Taylor v. Slater

• Decision Date: 23 December 1898
• Parties: TAYLOR v. SLATER et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

41 A. 1001

21 R.I. 104

TAYLOR

v. SLATER et al.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Dec. 23, 1898.

Bill by Maria Louise Taylor against John W. Slater and others. Defendants demur. Demurrer sustained.

Louis Kistler, John W. Byam, Robert B. Kendall, and Alfred S. Johnson, for complainant.

C. P. Robinson and Livingston Ham, for respondents.

STINESS, J. The complainant, a married woman, brings this bill to enforce the payment of a promissory note, on demand, against the representatives of the estates of Earl P. Mason and William S. Slater, deceased, and legatees and heirs of said Mason and Slater. The note, for the sum of $25,000, was given to her August 3, 1872, for money advanced out of her estate to the firm of Taylor & Wright, of Chicago; the firm consisting of Frank C. Taylor, her husband, and John W. Wright, both of Chicago, and also of said Mason and Slater, of this state. Soon after the date of the note the firm ceased to do business, and said Taylor and Wright were then, and since have been, insolvent. Earl P. Mason died intestate September 21, 1876, and William S. Slater died testate May 22, 1882. The complainant commenced an action against the surviving partners October 7, 1892, in Illinois, and recovered judgment, on which execution was returned nulla bona. This bill was filed April 26, 1897, to which the respondents demur.

We cannot consider the first two grounds of demurrer, that the note was void in Illinois prior to 1874, and that the separate estate of a married woman must be derived from persons other than her husband, for the reason that courts do not take judicial cognizance of the statutes of other states, and, hence, to raise a question of law before trial, they must be set up by pleading. O'Reilly v. Railroad Co., 16 R. I. 388, 17 Atl. 171, 900, and 19 Atl. 244.

The third ground of demurrer is based upon the statute of limitations and laches. In a former suit upon this note, which is referred to in the bill, this complainant alleged that the note was negotiated at the Fourth National Bank of Chicago, and that her trustee purchased said note two days afterwards, and that January 1, 1876, the firm gave another note to her for interest then due. Upon these allegations we held that the note for $25,000 was barred, because, the statute having begun to run while the note was in the hands of the bank, it continued to run after it came to her possession; the alleged new promise operating only to suspend the bar, and not to create a new cause of action. We also held that the second note was not barred, because it was given to the complainant while under the disability of coverture. Taylor t. Slater, 16 R. I. 86, 12 Atl. 727. According to that decision the statute of limitations does not apply to this bill, because the complainant now avers that the note was delivered directly to herself, a married woman. Strictly, statutes of limitations are applicable only to courts of law, but, as a rule, equity follows the law in this respect, for the reason that one should not be allowed to enforce a claim in equity which upon grounds of public policy could not be enforced at law. This doctrine, in equity generalized as laches, is of broader scope than a statute. As Story says: "There are cases in which the statutes would be a bar at law, but in which equity would, notwithstanding, grant relief; and, on the other hand, there are cases where the statutes would not be a bar at law, but where equity, notwithstanding, would refuse relief." 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 64a. Equity does not favor stale claims, and will not assist one who has slept upon his rights, and shows no excuse for his laches in asserting them. Lane v. Locke, 150 U. S. 193-201, 14 Sup. Ct 78. The defense may be taken on demurrer, where it appears in the bill, or by plea or answer. Warren v. Tool Co., 19 R. I. 360, 33 Atl. 876; Cammack v. Carpenter, 3 App. D. C. 219; Kerfoot v. Billings, 160 Ill. 563, 43 N. E. 804. The defense may also be set up in argument (Woodmanse v. Williams, 37 U. S. App. 109, 15 C. C. A. 520, and 68 Fed. 489), and even on suggestion of the court (Chase v. Chase, 19 R. I. 523, 36 Atl. 1131). The rule as stated in the latter case, reported in 20 R. I. —, 37 Atl. 804, is that the delay must be such as works a disadvantage to another. Applying that rule to the present case, we find that the bill sets out a note about 25 years old that after the death of Mr. Mason, in 1876, and after the death of Mr. Slater, in 1882, no suit was brought upon the note against the co-partnership until 1892, although the partners Taylor and Wright were "totally and completely insolvent" The bill alleges that there are now no assets of any kind of said partnership estate, but it does not allege that there were none when the firm ceased to do business, or that the...