Taylor v. Sandoval

• Decision Date: 28 December 1977
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 74-C-734.
• Citation: 442 F. Supp. 491
• Parties: Jack T. TAYLOR, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Ernest SANDOVAL, a/k/a Ernesto Sandoval, Individually and as Sheriff of Costilla County, Colorado, Samuel Gonzales, Roy D. Martinez and Ruben Pacheco, each Individually and as Members of the Board of County Commissioners of the County of Costilla and State of Colorado, the Board of County Commissioners of the County of Costilla, State of Colorado, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

442 F. Supp. 491

Jack T. TAYLOR, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Ernest SANDOVAL, a/k/a Ernesto Sandoval, Individually and as Sheriff of Costilla County, Colorado, Samuel Gonzales, Roy D. Martinez and Ruben Pacheco, each Individually and as Members of the Board of County Commissioners of the County of Costilla and State of Colorado, the Board of County Commissioners of the County of Costilla, State of Colorado, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 74-C-734.

United States District Court, D. Colorado.

December 28, 1977.

Albert B. Wolf, of Meer, Wolf & Slatkin, Denver, Colo., Jon L. Holm, of Holm & Dill, Denver, Colo., for plaintiff.

Normando R. Pacheco, of Pacheco & Auer, Denver, Colo., for defendant Ernest Sandoval, a/k/a Ernesto Sandoval and the remaining defendants.

Ronald Lee Cooke, of Cooke, Gilles & Schaefer, Denver, Colo., for remaining defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

CHILSON, Senior District Judge.

The plaintiff, a citizen and resident of North Carolina, prior to the year 1960 acquired a large tract of land (in excess of 77,000 acres) in Costilla County, Colorado, which is referred to herein as the Taylor Ranch.

A portion of the Taylor Ranch was traversed by four roads, commonly known as the Whiskey Pass, Vallejo, El Poso and San Francisco roads.

At some time subsequent to the year 1960, plaintiff constructed barricades across these four roads where they entered the Taylor Ranch to prevent the public from using that portion of the roads which existed on the Taylor Ranch.

In August 1974, the Board of County Commissioners of Costilla County removed the barricades claiming that the roads were public highways and were a part of the county highway system of Costilla County, and as such the County Commissioners had the right and duty to maintain these roads for the use of the public.

More specifically, the defendants claimed that these roadways were established by adverse use for more than twenty years prior to the year 1960 and thereby they became public highways by virtue of a Colorado statute which provides in its pertinent parts as follows:

"The following are declared to be public highways: . . . (c) All roads over private lands that have been used adversely without interruption or objection on the part of the owners of such lands for twenty consecutive years."

C.R.S. 1973, § 43-2-201.

The plaintiff denied that the roads in question were ever established as public highways by adverse use pursuant to the above statute and additionally, contended that if public highways were established by adverse use, they had been abandoned prior to August 1974.

The plaintiff, alleging diversity jurisdiction, instituted this action seeking compensatory and punitive damages from the defendants for an alleged unlawful trespass by the County Commissioners in entering upon his land and removing the barricades and sought an injunction against the County Commissioners enjoining any further trespass upon his property.

Trial was had to a jury and the following issues were submitted for determination by the jury under the following pertinent instructions:

"Therefore, the issues or questions to be answered by you are:

"First, were any one or more of these roads in question established by a preponderance of the evidence, as public highways in accordance with the Colorado statute which states:

`The following are declared to be public highways: . . . (c) All roads over private lands that have been used adversely without interruption or objection on the part of the owners of such lands for twenty consecutive years.'

prior to the year 1960. If your answer is `no' that no such public roads were established prior to the year 1960 by adverse use, you will find for the plaintiff.

"If you find that any one or more of the roads were established by adverse use, you will next consider whether or not any one or more of these roads were abandoned and if you find that any one or more of the roads have been abandoned, you shall find for the plaintiff as to that road or those roads.

"If you find the roads were established by adverse use and were not abandoned, the barricades constructed by plaintiff were unlawful and the removal thereof by defendants did not constitute an unlawful trespass and your verdict should be in favor of defendants and against the plaintiff.

. . . . .

"If you find in favor of the plaintiff on his claim of trespass, then you shall assess as damages, an amount which will fairly and justly compensate him for any damages which he suffered as shown by a preponderance of the evidence and which were proximately caused by the unlawful trespass.

