Taylor v. Robinson

• Decision Date: 02 July 1985
• Citation: 196 Conn. 572,494 A.2d 1195
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: William H.X. TAYLOR, v. Carl ROBINSON, Warden.

Page 1195

494 A.2d 1195

196 Conn. 572

William H.X. TAYLOR, v.Carl ROBINSON, Warden.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 2, 1985.

Decided July 2, 1985.

L.D. McCallum, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, was Joseph I. Lieberman, Atty. Gen., for appellant(respondent).

G. Douglas Nash, Asst. Public Defender, with whom, on the brief, was Joette Katz, Public Defender, for appellee(petitioner).

Before PETERS, C.J., and ARTHUR H. HEALEY, SHEA, DANNEHY and SANTANIELLO, JJ.

ARTHUR H. HEALEY, Associate Justice.

The petitioner, William H.X. Taylor, instituted this habeas corpus proceeding against the respondent commissioner of correction, seeking credit under General Statutes § 18-98¹ for ninety-seven days which he spent confined in New York awaiting extradition to Connecticut.The trial court granted the writ under § 18-98 and ordered the commissioner to credit the petitioner's Connecticut sentence with the ninety-seven days.The commissioner has appealed.

Certain background circumstances should be set out.On August 29, 1979, Taylor was arrested in New York as a fugitive from justice in Connecticut on the basis of an arrest warrant charging him with robbery in the first degree and larceny in the second degree in connection with a New Haven bank robbery.He was incarcerated in New York without bail from August 29, 1979, to December 3, 1979, during which time there were extradition proceedings.On November 5, 1979, the governor of New York issued an extradition warrant.On December 3, 1979, Taylor waived extradition and was returned that day to Connecticut, where he was arrested, arraigned and remanded in lieu of bond.He was tried and convicted on the bank robbery charge and on October 3, 1980, was given an effective sentence of not less than ten years nor more than twenty years.²From the time of his return to Connecticut through the time that sentence was imposed, the petitioner was incarcerated because of his failure to obtain bail.At his sentencing on October 3, 1980, the commissioner credited him with the number of days he spent in confinement in Connecticut after his return from New York on December 3, 1979.The commissioner, however, refused to give credit for the ninety-seven days that Taylor was confined in New York from August 29, 1979, to December 3, 1979.

On appeal from the trial court's reversal of his determination, the commissioner claims that the trial court erred (1) in concluding that General Statutes § 18-98 authorizes a credit on the petitioner's Connecticut sentence for the time for which he was incarcerated in New York awaiting extradition; (2) in concluding that the Connecticut charges were the sole reason for the petitioner's incarceration in New York; and (3) in allowing the petitioner himself to testify about the "official circumstances" of his arrest and incarceration in New York.³

We agree with the commissioner's claim that it was error for the trial court to conclude that General Statutes § 18-98 mandates that the commissioner grant the petitioner the credit on his Connecticut criminal sentence for that time he was confined in New York awaiting extradition.Our recent decision in Johnson v. Manson, 196 Conn. 309, 493 A.2d 846(1985), requires this result.

Because § 18-98 does not authorize the credit sought by the petitioner, the trial court's implicit conclusion that he was held in New York solely pursuant to a Connecticut warrant requires no different conclusion;seeJohnson v. Manson, supra; and, therefore, we need not reach any other claim of error properly raised by the commissioner.⁴

Finally, we address a matter which developed in oral argument and about which counsel admitted there was no evidence or claim made at the trial.This involved instances where the commissioner apparently gave "credit" on a Connecticut criminal sentence for time spent in confinement while awaiting extradition in another state.Counsel for the commissioner acknowledged that the commissioner had given "credit" up to as much as ten or twelve days.He specifically said, however, that all of these "credits" had been granted where the persons involved had in fact either been already ordered extradited to Connecticut or had already waived extradition to return to this state, and, therefore, these persons were then immediately available to be returned here.The "credit" was given in those cases, he explained, because Connecticut authorities were not in the other state at those particular times, and the period for which the "credit" was given was for that period that was necessarily required for travel to that jurisdiction in order to return such persons to Connecticut.In these cases it is apparent that those persons were immediately available to be returned to this state, if Connecticut authorities were on the scene to do so.Although such credit is not statutorily authorized by § 18-98;Johnson v. Manson, supra; the commissioner has suggested that to credit such time is a fair accommodation under those circumstances.Some jurisdictions have granted credit for time when a prisoner was held in unnecessary custody in another jurisdiction;see generallyWilliams v. State, 280 N.W.2d 406, 408(Iowa1979); and we note, without deciding, that the commissioner's "crediting" of travel time may be arguably analogous.We also reserve for another day, when it is properly before us, our views on any claim regarding an extraditee whose detention in another jurisdiction has been prolonged by unnecessary delay caused by the failure of Connecticut authorities to return the extraditee when he is available to be returned to Connecticut.We reiterate unequivocally, however, that the commissioner cannot provide any such "credit" under the authority of § 18-98.⁵

There is error, the judgment is set aside and the case is remanded with direction to dismiss the writ of habeas corpus.

In this opinion DANNEHY, J., concurred.

PETERS, Chief Justice, with whom SANTANIELLO, Associate Justice, joins, concurring.

I write separately because I am wholly persuaded, on the merits, by Justice Shea's dissenting opinion in Johnson v. Manson, 196 Conn. 309, 328, 493 A.2d 846, 856(1985).I do not understand how the majority holding can fail to chill the right of a person accused of a crime to contest his extradition to Connecticut.The commissioner of correction does not believe that this is what the Connecticut legislature intended to do, and neither do I.I agree with Justice Shea that General Statutes § 18-98, as interpreted by the majority in Johnson, violates constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws.

Nevertheless, I concur in the result reached by the majority here because I agree that this case is controlled by Johnson v. Manson."Though blind adherence to precedent is of no value, the necessity of certainty and continuity in the law dictates that 'a court should overrule its own precedents for only the most compelling reasons.Herald Publishing Co. v. Bill, 142 Conn. 53, 62, 111 A.2d 4(1955).'Society for Savings v. Chestnut Estates, Inc., 176 Conn. 563, 570, 409 A.2d 1020(1979)."State v. Castonguay, 194 Conn. 416, 435, 481 A.2d 56(1984).A change in the constituency of this court is not a sufficiently compelling reason to warrant departure from a recently established construction of a state statute.

Because the majority holding in Johnson v. Manson rests squarely on construction of the language of § 18-98, it is now up to the legislature to decide whether this court is correct in its view of the credit properly to be afforded pretrial detainees held in other jurisdictions.In light of the seriousness of the issues raised, I further urge the legislature, in the near future, to reexamine in their entirety the principles that should govern credits for pretrial incarceration.As counsel for the commissioner of correction noted in oral argument, effective operation of the criminal justice system depends upon having clear rules about how long a prison sentence a convicted criminal must serve.

For the reasons stated above, I concur in the judgment of the court.

SHEA, Associate Justice, dissenting.

It is clear that the dispositive issues in this appeal are the same as those presented in Johnson v. Manson, 196 Conn. 309, 328, 493 A.2d 846, 856(1985).The...