Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

• Citation: 248 La. 246,178 So.2d 238
• Decision Date: 02 July 1965
• Docket Number: No. 47693,47693
• Parties: Archie G. TAYLOR v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY et al.
• Court: Supreme Court of Louisiana

Page 238

178 So.2d 238

248 La. 246

Archie G. TAYLOR v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY et al.

No. 47693.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

July 2, 1965.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 30, 1965.

Gist, Gist, Methvin & Trimble, by DeWitt T. Methvin, Jr., Alexandria, for defendant-relator.

James A. Pharis, Jr., of Pharis & Pharis, Alexandria, for plaintiff-respondent.

HAMLIN, Justice.

In the exercise of our supervisory jurisdiction (Art. VII, Sec. 11, La.Const. of 1921) we directed Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, for a partial review of its judgment which affirmed a judgment of the trial court in favor of plaintiff, Archie G. Taylor, and against defendants, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, in the amounts of $5,000.00 and $5,234.15, respectively. In granting the writ, we stated, 'Writ granted as to State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., but limited to a consideration of the question of whether Daniel Taylor was a resident of the household of Garnie Taylor in Arkansas at the time of the accident (Assignment of Error No. 1.) In all other respects the application is denied.' 247 La. 681, 173 So.2d 543; La.App., 171 So.2d 816; La.App., 158 So.2d 413.

The facts leading to this proceeding are not in dispute. During the early morning hours of September 13, 1962, plaintiff and his nephew, Daniel Taylor, born in 1943, departed from plaintiff's residence in Pineville, Louisiana, to go to their place of employment near New Roads, Louisiana. Daniel drove plaintiff's 1957 Ford Ranchero pickup truck with his uncle's consent, while plaintiff slept on the seat next to him. Some few miles west of Marksville, Louisiana, Daniel apparently went to sleep and lost control of the vehicle. He and plaintiff were awakened by the swerving motion of the truck, which overturned despite their attempts to regain control of it. As a result, plaintiff was seriously injured.

At the time of the accident, Daniel, the son of Garnie William Taylor of Camden, Arkansas, was an unemancipated minor, nineteen years of age, having resided with his parents all of his life; he had graduated from high school in Arkansas during May, 1962, and wanted to go to work. During the early part of July, 1962, Archie Taylor, a drag-line operator, asked Daniel to come to Louisiana and work with him as an oiler. Daniel accepted his uncle's invitation and came to Louisiana; he lived with his uncle but paid his own way; he secured employment with his uncle's employer, his work being under his uncle's supervision. He brought to Louisiana those clothes that he needed for work and visited his parents several times when he had time off.

Plaintiff brought this suit for damages against his own liability insurer, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, and against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (Hereinafter referred to as State Farm), the liability insurer of Garnie W. Taylor, Daniel's father.

Relying on the case of Watkins v. Cupit, 130 So.2d 720, both the trial court and the Court of Appeal held that Daniel's legal residence was that of his parents, Camden, Arkansas, and that State Farm was liable to plaintiff in damages for the negligence of his nephew.

State Farm argues in this Court that the Court of Appeal erred in holding that Daniel Taylor was not a member of the same household as plaintiff with whom he was admittedly living and working and in holding that Daniel Taylor was a resident of the same household as his father in Arkansas.

Insofar as this limited writ is concerned, the pertinent provisions of State Farm's family type policy provide:

'POLICY NUMBER 291 359--F30--04

POLICY PERIOD (Month-Day-Year) 06--26--58 to 12--30--58

'Named Insured

TAYLOR, GARNIE W

ROUTE 1 BOX 192A

LOUANN ARK

COVERAGES AS DEFINED IN POLICY AB C D G$50

'DEFINITIONS--INSURING AGREEMENTS I AND II

Named Insured--means the individual so designated in the declarations and also includes his spouse, if a resident of the same household.

Insured--under coverages A, B, C and M, the unqualified word 'insured' includes (1) the named insured, and also includes (2) his relatives, (3) any other person while using the automobile, provided the actual use of the automobile is with the permission of the named insured, and (4) under coverages A and B any person or organization legally responsible for the use thereof by an insured as defined under the three subsections above.

Relative--means a relative of the named insured who is a resident of the same household.

Automobile--means the private passenger automobile, utility automobile or trailer described in the declarations and includes a temporary substitute automobile and a newly acquired automobile, and under coverages A, B, C and M a trailer owned by the named insured.

Private Passenger Automobile--means a private passenger, station wagon or jeep type automobile.

Utility Automobile--means an automobile with a load capacity of fifteen hundred pounds or less of the pick-up body, sedan delivery or panel truck type.