"The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the nature and amount of the damages he suffered as a proximate result of any unlawful trespass by the defendants and any award for damages must be based on probability and not possibilities.

"An award may not be based on surmise, speculation or conjecture.

"If you find there was an unlawful trespass by the defendants and the plaintiff has not sustained the burden of proving damages, you shall award him nominal damages in the amount of one dollar.

"If you find in favor of the plaintiff, Jack T. Taylor, and award him actual damages for his claim of trespass, then you should consider whether the plaintiff is entitled to exemplary damages. If you also find beyond a reasonable doubt that the injury complained of was attended by circumstances of malice or a wanton or reckless disregard of the rights and feelings of the plaintiff, then in addition to any actual damages, you may also award the plaintiff a reasonable sum as exemplary damages.

"Exemplary damages are not to be construed as compensation to the plaintiff for wrong done, but as punishment to the defendant, and as an example to others."

The jury returned a verdict, finding that the four roads in question were not public highways as contended by the County Commissioners; that the plaintiff did not sustain the burden of proving compensatory damages and under the Court's instruction, awarded nominal compensatory damages in the amount of $1.00, and exemplary damages in the amount of $4,000.00.

The defendants filed a motion for a new trial and to alter and amend the judgment and a separate motion for judgment notwithstanding the jury's verdict.

Upon a consideration of these motions, the Court determined that only two questions were raised which required further consideration. They are:

1. Whether or not the trial record establishes that the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000.00, which is necessary for this Court's jurisdiction; and

2. whether or not the Court may permit the award of $4,000.00 exemplary damages to stand.

The Court requested counsel to submit briefs on these two questions. The briefs have been received and considered by the Court and for the reasons hereinafter set forth, the Court finds that the record sufficiently establishes the jurisdictional amount and that the exemplary damages should be reduced to $5.00.

1. JURISDICTION

Diversity jurisdiction as regulated by 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requires as one prerequisite that the value of the "matter in controversy" exceed $10,000.00. The dismissal of claims which fail to reach the jurisdictional amount is discussed in St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-90, 58 S.Ct. 586, 590, 82 L.Ed. 845 (1938):

"The rule governing dismissal for want of jurisdiction in cases brought in the federal court is that, unless the law gives a different rule, the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith. It must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal. The inability of the plaintiff to recover an amount adequate to give the court jurisdiction does not show his bad faith or oust the jurisdiction. . . . But if, from the face of the pleadings, it is apparent, to a legal certainty, that the plaintiff cannot recover the amount claimed, or if, from the proofs, the court is satisfied to a like certainty that the plaintiff never was entitled to recover that amount, . . . the suit will be dismissed. Events occurring subsequent to the institution of suit which reduce the amount recoverable below the statutory limit do not oust jurisdiction." (footnotes omitted)

These rules state the controlling law in the Tenth Circuit. See, e. g., Fehling v. Cantonwine, 522 F.2d 604 (10th Cir. 1975). The defendant, or the court on its own motion, may question the existence of the jurisdictional amount at any time in the proceedings. Rule 12(h)(3), Fed.R.Civ.P. Once a challenge has been made the plaintiff has the burden of showing that his claim is sufficient to survive the "legal certainty" test. Gibson v. Jeffers, 478 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1973); Emland Builders, Inc. v. Shea, 359 F.2d 927 (10th Cir. 1966).

Regardless of the date of an objection, the Court makes its determination of jurisdiction as of the date the action was commenced. Emland Builders, Inc. v. Shea, 359 F.2d 927 (10th Cir. 1966); 14 Wright, Miller and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3702 at 379 (1976). The testimony and evidence submitted during trial, however, may be used to show that the plaintiff, to a legal certainty, never had a $10,000 claim. In such cases the suit must be dismissed, even though the jury has deliberated and returned a verdict. City of Boulder v. Snyder, 396 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1051, 89 S.Ct. 692, 21 L.Ed.2d 693 (1969); F & S Const. Co. v. Jensen, 337 F.2d 160 (10th Cir. 1964); Francis v. Bothwell, 263 F.Supp. 354 (D.Colo.1967).

The defendants in this suit have denied the jurisdiction of this court throughout the proceedings. In their brief, defendants argue that the failure of the plaintiff to substantiate his damages during discovery, his failure to comply with a Magistrate's order compelling discovery, and his failure to present credible proof of his damages...