Taylor v. State

• Decision Date: 09 August 1982
• Docket Number: No. 382S106,382S106
• Citation: 438 N.E.2d 275
• Parties: 8 Media L. Rep. 2287 Gary Wayne TAYLOR, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 275

438 N.E.2d 275

8 Media L. Rep. 2287

Gary Wayne TAYLOR, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).

No. 382S106.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Aug. 9, 1982.

Samuel S. Shapiro, Applegate & Shapiro, Bloomington, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Palmer K. Ward, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

HUNTER, Justice.

The defendant, Gary Wayne Taylor, was convicted by a jury of robbery, a class A felony. Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-5-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.). He was sentenced to a period of twenty years in the Indiana Department of Correction. In his direct appeal, he presents the following issues for our review:

(1) Whether the juvenile court erred in failing to grant defendant's motion to dismiss based on jurisdictional grounds (2) Whether the juvenile court erred by overruling defendant's objection to the presence of news media at the juvenile waiver hearing;

(3) Whether the juvenile court erred in admitting hearsay testimony at the waiver hearing;

(4) Whether the juvenile court erred by overruling defendant's objection designed to limit the use of his confession to the single purpose of determining the best interests of the state vis-a-vis the child's welfare; and

(5) Whether the trial court erred in overruling defendant's motion to suppress his tape-recorded confession for the reason that a valid waiver of juvenile rights had not occurred.

The record reveals that in the early morning hours of December 24, 1980, Albert Steward, age 79, and Viola Steward, age 82, were robbed of $4,000 in their home in Monroe County, Indiana; in the course of the robbery, both Stewards were severely beaten. The subsequent police investigation culminated in the arrest of five persons. Among them was the sixteen year old defendant and his uncle, with whom defendant then resided. Ultimately, defendant was waived from juvenile to adult court, where he was found guilty.

I.

At the outset of the juvenile waiver hearing, defendant made a motion to dismiss the cause based on jurisdictional grounds. His motion was predicated on the bases that the formal prerequisites to the assumption of jurisdiction, as enunciated in Duty v. State, (1976) 169 Ind.App. 621, 349 N.E.2d 729, had not been satisfied.

In Duty, the court outlined the procedural prerequisites to the assumption of jurisdiction over a juvenile. A four-step process was delineated: (1) the filing of a petition requesting that a child be declared a delinquent; (2) a preliminary investigation into the home, environment, and personal history of the child, as well as the circumstances or incident which prompted the petition; (3) a determination by the court that it will assume jurisdiction; and (4) the filing of a formal petition of delinquency, pursuant to the court's authorization. Accord, Summers v. State, (1967) 248 Ind. 551, 230 N.E.2d 320; Seay v. State, (1975) 167 Ind.App. 22, 337 N.E.2d 489.

The requirements are statutory in nature. Ind.Code Sec. 31-6-4-7 and 9 (Burns 1980). As such, noncompliance with the procedural prerequisites precludes the assumption of jurisdiction over a juvenile. Summers v. State, supra; Murphy v. State, (1980) Ind.App., 408 N.E.2d 1311; Duty v. State, supra; Seay v. State, supra; Ingram v. State, (1974) 160 Ind.App. 188, 310 N.E.2d 903.

Defendant does not argue the various prerequisites were not discharged, or that the manner in which the requirements were discharged was somehow inadequate. Rather, defendant's claim of error is based on the fact that the juvenile court's order book did not contain entries which revealed the requirements had in fact been satisfied; to support his argument, he relies on the rule of law that a court speaks only through its official orders and entries. Meehan v. Meehan, (1981) Ind., 425 N.E.2d 157; Blum's Lumber & Crating, Inc. v. James, (1972) 259 Ind. 220, 285 N.E.2d 822.

The failure of the court's order book to reflect the fact that the procedural prerequisites had been satisfied was improper; at the hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss, however, defendant conceded the docket sheet reflected the fact that the requirements had been satisfied.

