Taylor v. State

• Decision Date: 27 February 1981
• Citation: 399 So.2d 881
• Parties: Ex parte State of Alabama ex rel. Attorney General. (Re Omar TAYLOR v. STATE of Alabama). 79-732.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 881

399 So.2d 881

Ex parte State of Alabama ex rel. Attorney General (Re Omar TAYLOR v. STATE of Alabama).

79-732.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Feb. 27, 1981.

Rehearing Denied April 10, 1981.

Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Thomas R. Allison, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.

Robert M. Beno, Montgomery, for respondent.

TORBERT, Chief Justice.

We granted certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals in Taylor v. State, 399 So.2d 875 (Ala.Cr.App.1980), which reversed the trial court decision. The principal issue presented for our consideration is whether the trial court erred in admitting the fingerprints and confession of the defendant, Omar Taylor. We hold that the evidence was properly admitted, and we reverse the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

At approximately 7:00 p.m. on December 2, 1978, two males entered and robbed Moseley's Grocery Store at the intersection of West Jeff Davis Street and Cleveland Avenue. There had been a number of robberies in this area of Montgomery in recent weeks, and the police initiated an intensive manhunt in an effort to apprehend the culprits. A number of suspects were interviewed, and during the course of the interviews it was learned that Appellant might be involved in the robbery of Moseley's Grocery Store. According to one of the investigating officers, the information linking Appellant to the robbery came from a jail inmate, Charles Martin, who was himself a suspect in the same robbery. Martin was in custody, charged with rape and robbery in an unrelated case.

At a suppression hearing, Police Officer R. D. Mobley testified that during numerous conversations with Martin, he told the officer he had information that Appellant was involved in the robbery of Moseley's Grocery Store. Mobley stated: "(Martin) didn't tell me how he got it. I don't know how he got it.... He did not go into any details or who told him or when or where he obtained the information, but only that he was involved in a robbery.... He said that he had heard that Omar Taylor (Appellant) was involved in the robbery of Moseley's Grocery. What part he took, he doesn't know."

Officer Mobley did not arrest Appellant. He referred the information which he had received from Martin to two other officers assigned to the Robbery-Homicide Division of the Montgomery Police Department, and these two officers arrested Appellant without a warrant on January 4, 1979. The arrest was based on the information furnished them by Officer Mobley following his interview with Martin.

Upon arresting Appellant, the officers informed him who they were and told him that he was being arrested in connection with the robbery of Moseley's Grocery. After Appellant was placed in the patrol car, one of the officers recited to him his constitutional rights, and, upon arriving at the station house, Appellant was surrendered to other detectives for questioning.

Sergeant Ed Alford, one of the arresting officers, testified that the arrest was made on information furnished by another investigator in the Robbery-Homicide Division who had interviewed informant Martin. Based on this information, Appellant was arrested without a warrant, as the officer felt it necessary to pick him up and check him out. When asked if he felt his information was sufficient to arrest Appellant, he replied, "Well, I did not know because I had never seen him." Asked if there was any basis on which the credibility of Martin could be established, he answered, "I did not attempt to establish any credibility on him."

Mr. and Mrs. John Moseley were in their store on the night of December 2, 1978, when the robbery occurred. Mr. Moseley was at the cash register checking out customers and Mrs. Moseley was in the office near the back of the store when she observed two men come in. One of the men entered the office, pulled a pistol on Mrs. Moseley and said, "This is a stick up. Give me all the money in the safe." When she told him there was no money in the safe, he repeated the demand, whereupon she told him that the safe was old and was not in use. He grabbed her by her collar, forced her from the office, and told her to go to the back of the store. As she was leaving the office, she glanced in the direction of the check-out register and saw her husband and an employee with their hands in the air and another man pointing a pistol at them. Shortly thereafter, she saw two men exit the store.

