. James Johnson, Shield No. 1205, and Town of Hempstead [sic], Defendants.

No. CV–10–5655 (SJF)(WDW).

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Oct. 19, 2012.

Trent Taylor, Fishkill, NY, pro se.

Debra Ann Urbano–Disalvo, Village of Hempstead Attorney's Office, Mary E. Mahon, Town of Hempstead, Susan P. Jacobs, Office of the Town Attorney–Town of Hempstead, Hempstead, NY, for Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

FEUERSTEIN, District Judge.

On December 6, 2010, pro se plaintiff Trent Taylor (“plaintiff”) commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants Police Officer Leroy Ridley (“Ridley”), Shield No. 1214; Police Officer James Johnson (“Johnson”), Shield No. 1205; and the Incorporated Village of Hempstead, i/s/h Town of Hempstead (“the Village”) (collectively, “defendants”), alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Pending before the Court is defendants' unopposed motion seeking summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims in their entirety pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.¹ For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion is granted.

I. BackgroundA. Factual Background ²

On March 21, 2009, at approximately 3:35 a.m., Village police officers were summoned to the parking lot of Rumba Sky, a nightclub located at 19 North Franklin Street in the Village, to respond to a disturbance. (Defendants' Local Rule 56.1 Statement [“56.1 Stat.”], ¶ 1; Declaration of Debra Urbano–DiSalvo [“Urbano–DiSalvo Decl.”], Ex. C, Ex. H at 9, and Ex. M1 at 5, 46, 72). When Ridley arrived at the location, there was “a ton of people” there and plaintiff's friend, Angelo McDeegan, was drunk, yelling and acting disorderly. (56.1 Stat., ¶ 2; Urbano–DiSalvo Decl., Ex. E at 17–21, 69, 91, Ex. M1 at 18–20, Ex. M2 at 111–12). When Lieutenant Joseph Sortino (“Sortino”) arrived at the location, he instructed his officers to disperse the large crowd spread out in the parking lot by telling them to leave or they would be arrested. (56.1 Stat., ¶ 3; Urbano–DiSalvo Decl., Ex. H at 9–10, 17, 24). Although Ridley told everyone in the parking lot to go home, (56.1 Stat., ¶ 4; Urbano–DiSalvo Decl., Ex. E at 19–24, 70–1, Ex. M1 at 19, 21, 31, 82 and Ex. M2 at 112, 122), plaintiff instead walked or ran to his car in the lot crowded with people whom the officers were trying to disperse, (56.1 Stat., ¶ 7; Urbano–DiSalvo Decl., Ex. E at 22, 92, Ex. H at 10–11, 17–8, Ex. M1 at 21–2, 34, 41–2 and Ex. M2 at 112–16, 122–5), and ignored Ridley when he told him to stop and put his hands behind his back. (56.1 Stat., ¶ 9; Urbano–DiSalvo Decl., Ex. E at 22–25, 28, 45–6, 72–3, 92, Ex. H at 11, Ex. M1 at 22, 24, 82 and Ex. M2 at 113–15, 128). Plaintiff testified that from Ridley's perspective, there were grounds for him to believe that plaintiff was disobeying his orders. (56.1 Stat., ¶ 8; Urbano–DiSalvo Decl., Ex. E at 92–4).

Upon plaintiff's failure to comply with Ridley's orders, Sortino instructed Ridley and Johnson to arrest plaintiff for disorderly conduct. (Urbano–DiSalvo Decl., Ex. H at 12, 21–2 and Ex. M1 at 50, 64–5, 75, 82–3). When Ridley and Johnson attempted to arrest plaintiff for disorderly conduct, he resisted arrest. (56.1 Stat., ¶ 10; Urbano–DiSalvo Decl., Ex. E at 38–9, 46–9, 73, 79, 91, Ex. H at 12, Ex. M1 at 26–7, 42, 48–50, 61, 68, 75–6 and Ex. M2 at 116, 131–34). At his deposition, plaintiff admitted that he was not hit in the head with a nightstick and knocked to the ground, nor kicked or beaten when he was on the ground, as he alleged in his complaint. (56.1 Stat., ¶ 11; see Compl., ¶ IV; Urban–DiSalvo Decl., Ex. E at 77–9). Rather, plaintiff accidentally fell to the ground while resisting arrest and being handcuffed. (56.1 Stat., ¶¶ 12–13; Urbano–DiSalvo Decl., Ex. E at 23, 34–43, 47–9, 73, Ex. M1 at 28, 51, 66–7, 76 and Ex. M2 at 117, 135–37, 144–45–48). As a result of falling to the ground, plaintiff injured his right shoulder and scraped his right elbow. (56.1 Stat., ¶ 14; Urbano–DiSalvo Decl., Ex. E at 36–7, 73, 86, Ex. M1 at 78 and Ex. M2 at 138–40). However, plaintiff did not seek medical attention for those injuries, (56.1 Stat., ¶ 15; see Urbano–DiSalvo Decl., Ex. E at 8–10, 34, 62–4, 80, 85), and has not alleged any injuries resulting from any purported kick or beating.

