Taylor v. State, 49S00-9311-CR-1264

Citation659 N.E.2d 535
Decision Date28 December 1995
Docket NumberNo. 49S00-9311-CR-1264,49S00-9311-CR-1264
PartiesRaleigh TAYLOR, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
CourtSupreme Court of Indiana

SHEPARD, Chief Justice.

Appellant Raleigh Taylor was tried before a jury and found guilty but mentally ill of murder, Ind.Code Ann. § 35-42-1-1 (West Supp.1990), and guilty but mentally ill of burglary resulting in serious bodily injury, a class A felony, Ind.Code Ann. § 35-43-2-1 (West 1986). The court sentenced Taylor to consecutive terms of sixty years for murder and fifty years for burglary. We affirm.

The evidence favorable to the verdict shows that the murder victim, Tawana Smith, was the daughter of Taylor's long-time girlfriend Cathy Smith. Taylor lived with Cathy and her three daughters, Tawana, Rhonda, and Zakiya, during the late 1980s and into early 1990. In March 1990, Tawana filed charges accusing Taylor of molesting her several years earlier, prompting Taylor to move out of the house and into the YMCA. Tawana and her eight-month-old son also left the household. They moved in with her aunt, Phyllis Smith, and Phyllis's daughter, Renica Johnson.

Close to midnight on the evening of May 4, 1990, Tawana and Renica decided to go for a drive with one of Renica's friends, Nicole Durham. As they were leaving the parking lot, Tawana spotted Taylor in her mother's blue Datsun. Tawana knew that Taylor was angry at her for claiming he molested her, so she ducked down in the back seat and instructed Nicole to drive on. The three soon decided to return to warn Phyllis Smith of Taylor's presence. When they arrived back at the apartment, Taylor was nowhere to be seen. As Nicole parked the car, however, he emerged from behind a parked van, pulled a gun, and jerked Tawana from the back seat. He then shot Tawana six times in the head and chest at close range.

Renica and Nicole ran to the apartment to call the police and locked the door behind them. Taylor followed. He broke into the apartment and attacked Phyllis Smith, hitting her repeatedly with the butt of the gun. He then fled the area, and the police later picked him up in Florida.

Taylor raises three issues on appeal. First, he contends that four of the State's exhibits should have been excluded as the product of illegal seizures. Second, he argues that the court should not have permitted the State's psychiatrist to recount Taylor's descriptions of the night of the murder. Third, he contends the court improperly admitted evidence about the victim's charge that Taylor molested her.

I. Seizures from the Car

First, appellant challenges the seizure of certain items during a search of the car he drove the night of the shooting. Specifically, he objects to the admission of a blood-stained sheet of paper, a two-page letter written by Taylor to the murdered girl's mother, Cathy Smith, 1 and photographs of the interior of the car and the letter. He claims the seizures were beyond the scope of the warrant that authorized searching the vehicle.

The Fourth Amendment protects both privacy and possessory interests by prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures. Since a warrant is generally required, Wright v. State, Ind., 593 N.E.2d 1192, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1001, 113 S.Ct. 605, 121 L.Ed.2d 540 (1992), when a defendant challenges a warrantless search or seizure, the burden lies with the State to justify on Constitutional grounds the failure to secure a warrant, White v. State (1987), Ind., 517 N.E.2d 83. On review, we will not reweigh the evidence. We consider only the evidence most favorable to the trial court's ruling and any uncontradicted adverse evidence. Id.

As part of their investigation, the police secured a search warrant for Taylor's apartment at the YMCA and for the 1979 blue Datsun he drove the night of the shooting. 2 The warrant for the car specified a search for "a large caliber handgun and ammunition." Officer Jim Meyer conducted the search; he testified that upon opening the car door, he saw a sheet of yellow lined paper next to the driver's seat. The paper appeared to have "blood or another body substance" on it so he retained it as evidence. Continuing his search, he opened a console between the seats where he found two folded sheets of yellow lined paper, which turned out to be a letter from Taylor to Cathy Smith. He removed the papers to search the compartment for the revolver and bullets. Finding neither, he then compared the blood-stained paper with the pages from the console. The officer testified he initially seized the letter because he believed it could provide a link, via fingerprints or handwriting, between the perpetrator and the blood-stained sheet. Photographs were also taken of the car's interior and the two sheets of paper.