Mr. Moseley testified that just before closing time a man, approximately five feet, five inches tall, came to the checkout counter with a two-pound bag of Domino sugar and a package of Zeigler hot dogs. He then asked for some lighter flints. Mr. Moseley turned away to get the flints, and when he turned back around, the man pointed a pistol at him and ordered him to open the cash register. Mr. Moseley flipped open the register, from which the bandit took $600.00. The bandit then demanded his wallet. Mr. Moseley told him he did not have a wallet. When the man again ordered him to produce his wallet, Mr. Moseley then reached in his back pocket and got his wallet which contained eight or nine hundred dollars. He handed the wallet to the robber. The man immediately ran from the store, but left the packages of sugar and hot dogs on the counter. Mr. Moseley then called the police.

Mr. and Mrs. Moseley were unable to identify either of the men engaged in the robbery, either at a line-up or in court. Fingerprints on the sugar and weiners turned out to be those of Appellant. This fact was undisputed. The interrogating officers informed Appellant that his fingerprints were found on the bags of sugar and hot dogs. Subsequently, he signed a waiver of rights form and executed a written confession. The form and signed confession were later admitted into evidence.

Appellant does not question the voluntariness of his confession, as it was shown to have been given in compliance with Miranda. Additionally, no promises, threats, coercion, rewards or hopes thereof were made or held out to Appellant to induce him to make and sign the confession. Appellant contends, however, that he was illegally arrested without probable cause and without an arrest warrant, and was involuntarily transported to the station house for interrogation which thereafter led to his confession.

The United States Supreme Court, in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), held that the question of whether a confession has been purged of the taint of an illegal arrest under Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), "must be answered on the facts of each case." 422 U.S. at 603, 95 S.Ct. at 2261. We are of the opinion that the facts in the case before us fall somewhere between those surrounding the confession in Wong Sun, where the Court held that the connection between Wong Sun's unlawful arrest and his statement "had become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint," 371 U.S. at 491, 83 S.Ct. at 419, quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341, 60 S.Ct. 266, 267, 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939), and those in Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979), Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), and Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969), where the Court held that the confessions were tainted by the unlawful arrests. We must therefore determine on which side of the line separating admissible confessions from inadmissible ones the confession of Omar Taylor falls.

In Dunaway, the petitioner was arrested without probable cause in hopes that something would "turn up." 442 U.S. at 218, 99 S.Ct. at 2259. Less than an hour after he reached the police station, after being informed of his Miranda rights, he waived counsel and made the first of two statements and drew sketches that eventually incriminated him. 442 U.S. at 203, 99 S.Ct. at 2251. Between the time of Dunaway's arrest and that of his confession, "no intervening event of significance whatsoever" took place. 442 U.S. at 218, 99 S.Ct. at 2259.

Brown contained facts similar to those in Dunaway. Petitioner Brown was arrested without probable cause and made a statement shortly thereafter. The State of Illinois argued that the Miranda warnings were sufficient to attenuate the taint of the illegal arrest. The Court held that "(t)he Miranda warnings are an important factor ... in determining whether the confession is obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest. But they are not the only factor to be considered." 422 U.S. at 603, 95 S.Ct. at 2261. Three additional factors were then set out by the Court to aid in determining whether the taint of an illegal arrest has been attenuated. They are: "(1) (t)he temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, (2) the presence of intervening circumstances, and ... (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct." Id. at 603-04, 95 S.Ct. at 2261-62 (citations omitted).

In Davis, the police in Meridian, Mississippi, without warrants, picked up 24 Negro youths over a period of 10 days and took them to police headquarters, where they were questioned briefly, fingerprinted, and then released without being charged. 394 U.S. at 722, 89 S.Ct. at 1395. Davis was subsequently arrested, without a warrant and without probable cause, and fingerprinted again. The second set of fingerprints, along with the fingerprints of 23 others, was sent to the FBI for comparison with prints taken from the scene of the crime. Id. The FBI matched Davis's prints to those of the perpetrator of the crime, and he was indicted. Id. at 723, 89 S.Ct. at 1395. The Court held that the fingerprints should be suppressed as the fruit of an illegal arrest. Id. at 728, 89 S.Ct. at 1398.

The Court held in Wong Sun, however, that where the defendant was lawfully arraigned and released on his own recognizance, and several days later voluntarily returned to the police station and...