Taylor v. Sc Dept. of Motor Vehicles, No. 4089.

• Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina
• Writing for the Court: Per Curiam
• Citation: 627 S.E.2d 751
• Parties: Suchart TAYLOR, Respondent, v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, Appellant.
• Docket Number: No. 4089.
• Decision Date: 20 January 2006

627 S.E.2d 751 Suchart TAYLOR, Respondent,
v.
SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, Appellant. No. 4089. Court of Appeals of South Carolina. Submitted January 1, 2006. Decided January 20, 2006. Refiled February 27, 2006.

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Frank L. Valenta, Jr., and Kelli Gregg Maddox, of Blythewood, for Appellant.

Michael Sean O'Neal, of North Charleston, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:

The South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles (the Department) appeals the trial court's order reversing the administrative hearing officer's order sustaining the suspension of Suchart Taylor's driver's license. We reverse.

FACTS

On September 1, 2004, Officer Hamm of the South Carolina Highway Patrol responded to a report of a vehicle accident on Interstate 26 in Berkley County. When Officer Hamm arrived at the scene of the accident, paramedics were treating Taylor for his injuries. During a break in the treatment, Officer Hamm approached Taylor's vehicle. As he approached, he smelled an odor of beer emanating from the area around Taylor. Officer Hamm arrested Taylor for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). Due to the extent of Taylor's injuries, Taylor was transported to the hospital.

At the hospital, Officer Hamm determined Taylor could not take a breath test due to the heavy mouth injuries he sustained from the accident. Officer Hamm requested a blood sample from Taylor. Taylor refused to provide a blood sample, and refused to sign the implied consent form. Because Taylor refused to sign the form, Officer Hamm read it out loud, but did not provide Taylor a tangible copy. Thus, Taylor heard his implied consent rights but neither read nor signed the implied consent form.

Because Taylor refused chemical testing, Officer Hamm issued him a notice of suspension of his driver's license. Shortly thereafter, Taylor requested a hearing to challenge the suspension of his license. On October 13, 2004, the hearing officer sustained the suspension of Taylor's license. Taylor then petitioned the trial court to review the administrative hearing officer's order. The trial court heard Taylor's petition and reversed the hearing officer's order. The Department now appeals the trial court's order.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The South Carolina Administrative Procedures Act establishes the standard of review for an appeal from an order of an administrative agency. Section 1-23-380(A)(6) of the South Carolina Code (2005) provides:

The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:

(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions. . . .

"The findings of an administrative agency are presumed correct and will be set aside only if unsupported by substantial evidence." S.C. Dep't of Motor Vehicles v. Nelson, 364 S.C. 514, 519, 613 S.E.2d 544, 547 (2005). "Substantial evidence is not a mere scintilla of evidence, nor the evidence viewed blindly from one side of the case, but is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion the administrative agency reached in order to justify its action." Id. "In reviewing a final decision of an administrative agency, the circuit court essentially sits as an

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appellate court to review alleged errors committed by the agency." Id.

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