Taylor v. State
| Decision Date | 07 September 1962 |
| Docket Number | No. 18,J,18 |
| Citation | 367 Mich. 256,116 N.W.2d 848 |
| Parties | Thaddeus B. TAYLOR, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. STATE of Michigan and Otis Smith, Auditor General, Defendants and Appellants. an. Term. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Thaddeus B. Taylor, Grand Rapids, plaintiff and appellee, in pro. per., F. Roland Allaben, Grand Rapids, of counsel.
Paul L. Adams, Atty. Gen., Joseph B. Bilitzke, Sol. Gen., Russell A. Searl, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendants and appellants.
Before the Entire Bench, except SMITH and ADAMS, JJ.
The superior court of the city of Grand Rapids was created by, and organized pursuant to, P.A.1875, No. 49, Comp.Laws 1948, § 727.1 et seq. The Constitution of 1850 then in force and effect provided in article 6, § 1, thereof that:
That the legislative action was taken pursuant to the permissive authority granted by the provision quoted of the then fundamental law of the State is apparent. The statute was entitled:
'AN ACT to provide for a municipal court in the city of Grand Rapids to be called 'The Superior Court of Grand Rapids.''
The provisions of the act were in accord with the general purpose set forth in the title. Notice of the election of the judge of the court was required to be given in the manner prescribed by law with reference to city officers. One elected to the office, under the statute as amended in 1881, entered on the performance of his duties on the first Monday of May next succeeding his election. Pursuant to amendment the clerk has been, and now is, appointed by the judge of the court for a term of two years. It is further provided by the statute, as amended, that the judge shall appoint a chief deputy clerk who shall also perform the duties of bailiff. Power of removal of said officers of the court is vested in the judge thereof. Other provisions of the statute clearly indicate the purpose of the legislature to establish a municipal court pursuant to the permissive authority granted with reference thereto by the State Constitution then in effect.
The plaintiff in the instant case served as judge of the superior court of Grand Rapids for a number of terms, retiring on May 4, 1959. Involved here is the question as to the amount of compensation that he was entitled to receive from the State during the last three of the 6-year terms served by him. The statute creating the court provided in section 6, Comp.Laws 1948, § 727.6, thereof as originally enacted, and as subsequently amended, that:
'The judge of said superior court shall receive from the treasury of the state of Michigan the same annual salary as may be payable to circuit judges * * *.'
The statute also authorizes additional payments to be made by the city of Grand Rapids pursuant to action of the legislative body thereof.
The present action was instituted in the court of claims of the State, plaintiff seeking a declaratory judgment with reference to compensation that he asserted was owing to him but which State officials declined to pay. The petition was denied for reasons set forth in Taylor v. Auditor General, 360 Mich. 146, 103 N.W.2d 769, and thereafter plaintiff's statement of claim was amended in such manner as to assert the right to a judgment for the aggregate of the alleged withheld payments. The amended claim, referring to the provision of section 6 of the act creating the superior court, above quoted, asserted that on the 10th of January, 1942, the annual salary of circuit judges, payable by the State, was fixed by legislative action at $7,000, that plaintiff was entitled to a like salary but was paid at the rate of $6,000 per annum until the first of May, 1947, when a new term began. Likewise, during such new term the annual salary of circuit judges was fixed at $9,000 but that plaintiff continued to be paid at the rate of $7,000 until the expiration of his current term of office and his entry on a new term in May, 1953. In August, 1954, the salary of circuit judges was fixed at $12,500 but the officers of the State charged with the duty of paying plaintiff's salary refused to make payments to him at the increased rate during the continuance of his then term of office. Plaintiff asserted that during the aggregate period in question he should have received from the State of Michigan the sum of $28,978.46 over and above the salary payments made to him. He sought judgment for that amount, together with interest, claiming that the officers of the State whose acts he questioned improperly determined the sallary that he was lawfully entitled to receive.
The State contested plaintiff's right to the additional payments claimed by him, asserting that under article 16, § 3, of the present Constitution of the State plaintiff's salary could not be increased during a current term of office. Said section reads as follows:
It was the contention of the defendants on the hearing of the matter in the trial court that plaintiff was not a circuit judge within the meaning of said section of the Constitution, that he was not entitled to the benefit of the specific exception made in favor of such judges, and that the payments that he claimed should have been made to him were forbidden by the Constitution. It was further pleaded by way of affirmative defenses that the statute of limitations barred all portions of plaintiff's claim asserted to have accrued prior to November 14, 1955; and that plaintiff, having failed to institute action or give notice of his intention to do so within a period of one year from the date his claimed cause of action accrued, as provided by section 11a* of the court of claims act, was barred as to the portion of his said claim accruing prior to November 14, 1957.
Following a hearing the trial judge rejected defendants' claims and entered judgment for plaintiff in the aggregate sum of $39,190.58 with interest thereon at the rate of 5% per annum from November 15, 1960. From the opinion filed it would appear that the trial judge accepted plaintiff's theory that because of the nature of the jurisdiction vested in the superior court plaintiff was, from both a practical and legal standpoint, a circuit judge within the meaning of article 16, § 3, of the present State Constitution. Defendants have appealed from the judgment entered, asserting that the superior court of Grand Rapids is not a circuit court, that plaintiff during the period in question was not a circuit judge within the meaning of the term as used in the State Constitution, and that the statutory provision on which plaintiff relies that the State shall pay him the same salary as is paid to circuit judges cannot be given the force and effect of rendering inapplicable the specific prohibition of article 16, § 3.
As before suggested, there is nothing in the act creating the superior court of Grand Rapids or in subsequent amendments thereto, including P.A.1877, No. 147, indicating that the legislature of the State has at any time regarded said court as a circuit court. The title of the act of 1875 is significant in this regard, and that title has never been changed. There can be no question as to the provision of the Constitution of 1850 on which the legislature relied in providing for a municipal court in Grand Rapids. The status of said court was involved in several cases arising shortly after its organization, among which are Heath v. Kent Circuit Judge, 37 Mich. 372; Allen v. Kent Circuit Judge, 37 Mich. 474; Grand Rapids, Newaygo and Lake Shore Railroad Company v. Gray, 38 Mich. 461. In the latter case the Court, after referring to article 6, § 1, of the Constitution of 1850, said:
'It is also clearly apparent that each circuit, as contemplated in and provided for by the constitution, should include at least one county, and that at no time could there be more than one circuit court in a county or a circuit and a county court in the same county. It must however have been a matter considered by the members of the Constitutional Convention, engaged as they were, in the preparation of a judicial system permanent in its character, that a necessity might thereafter arise in some circuits, to relieve them from a part of their business; that in the growth and development of the State, cities would be springing up, in which, owing to the large manufacturing, mercantile and other business carried on and transacted therein, considerable litigation might be expected to arise, and that the circuit court of the county in which such city or cities were situate, would be inadequate to meet the growing demands made upon it in a prompt and satisfactory manner, and that it might therefor at some time become necessary to establish one or more courts in particular cities to relieve the circuit of a portion of the business, and that with this object and purpose in view the clause in question authorizing the legislature to establish municipal courts in cities was inserted.
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