Taylor v. State

• Decision Date: 27 September 1973
• Citation: 287 So.2d 901,291 Ala. 756
• Parties: In re Archie TAYLOR v. STATE of Alabama. Ex parte STATE of Alabama ex rel. Attorney General. SC 430.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 901

287 So.2d 901

291 Ala. 756

In re Archie TAYLOR v. STATE of Alabama.

Ex parte STATE of Alabama ex rel. Attorney General.

SC 430.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Sept. 27, 1973.

William J. Baxley, Atty. Gen. and Joseph G. L. Marston, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State, petitioner.

No brief for respondent.

MADDOX, Justice.

The central issue presented is the role of defense counsel in a criminal prosecution. Archie Taylor was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Except for Taylor's alibi testimony there was no substantial conflict in the evidence presented at the trial.

Four eye-witnesses, who knew both defendant and deceased, testified that Taylor accosted the deceased, Jimmie Lee Mason, in South Birmingham, that the two men argued and Taylor shot and killed Mason. Taylor was arrested almost immediately after the murder a short distance from the scene.

The trial court appointed counsel to represent Taylor. His attorney made a thorough investigation of the facts in the case. Counsel learned early in his investigation that the first officer to arrive found a partially opened knife near deceased's body. The officer had taken custody of the knife to preserve it as evidence, and had left then to pursue Taylor. When this officer returned to the scene, he found the deputy coroner examining the deceased. He told the coroner about the knife. Other witnesses testified that they did not see Mason with a knife.

The defense attorney also went to the coroner's office and inquired whether a blood sample was taken from Mason's body to determine if he had been drinking. Counsel learned that a blood sample had been taken, and that according to the State Toxicologist's report, the deceased was intoxicated shortly before death.

On several occasions before trial, defendant's attorney conferred with Taylor and told him about the knife and Mason's intoxication and that he could make out a good case of self-defense. Taylor replied, 'Maybe we could, But I wasn't there.' Defense counsel said, 'Well, I cannot make out a case of self-defense if you weren't there.' Taylor said, 'Nonetheless, that is what I am going to say. I wasn't there.'

Counsel begged Taylor to let him proceed with self-defense. On each occasion Taylor insisted that he could not plead guilty in good conscience. Counsel advised Taylor that without some evidence of self-defense, the knife found near the deceased, and the deceased's state of intoxication could not be proven. Taylor said he understood this, but he could not admit killing the deceased.

Defense counsel also obtained an agreement for Taylor to bargain his plea. The prosecutor agreed to recommend a twenty year sentence if Taylor would plead guilty to a lesser charge. Taylor refused.

From indictment to trial, Taylor said he was in a cafe about two blocks from the murder scene and when he left the cafe, he saw an ambulance and a crowd of people gathered around. Two minutes before trial, he turned to his lawyer and said, 'By the way, I do remember where I was. I was in jail.' He produced a receipt from the warden at the county jail and claimed the date thereon was August 1, 1971.

The lawyer defended Taylor on his alibi, although strong evidence was presented to indicate that Taylor was lying. First, no one in the cafe had seen Taylor the morning of the murder. Secondly, the warden testified that what appeared to be August 1 on the receipt was actually August 7, one day after the murder.

The Court of Criminal Appeals noted that Taylor's attorney was 'faced with a recalcitrant and uncooperative defendant who was adamant in 'quarterbacking' his own trial.'

During a recess in the main trial, the defendant's attorney told the trial judge about the knife and Mason's intoxication and that Taylor had refused to cooperate by not allowing him to defend him on self-defense. The trial judge told the attorney to 'make voluminous notes, so that if he needed to remember almost immediately, or years later, that he would have enough notes to refresh his recollection about this, because in my opinion, the petitioner (defendant), through interference in this case, or because the case was the case it was, or whatever it was, after a long period of time in the penitentiary, then he would come back and say that someone had improperly represented him.'

Five days after his conviction, Taylor wrote a letter to the trial judge. In it the defendant said, 'I am writing to ask you to reconsider may case for and (sic) appeal on the grounds of misrepresentation by my lawyer. He fail to product (sic) evidence in my faver (sic).'

