Taylor v. Schweiker, 82-3051

Decision Date30 May 1984
Docket NumberNo. 82-3051,82-3051
Parties, Unempl.Ins.Rep. CCH 15,511 Catharine TAYLOR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard S. SCHWEIKER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Floyd A. Ramsier, Fort Wayne, Ind., Sanford Meizlish, Barkan & Neff Co., Columbus, Ohio, for plaintiff-appellant.

James W. Miles, Dept. of Health and Human Services, Chicago, Ill., R. Lawrence

Steele, Jr., U.S. Atty., Hammond, Ind., for defendant-appellee.

Before PELL, COFFEY and FLAUM, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from a district court judgment affirming a decision by the Secretary that claimant Catharine Taylor did not qualify for Social Security disability insurance benefits. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse and remand the case to the Social Security Administration.

The claimant is a former elementary school teacher who taught fifth and sixth grades from 1937 through 1942 and second grade from 1957 through 1974. In March 1976, she applied for Social Security disability benefits and her claim was allowed. It was determined, however, that her disability ceased in August 1977; that determination was not challenged and may not be challenged here. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977). In May 1981, when the claimant was 61 years old, she again filed for disability benefits.

The application was denied both initially and on reconsideration. In December 1981, a de novo hearing was conducted by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ); the claimant was represented by an attorney and testified on her own behalf. The ALJ determined that she was not disabled for purposes of the statute, and that decision became the final decision of the Secretary when it was adopted by the Appeals Council in March 1982. The claimant initiated review in federal court, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary. On appeal, the claimant argues that the decision of the ALJ was not supported by substantial evidence in the record and that the ALJ did not consider the credibility of her claims of inability to work.

I.

The claimant alleged that she was unable to work because of nervousness and emotional problems, high blood pressure, and the after-effects of several surgical procedures. The ALJ found that she suffered from mild degenerative arthritis and mild depression. He further found that these impairments were not severe and, consequently, that the claimant was not disabled for purposes of the Social Security Act. 1

The question before us is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the Secretary's findings. Whitney v. Schweiker, 695 F.2d 784, 786 (7th Cir.1982); 42 U.S.C. Sec. 405(g). Substantial evidence is that which "a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support [the] conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). If the record contains such support, we must affirm, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 405(g), unless there has been an error of law, Schmoll v. Harris, 636 F.2d 1146, 1150 (7th Cir.1980).

The record in this case consists of the claimant's testimony and a number of medical and psychiatric reports. At the hearing, the claimant testified that she is nervous and sometimes has trouble with her memory. She testified that she no longer goes out or attends church because to do so causes emotional problems and stress. Also, after she had a hysterectomy in 1971 she no longer could "keep up with the pace." She stated that she couldn't stand to be around the children and her co-workers and that she would cry or become extremely angry almost every day during her last two years of teaching. During that time, she stayed in bed from Friday evening until Monday morning every week. At present, she stays at home where she prepares the meals, does most of the laundry, and does a good deal of the housecleaning. She reported having surgery for torn cartilage on her left knee and said that she continues to experience pain and stiffness in both knees. She estimated that she could probably walk about three blocks and stand in one place for about two minutes. She also reported symptoms of swelling and pain in her hands which she believes are caused by arthritis. These problems cause difficulty in lifting and carrying objects. Other operations have included the hysterectomy, a procedure for hemorrhoids, and bladder surgery. She said that the stitches from several of these operations occasionally bother her and would prevent her from lifting more than a few books at one time. She also reported possible irregular heartbeats, causing shortness of breath and a little dizziness. She further testified that to be with people bothers her a great deal and that she is not able to do tedious tasks; in response to a question she said that she would not be able to tolerate grading papers. She said her condition has not appreciably changed since 1977.

Also before the ALJ were medical reports from seven doctors, three psychiatrists, and one psychologist. The medical reports, taken as a whole, confirm her reported operations and indicate arthritis in her left knee, a slightly enlarged heart, some irregular heartbeats, and possible heart disease and hypertension. As of August 1981, the medication taken for the hypertension was controlling it only poorly.

Four psychiatric and psychological reports outline the claimant's emotional problems. In April 1976, a psychiatrist, Dr. Fiacable, found possible evidence of mild depressive symptoms with a "probably associated anxiety under pressure." He doubted that she had the ability to return to a competitive setting and to cope with day-to-day routine. In May 1976, a psychologist diagnosed the claimant as "normal with considerable emotional overlay," and indicated that she "could not or should not" go back to her teaching situation. In August 1977, a psychiatrist, Dr. Musselman, did not make a specific diagnosis but included the following statement: "She is capable of doing all her own housework and thus in the opinion of this examiner, I would not consider her totally disabled on the basis of her psychological problems." In June 1981, an internist, Dr. Bartel, conducted what appears to have been a neuro-psychiatric evaluation. He diagnosed her condition as depressive neurosis-reactive and indicated that she might respond to psychotherapy and medication. He felt that she could relate to other people in work or personal situations, but he also stated that at that time she could concentrate only on simple tasks and that her ability to withstand the stresses of day-to-day work activity was only fair. He did not specifically address her ability to handle the stresses of teaching.

The ALJ concluded that the claimant's emotional problem, which he termed mild depression, was not a severe impairment. He based this conclusion on Dr. Bartel's report, Dr. Musselman's comment that a specific diagnosis was not warranted, and the claimant's testimony that she could take care of her personal needs and housework. In affirming the ALJ's decision, the district court stated that there was no indication that the ALJ had ignored the psychiatric reports or overlooked any of her infirmities or their effects.

II.

We find it necessary to remand this case because we are unable to conclude that the critical finding of the ALJ is based on substantial evidence. The critical finding was that the claimant's emotional problem is not a severe impairment. A severe impairment is, for purposes of the statute, one which significantly limits an individual's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.1521(a) (1983). The Secretary's regulations provide examples of basic work activities including use of judgment; responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual work situations; and dealing with changes in a routine work setting. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.1521(b)(4), (5) & (6) (1983).

Looking only at the claimant's emotional...

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