Taylor v. State
| Decision Date | 23 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 2, Sept. Term, 2020,2, Sept. Term, 2020 |
| Citation | 249 A.3d 810,473 Md. 205 |
| Parties | Devon Jordan TAYLOR v. STATE of Maryland |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Argued by Allison Pierce Brasseaux, Asst. Public Defender (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender of Maryland of Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Petitioner/Cross-Respondent.
Argued by Jessica V. Carter, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Brian E. Frosh, Atty. Gen. of Maryland of Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner.
Argued before: Barbera, C.J., McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Getty, Booth, Biran, JJ.
This appeal relates to a trial of criminal charges arising out of a home invasion. The victim of the home invasion, when presented with a photo array a month after the incident, identified Petitioner Devon Taylor, who was otherwise a stranger to her, as the person who forced his way into her home. No other evidence linked Mr. Taylor to the crime. He was subsequently indicted in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County on various charges related to the home invasion.
At Mr. Taylor's trial, the trial judge gave what is known as an "anti-CSI effect" jury instruction, which advises the jury that the prosecution need not prove its case through forensic or scientific techniques often featured in police procedural television shows. After initially indicating that it was deadlocked, the jury returned a guilty verdict.
This appeal concerns whether Mr. Taylor preserved an objection to the anti-CSI effect instruction; if so, whether that instruction was appropriately given; and, if the instruction was not appropriate, whether the error was harmless. The Court of Special Appeals held that the objection was preserved and that the trial court abused its discretion when it gave the anti-CSI effect instruction. Nevertheless, it concluded that the error was harmless and affirmed Mr. Taylor's conviction.
For the reasons discussed below, we agree that the instruction given at Mr. Taylor's trial was erroneous. In our view, however, these circumstances do not satisfy the harmless error standard applied by Maryland appellate courts. Accordingly, Mr. Taylor's conviction is reversed.
The jury instruction at issue in this case is a version of what is sometimes referred to as an anti-CSI effect instruction in that it is intended to dispel a possible juror expectation, drawn from television shows, that the prosecution ordinarily meets its burden of proof by presenting fingerprint, DNA, or other forensic evidence linking a defendant to a crime. In 2007, the Court of Special Appeals issued the first reported Maryland appellate decision on the propriety of an anti-CSI effect instruction in Evans v. State , 174 Md. App. 549, 922 A.2d 620, cert. denied , 400 Md. 648, 929 A.2d 890 (2007). Beginning in 2011, this Court has dealt with such an instruction in four decisions. See Atkins v. State , 421 Md. 434, 26 A.3d 979 (2011) ; Stabb v. State , 423 Md. 454, 31 A.3d 922 (2011) ; Robinson v. State , 436 Md. 560, 84 A.3d 69 (2014) ; Hall v. State , 437 Md. 534, 87 A.3d 1287 (2014).1
All of these decisions dealt with the same five-sentence instruction. That instruction consists of a key statement that "there is no legal requirement that the State use any specific investigative technique or scientific test to prove its case" bracketed by several introductory sentences, including one telling the jury to consider "all of the evidence or lack of evidence" in reaching its decision, and by a final sentence reiterating that the State must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. As quoted in Evans , the instruction was as follows:
During this trial, you have heard testimony of witnesses and may hear argument of counsel that the State did not utilize a specific investigative technique or scientific test. You may consider these facts in deciding whether the State has met its burden of proof. You should consider all of the evidence or lack of evidence in deciding whether a defendant is guilty. However, I instruct you that there is no legal requirement that the State utilize any specific investigative technique or scientific test to prove its case. Your responsibility as jurors is to determine whether the State has proven, based on the evidence, the defendants' guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
174 Md. App. at 562, 922 A.2d 620 (emphasis added). The anti-CSI effect instruction given in each of the other cases described in this section of this opinion was the same, in some cases with very minor differences in wording.