The trial judge treated the letter as a motion for a new trial. The court appointed another lawyer to represent Taylor at the hearing on the motion and on appeal. Taylor testified at the hearing that, 'He (i.e., his attorney at the main trial) haven't mentioned self-defense to me during the whole time he walked (sic) up to me.' The attorney who represented Taylor during trial contradicted his client's testimony by restating matters already brought out; that early in the investigation he discovered the knife and that deceased was intoxicated; that he had pleaded with his client to let him introduce this evidence; that Taylor plead self-defense; and that Taylor refused to do so and vehemently denied that he shot and killed the deceased.

The trial court overruled Taylor's motion for a new trial.

On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed Taylor's conviction and held that the motion for a new trial should have been granted. Taylor v. State, Ala.Cr.App., 51 Ala.App. 573, 287 So.2d 889 (1973).

This court granted the State's petition for certiorari.

It affirmatively appears that after a full, independent investigation of the circumstances and facts, after consultation with his client, defense counsel recommended to Taylor that he admit to killing the deceased in self-defense. The record also clearly reveals that Taylor, on several occasions, said that he had an alibi and that, 'I wasn't there.'

Did the defense attorney fail to perform in his role as defense counsel? A majority of the Court of Appeals thought so. We do not think so, and must reverse that court.

It is well settled that every person is entitled not only to the assistance of counsel, but also to the effective assistance of counsel. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158, 84 A.L.R. 527 (1932). Constitution of Alabama, Art. I, § 6. Also, the State must appoint counsel for an accused felon if he cannot afford to hire his own attorney. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, 93 A.L.R.2d 733 (1963); Title 15 § 318(6), Code of Alabama, 1940, Recomp. 1958 (1971 Supp.).

This concept of 'effectiveness' as a part of the Sixth Amendment's guaranty of assistance of counsel first appeared in Powell, supra.

"* * * (T)he record indicates that the appearance was rather Pro forma than zealous and active . . .' Under the circumstances disclosed, we hold that defendants were not accorded the right of counsel in any substantial sense.' 287 U.S. at 58, 53 S.Ct. at 60.

'* * * (I)n a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel . . . it is the duty of the court . . . to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law; and that duty is not discharged by an assignment at such a time or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case.' 287 U.S. at 71, 53 S.Ct. at 65.

In Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698, 704 (5th Cir. 1965), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals said:

'It is the general rule that relief from a final conviction on the ground of incompetent or ineffective counsel will be granted only when the trial was a farce, or a mockery of justice, or was shocking to the conscience of the reviewing court, or the purported representation was only perfunctory, in bad faith, a sham, a pretense, or without adequate opportunity for conference and preparation. (Emphasis added.)

The 'mockery of justice' rule is frequently cited as a minimum standard of competence and efficacy. ¹ Other factors often mentioned include the fairness of the trial as a whole, the reasonableness of counsel's assistance, ² loyalty to client, good faith, and the nature and extent of counsel's pre-trial preparation and opportunity for conference. ³

No one factor determines whether defendant is effectively represented in accord with due process of law. There is a wide range of acts and omissions which result in charges of ineffective counsel.

The nature of the problem of misrepresentation is further reason for the lack of an all-encompassing definition of 'effectivenss' or 'ineffectiveness.' Effective assistance does not mean counsel is without error. What may later seem to be error may have been a trial tactic at the time. Further, conviction of a client does not prove the lack of skill or zeal on the part of counsel. See Mills v. State, 275 Ala. 217, 153 So.2d 650, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 867, 84 S.Ct. 142, 11 L.ed.2d 95 (1963); Echols v. State, 276 Ala. 489, 164 So.2d 486 (1964); Aldridge v. Sate, 278 Ala. 470, 179 So.2d 51 (1965).

The proper role of defense counsel has received much attention by members of the judiciary and the legal profession. In 1963, the American Bar Association began formulating criminal justice standards relating to proper method of handling a criminal case. After careful and deliberate screening and drafting, seventeen Standards for the Administration of Criminal Justice have been approved. They provide guidance at each stage of a criminal trial from the police function to the last postconviction proceeding. The Standards, designed to strengthen the criminal justice system, are suggestion guidelines for use in the fifty states and the federal jurisdiction. See 'The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice: Prescription for an Ailing System,' Tom C. Clark, 47...