Taylor v. Rogers Grp., Inc.

• Decision Date: 31 October 2014
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13CV150-SAA
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi
• Parties: PETER TAYLOR PLAINTIFF v. ROGERS GROUP, INC. DEFENDANT

PETER TAYLOR PLAINTIFF v. ROGERS GROUP, INC. DEFENDANT

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13CV150-SAA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI OXFORD DIVISION

October 31, 2014

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case is before the undersigned on the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The motion is fully briefed and ready for review.

FACTUAL, PROCEDURAL AND JURISDICTIONAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Peter Taylor is a resident of Farmington, New York. Defendant Rogers Group, Inc. [RGI], an Indiana corporation with its principal place of business in Tennessee, is authorized to do business in the State of Mississippi.¹ Taylor filed this action against RGI in the Circuit Court of Marshall County, Mississippi on May 17, 2013, seeking damages for injuries he sustained in an accident caused by the negligence of one of RGI's employees during road construction in Marshall County, Mississippi. Docket 3. Defendant removed the action to this court on June 6, 2013. Docket 1. The court has jurisdiction of this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1332 as there is complete diversity between the parties, and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00.²

The facts of this case are generally agreed. See Docket 43. As summarized from the statement of undisputed facts (Docket 43), defendant RGI was the prime contractor for road construction work to be performed for the Mississippi Department of Transportation ("MDOT") on U.S. Highway 78 in Marshall County. RGI subcontracted with Villager Construction, Inc., plaintiff's employer, to remove pavement on the highway. The contract between RGI and Villager required Villager to "acquire, pay for and thereafter maintain policies of insurance," including workers' compensation insurance for its employees working at the project. Villager maintained coverage through ABC Compensation Trust.

Rogers was injured at the project on April 30, 3012, while he was standing on the shoulder of the west bound lane of Highway 78 helping remove asphalt for Villager when a cluster of barrels fell off a passing truck driven by RGI's employee, hit him from behind and caused him to fall onto the pavement. On May 7, 2012, plaintiff submitted a claim to Villager's workers' compensation carrier for the injuries he sustained, and Villager's carrier compensated plaintiff, paying him temporary total disability benefits, permanent partial disability benefits and all of his medical bills.

RGI filed a motion for summary judgment on March 25, 2014, arguing that plaintiff's claims are barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Act, MISS. CODE ANN. §71-3-1, et seq. Docket 42. A little over a week after it filed the summary judgment motion, RGI filed a motion for leave to amend its answer to include the exclusive remedy provision as an affirmative defense. Docket 48. The court allowed the amendment on June 10, 2014, and RGI filed its First Amended Answer to include as a defensethe exclusive remedy provision of the Mississippi Workers' Act. Docket 62 & 63. The specific defense added is as follows:

TWENTIETH DEFENSE

Plaintiff's claims against RGI are barred because Plaintiff, as a statutory employee of RGI under the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Act in connection with the project at issue, could only pursue a remedy against RGI for his alleged injuries under the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Act. MISS.CODE ANN. §§71-3-7.

Docket 63, p. 6. On July 28, 2014 the court denied plaintiff's Motion to Strike Waived and Untimely Defenses. Docket 67. The parties now have fully briefed the motion for summary judgment, and after detailed review of the record in this case, applicable rules and case law, the court finds that the defendant's motion should be granted.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A party is entitled to summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). On a motion for summary judgment, the movant has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). If the movant makes this showing, the burden then shifts to the non-movant to "go beyond the pleadings and by . . . affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324, quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c), (e). Before finding that no genuine issue for trial exists, the court must first be satisfied that no rational trier of fact could find for the non-movant. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

"[T]he issue of fact must be 'genuine.' When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Id. at 586; see also Kovacic v. Villarreal, 628 F.3d 209 (5^th Cir. 2010). "Conclusory statements, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment." RSR Corp. v. International Ins. Co., 612 F.3d 851, 857 (5^th Cir. 2010). Where a party opposes summary judgment on a claim or defense on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, and when the moving party can show a complete failure of proof on an essential element of the claim or defense, then all other issues become immaterial, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Further, self-serving "affidavit or deposition testimony setting forth ultimate or conclusory facts and conclusions of law are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment." Clark v. America's Favorite Chicken Co., 110 F.3d 295, 297 (5^th Cir. 1997); see also Jackson v. Cal-Western Packaging Corp., 602 F.3d 374 (5^th Cir. 2010).

The court must render summary judgment in favor of the moving party if "there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 135 (2000). The Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that the ruling court must not encroach upon the functions of the jury. As the Court stated in Reeves,

. . . the court must review all of the evidence in the record, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, but making no credibility determinations or weighing any evidence. The latter functions, along with the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts, are for the jury, not the court. Thus, although the court should review the record as a whole, it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe.

Id. (citations omitted). "Summary judgment, although a useful device, must be employedcautiously because it is a final adjudication on the merits." Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1241 (5^th Cir. 1989).

ANALYSIS

The sole issue raised by RGI in its motion for summary judgment is the applicability of the exclusive remedy provision of the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Act as a bar to plaintiff's claims. The law of this case is that Rogers has pled an affirmative defense that includes the statutory bar to plaintiff's claims against defendant under Mississippi Code Annotated §71-3-7. Rogers argues that New York law, rather than Mississippi law applies to this case, and in the alternative, if the court concludes that Mississippi law is applicable, the court should decline to follow Doubleday v. Boyd Construction Co., 418 So.2d 823 (Miss. 1982) and its progeny as these decisions are in derogation of the plain language and intent of the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Act.³ Docket 52. The court will address these arguments seriatim.

1. Choice of Law

A federal court sitting in diversity must apply the choice-of-law rules of the state in which it sits. Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 4-5, 96 S.Ct. 167, 46 L.Ed.2d 3 (1975) (per curiam); Ellis v. Trustmark Builders, Inc., 625 F.3d 222, 225 (5th Cir.2010); see also Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). This diversity case was removed from the Circuit Court of Marshall County, Mississippi. It is undisputed thatMississippi's choice-of-law rules apply. Williams v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 741 F.3d 617, 620 (5th Cir. 2014). In this case, Rogers argues that his right to bring suit against RGI, as the general contractor on the construction project, grows out of the contractual relationship between RGI and Villager, and therefore this court should use the choice of law analysis for claims sounding in contract rather than in tort. Docket 68.

Despite plaintiff's rather tenuous and convoluted arguments to this effect,⁴ the word "contract" does not even appear in the complaint. Docket 3. The only claim articulated against RGI in the plaintiff's complaint is specifically entitled, "CAUSE OF ACTION - NEGLIGENCE" [Docket 3, p. 2], and after review the court finds that there is no doubt that his claim sounds in tort, and is not contractual. See Powe, 910 So.2d at 1204. Finding that plaintiff's claims are tort claims, the court must apply the factors outlined in §145 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws (1971):

(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.⁵

(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:

(a) the place where the injury occurred,

(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,

(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place

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