The Evans decision flashed what might be characterized as a yellow caution light concerning such an instruction. While this Court never quite turned that light red in its subsequent decisions, it has come close to doing so.2
In Evans , the Court of Special Appeals opined that an anti-CSI effect instruction that also reiterated the requirement that the prosecution prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt could be permissible in some circumstances.3 With respect to the case before it, the court pointed to defense counsel's "robust and vehement closing arguments" about the State's failure to employ audio or video surveillance equipment and the lack of any other investigative or scientific evidence and to the trial court's legally "correct" explanation that there is no requirement that the State present particular types of evidence, "as long as the evidence adduced supports a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." 174 Md. App. at 570, 922 A.2d 620. Under these circumstances, the Evans court was satisfied that the anti-CSI effect instruction in the case before it had not compromised the concept of reasonable doubt. However, the court cautioned that "such an instruction will run afoul of the prohibition against relieving the State of its burden [of proof beyond a reasonable doubt] where the instruction is predominant in the overall instructions and its relation to the reasonable doubt standard unclear." Id . at 570-71, 922 A.2d 620.
In other jurisdictions, the instruction given in Evans – or a very similar one – has been approved, before and after the Evans decision, both as a pattern instruction and as given in particular trials.4 The common issue in those appeals, as in Evans , has been whether the instruction has the effect of reducing the prosecution's burden of proof.5
This Court first addressed the propriety of this anti-CSI effect instruction in Atkins . In that case, the defendant was involved in an altercation with several other people and was charged with an assault that allegedly involved a knife. The defendant testified that he had used a small pocketknife in self-defense. Police later recovered a large knife from the defendant's bedroom while executing a search warrant. The prosecution argued that the large knife was the actual weapon used by the defendant, and that its use negated the claim that he acted in self-defense and indicated that he was the aggressor. Defense cross-examination of a police detective at trial established that no forensic evidence linked the large knife to the alleged assault. When the trial court charged the jury, it included the same anti-CSI effect instruction that had been given at the trial in Evans , as outlined above. Atkins , 421 Md. at 441-42, 26 A.3d 979. The defendant was convicted.
On appeal, this Court reversed the conviction on the grounds that, under the circumstances, the anti-CSI effect instruction had improperly addressed the weight of the evidence, thereby undermining the defendant's legitimate defense that the State had not linked the large knife to the crime and invading the province of the jury. 421 Md. at 451-54, 26 A.3d 979. Distinguishing the events of the trial from those in Evans , the Atkins Court noted, that, in contrast to the theories advanced by the prosecution in Evans , the State's theory that the defendant had used the large knife was speculative and uncorroborated by other evidence. In addition, in contrast to the "robust and vehement" defense closing argument about the lack of forensic evidence in Evans , defense counsel in Atkins had reasonably elicited the lack of forensic evidence related to the knife in cross-examination, and had neither distorted the law nor overstated the State's burden of proof. Id. at 450, 26 A.3d 979.
Accordingly, the Court reversed the conviction as violative of the defendant's right to a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Articles 21 and 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The Court cautioned that it was not holding that such an instruction could never be given. Rather, a neutral instruction that holds the prosecution to its continuing burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt – as the Evans court had indicated – could be appropriate in certain circumstances. 421 Md. at 454-55, 26 A.3d 979.6
A concurring opinion joined by three judges provided background on the perceived "CSI effect" of police television dramas – that jurors who watch television might have unrealistic expectations as to the availability and results of forensic investigative techniques – and on the efforts to counter that perceived effect, including development of anti-CSI effect instructions. 421 Md. at 456-73, 26 A.3d 979 (Harrell, J., concurring). The concurring opinion emphasized that a curative anti-CSI effect instruction could be appropriate if a defense argument went beyond arguing a lack of forensic evidence to suggesting to the jury that the prosecution was required to use specific techniques to prove its case. Id. at 473, 26 A.3d 979.
The Court reiterated its analysis a few months later in Stabb and held that the anti-CSI effect instruction given at the trial in that case violated the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. Stabb concerned an alleged sexual assault of a seven-year old girl. The defense cross-examined a social worker who had interviewed the girl about the social worker's decision not to refer the girl for a...
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