'INSURING AGREEMENT II--NON-OWNED AUTOMOBILES

Such insurance as is afforded by this policy under coverages A, B, Division 2 of C and M, D, D--50, F, G and H with respect to the automobile applies to the use of a non-owned automobile by the named insured or a relative, and any other person or organization legally responsible for the use by the named insured or relative of an automobile not owned or hired by such other person or organization.

Insuring Agreement II does not apply:

(1) to a non-owned automobile (a) registered in the name of the named insured or a relative, (b) hired by or furnished to the named insured or a relative for regular use, or (c) while used in the business or occupation of such named insured or relative * * *.'

Daniel Taylor, being his son, was a relative of Garnie W. Taylor at the time the instant accident occurred. Posed for our determination, therefore, is the question of whether under the facts as stated supra he was 'a resident of the same household' as that of Garnie W. Taylor, the named insured under the instant family automobile liability policy.

In 21 La.L.Rev., pp. 835, 836, the author (Gerald L. Walter, Jr.) well states:

'The guiding principle of the family automobile policy 'is to cover virtually every risk contingency which might reasonably occur in a family's use of automobiles.' In general, the policy attempts to provide protection for the insured against liability growing out of the use of an automobile without regard to the particular automobile being used at the time when liability attaches. At the same time certain limitations are imposed for the purpose of enabling the insurer to set premiums which will not make the cost of such a policy prohibitive. Broadening of coverage, while maintaining reasonable premiums, has been accomplished through such provisions as the 'non-owned automobile,' 'owned automobile,' and 'temporary substitution' provisions.'¹

The instant insurance policy constituted a contract between Garnie W. Taylor and State Farm and was the law between them. Harmon v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company, 247 La. 263, 170 So.2d 646. The policy was issued in 1958, and no contention has been raised that it was not in force and that premiums were not timely paid at the time of the accident. The words used in the policy are to be understood in the common and usual signification, without attending so much to grammatical rules as to general and popular use. LSA-C.C. Art. 1946. 'Also, all ambiguities in the provisions of an insurance policy are to be construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer, subject to the qualification that if the intent of the policy is clearly evidenced by the terms of the contract, then the policy must be given a reasonable interpretation with relation to such intent.' Liprie v. Michigan Millers Mutual Insurance Co., La.App., 143 So.2d 597. See, Hemel v. State Farm Mut. Anto. Ins. Co., 211 La. 95, 29 So.2d 483.

On September 13, 1962, Daniel Taylor was a minor under both Louisiana law and Arkansas law.² His domicile was that of his father. LSA-C.C. Art. 39; Toca v. Rojas, 152 La. 317, 93 So. 108;³ Blackburn v. Blackburn, La.App., 168 So.2d 898; Graves v. Graves, La.App., 122 So.2d 350; Oglesby v. Turner, 127 La. 1093, 54 So. 400; In Re Watson, D.C., 99 F.Supp. 49; Central Manufacturers' Mut. Ins. Co. of Van Wert, Ohio v. Friedman, 213 Art. 9, 209 S.W.2d 102, 1 A.L.R.2d 557; Cf. Bell v. Silas, 223 Ark. 694, 268 S.W.2d 624; Johnson v. Taylor, 140 Ark. 100, 215 S.W. 162. Fathers and mothers, by the very act of marrying, contract together the obligation of supporting, maintaining, and educating their children. LSA-C.C. Art. 227. The father, or after his decease, the mother, are responsible for the damage occasioned by their minor or unemancipated children, residing with them, or placed by them under the care of other persons, reserving to them recourse against those persons. LSA-C.C. Art. 2318. Watkins v. Cupit, La.App., 130 So.2d 720; 36 Tu.L.Rev. 340; LaRue v. Adam, La.App., 59 So.2d 839.

Residence and domicile are not synonymous terms. LSA-C.C. Art. 38; Oglesby v. Turner, 127 La. 1093, 54 So. 400; Foreman v. Jordan, La.App., 131 So.2d 796; Harrison v. Commission Council of Bogalusa, La.App., 169 So.2d 159; Stephens v. AAA Lumber Company, 238 Ark. 842, 384 S.W.2d 943; Vehrs v. Jefferson Insurance Company, La.App., 168 So.2d 873, 877; In Re Watson, D.C., 99 F.Supp. 49. Even though a person, which could include a child, might have several residences, despite the fact that he has one domicile, the Legal residence of an unemancipated minor (with which we are herein concerned) is that of his father unless changed by law. McInnis v. Terry, La.App., 121 So.2d 329; Watkins v. Cupit, La.App., 130 So.2d 720.⁴ This is reasonable and understandable because, as stated supra, the father has numerous obligations to his child (including his support and maintenance), is...