Plaintiff was arrested and charged with assault in the second degree, resisting arrest and disorderly conduct. (56.1 Stat., ¶ 16; Urbano–DiSalvo Decl., Ex. D). On August 24, 2009, the grand jury of Nassau County returned an indictment charging plaintiff with one (1) count of assault in the second degree (N.Y. Penal Law § 120.05(3)); one (1) count of assault in the third degree (N.Y. Penal Law § 120.00(2)); one (1) count of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree (N.Y. Penal Law § 195.05); one (1) count of resisting arrest (N.Y. Penal Law § 205.30); and one (1) count of disorderly conduct (N.Y. Penal Law § 240.20(1)). (56.1 Stat., ¶ 17; see Urbano–DiSalvo Decl., Exs. E at 27–28 and G).

Following his arrest, plaintiff was in custody for approximately two (2) days, until the court rescinded any bail requirements. (56.1 Stat., ¶ 20; Urbano–DiSalvo Decl., Ex. E at 34, 49–50, 85). However, plaintiff has been in custody since September 17, 2009, after being arrested on unrelated charges to which he pled guilty. (56.1 Stat., ¶ 21; see Urbano–DiSalvo Decl., Ex. E at 10–11, 51, 57, 60–1).

On May 7, 2010, a suppression hearing was held in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Nassau County (McCormack, J.) (“the hearing court”), to determine whether there was probable cause to arrest plaintiff and whether Sortino could testify at trial regarding plaintiff's physical condition at the time of his arrest. (56.1 Stat., ¶ 18; Urbano–DiSalvo Decl., Ex. H).³

On May 17, 2010, plaintiff was acquitted of the criminal charges against him. (56.1 Stat., ¶ 19).

It is undisputed that plaintiff did not file a notice of claim against defendants. (56.1 Stat., ¶ 21; Urbano–DiSalvo Decl., Ex. I).

B. Procedural History

On December 6, 2010, plaintiff commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants alleging violations of his constitutional rights. On September 19, 2011, defendants served plaintiff with demands for documents and interrogatories. (56.1 Stat., ¶ 22; Urbano–DiSalvo Decl., Ex. J). By letter dated January 3, 2012, defendants followed with plaintiff for a response to their discovery demands. (56.1 Stat., ¶ 23; Urbano–DiSalvo Decl., Ex. K). During a telephone conference with the Honorable William D. Wall, United States Magistrate Judge, plaintiff was advised that his failure to respond to defendants' discovery demands could result in the dismissal of this action. (56.1 Stat., ¶ 24). Plaintiff has not responded to defendants' discovery demands to date. (56.1 Stat., ¶¶ 23–26; see Urbano–DiSalvo Decl., Ex. E at 6–8, 12–16).

Defendants now move, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims in their entirety pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment should not be granted unless “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In ruling on a summary judgment motion, the district court must first “determine whether there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact, raising an issue for trial.” McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 202 (2d Cir.2007) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 129 S.Ct. 2658, 2677, 174 L.Ed.2d 490 (2009) (holding that “[o]n a motion for summary judgment, facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” (Emphasis added) (internal quotations and citation omitted)), “A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.” Ramos v. Baldor Specialty Foods, Inc., 687 F.3d 554, 558 (2d Cir.2012) (quotations and citation omitted); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Rojas v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Rochester, 660 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir.2011), cert. denied,––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1744, 182 L.Ed.2d 530 (2012) (accord). “Where the undisputed facts reveal that there is an absence of sufficient proof as to one essential element of a claim, any factual disputes with respect to other elements become immaterial and cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Chandok v. Klessig, 632 F.3d 803, 812 (2d Cir.2011); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (holding that summary judgment is appropriate when the non-moving party has no evidentiary support for an essential element for which it bears the burden of proof).

If the district court determines that there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact, the court must then “resolve all ambiguities, and credit all factual inferences that could rationally be drawn, in favor of the party opposing summary judgment,” Spinelli v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 160, 166 (2d Cir.2009) (internal quotations and citation omitted); see also Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 553 (2d Cir.2005) (“When considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, drawing all inferences in that party's favor.”), to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See Ricci, 557 U.S. 557, 129 S.Ct. at 2677. “An issue is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Rojas, 660 F.3d at 104 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505);see also Ramos, 687 F.3d at 558. “Where...