The State contends that the seizure of the paper and letter were justified under the plain view doctrine. According to that doctrine, an officer may seize incriminating evidence without a warrant when two conditions are met. First, the officer must have otherwise complied with the Fourth Amendment. This means that "not only must the officer be lawfully located in a place from which the object can be plainly seen, but he or she must also have a lawful right of access to the object itself." Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 137, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 2308, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990). As the Supreme Court explained in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, "plain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence." 403 U.S. 443, 468, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2039, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (emphasis in original). The initial intrusion must have been authorized under the Fourth Amendment. Horton, 496 U.S. at 136-37, 110 S.Ct. at 2307-08; Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465-66, 467-68, 91 S.Ct. at 2037-38, 2038-39. 3 Second, the incriminating nature of the evidence must have been immediately apparent. Horton, 496 U.S. at 136, 110 S.Ct. at 2307. 4

Appellant neither contests the validity of the warrant nor denies that Officer Meyer was proceeding within the scope of the warrant when he opened the car door and found the blood-stained paper or when he opened the center compartment and found the letter. The paper and letter were not, however, within the scope of the warrant, and the question presented is whether the incriminating nature of these items was immediately apparent to the officer. If not, even though they were in plain view they could not be seized without a separate warrant.

The "immediately apparent" prong of the plain view doctrine requires that law enforcement officials have probable cause to believe the evidence will prove useful in solving a crime. See, e.g., White, 517 N.E.2d at 85; see also Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 1153, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987). As a plurality of the Supreme Court explained in Texas v. Brown, this does not mean that the officer must "know" that the item is evidence of criminal behavior. 460 U.S. 730, 741, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 1542, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983). Probable cause requires only that the information available to the officer would lead a person of reasonable caution to believe the items could be useful as evidence of a crime. Id. at 742, 103 S.Ct. at 1543. "A 'practical, nontechnical' probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required." Id.

Appellant contends that Meyer could not have believed that the letter was evidence related to the murder until after he unfolded and read it. The State counters that the blood on the first sheet of paper was sufficient to justify its seizure and that Meyer had probable cause to seize the letter given its similarity to the blood-stained sheet.

The trial court was correct to admit the exhibits. First, Meyer knew he was investigating a murder committed with a firearm, a shooting that would, of course, produce a good deal of blood. The apparent blood stains on the sheet of paper in the door certainly justified its seizure. Cf. Hopkins v. State (1991), Ind., 582 N.E.2d 345 (upholding plain view seizure of blood-stained towel during warranted search of vehicle). Second, when Meyer stumbled across the letter, written on similar yellow lined paper, he naturally connected the two items. A person of reasonable caution certainly could have concluded that the pages from the console were related to the page found in the door, and that together they would aid in the murder investigation. Cf. Lee v. State (1989), Ind., 545 N.E.2d 1085 (upholding plain view seizure of trash bags during warranted search of apartment).

Meyer's subsequent discovery that the contents of the letter were relevant to the murder was also reasonable. After Meyer seized the papers, it was reasonable to inspect them for blood stains and fingerprints and to compare them with the previously seized paper. As the Supreme Court explained in Arizona v. Hicks, "It would be absurd to say that an object could lawfully be seized and taken from the premises, but could not be moved for closer examination." 480 U.S. at 326, 107 S.Ct. at 1153. It did not take much effort to determine the relevancy of the letter. It begins with a reference to the murdered girl and her aunt and ends with "Good-by, Good-by, God Bless," set off from the rest of the text in large letters.

Finally, because the search of the car was justified under the warrant, and the seizures of the papers were reasonable, the photographs were also admissible at trial. See Tata v. State (1986), Ind., 486 N.E.2d 1025.

II. Examination by the State's Psychiatrist

Appellant claims his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel were violated. Relying on Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981), Taylor argues that the State's psychiatrist was required to...

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