In these circumstances, the omissions in the order book, which apparently were the product of clerical oversight, cannot be characterized as reversible error. The purposes of the procedural requirements had been satisfied: the interests of the public and the juvenile had been evaluated and considered. The required documents had been filed; defendant and his mother were fully apprised of the matters therein. In this context the technical error of the court did not prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant; the error was harmless. Ind.R.Ap.P. 15(E); Ind.Code Sec. 35-1-47-9 (Burns 1979 Repl.); North v. State, (1980) Ind.App., 406 N.E.2d 657.

Defendant also predicates his claim of error on the trial court's subsequent nunc pro tunc amendment of the order book to reflect compliance with the procedural prerequisites. He concedes the docket entries reflecting that compliance were sufficient written memorabilia to support the nunc pro tunc amendment of the order book. Russell v. State, (1981) Ind.App., 428 N.E.2d 1271; Huffman v. Huffman, (1981) Ind.App., 424 N.E.2d 456. He argues, however, that the nunc pro tunc entry was improper in that the court failed to give notice to defendant that the entry was to be made.

It is true that nunc pro tunc entries may be made only after notice and the opportunity to be heard thereon has been provided to the parties. Stowers v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 403, 363 N.E.2d 978; Apple v. Greenfield Banking Co., (1971) 255 Ind. 602, 266 N.E.2d 13. Inasmuch as defendant concedes the nunc pro tunc entry was properly supported and that, as reflected in the docket entries, the procedural prerequisites had been satisfied, it is difficult to perceive any harm to defendant by virtue of the fact that notice and an opportunity to be heard were not provided. Nor has defendant explained the manner in which prejudice inured to him by virtue of the lack of notice. The trial court's error consequently cannot be said to require that defendant's conviction be reversed. Ind.R.Ap.P. 15(E); Ind.Code Sec. 35-1-47-9, supra; Blackburn v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 5, 291 N.E.2d 686.

II.

Three days prior to the juvenile hearing, the Bloomington Herald-Telephone, a local newspaper, filed a written request with the court seeking access to the hearing. The following day, the court granted the request. Defendant maintains the juvenile court erred when it overruled his objection and permitted members of the local news media to attend the hearing; he argues the court's action violated Ind.Code Sec. 31-6-7-10 (Burns 1979 Repl.).

The statute reads in pertinent part:

"Sec. 10. (a) All proceedings in the juvenile court involving adults charged with:

"(1) contempt of court; or

"(2) criminal charges;

"shall be tried in open court.

"(b) The juvenile court shall determine whether the public should be excluded from other juvenile proceedings. In making that determination, the court shall consider that the best interests of the safety and welfare of the community are generally served by the public's ability to obtain information about:

"(1) the alleged commission of an act that would be murder or a felony if committed by an adult; or

(2) the alleged commission of an act that would be part of a pattern of less serious offenses.

"A copy of the public access or exclusion order shall be placed in the file of the proceedings."

The defendant specifically argues that the court committed reversible error when it failed to enter a copy of the access order in the record of the proceedings. He suggests the error reveals "a complete disregard for the balancing of interests" involved in the "delicate decision" at hand.

This Court has recognized that the issue whether the public and media representatives should be allowed access to a juvenile's records and court proceedings is a "sensitive" one. State ex rel. Shelbyville Newspapers, Inc. v. Shelby Superior Court, (1979) Ind., 396 N.E.2d 337, 340. Involved is a collision of significant public interests--the need to protect juveniles from the dissemination of information regarding minor offenses, as emphasized in State ex rel. Shelbyville Newspapers, Inc. v. Shelby Superior Court, supra, versus the extraordinary protections afforded by the constitutional guarantees of free speech and press. U.S.Const. amend. I; Ind.Const. art. 1, Sec. 9.

The significance of the latter guarantees requires no lengthy discourse here. The historical bases of our constitutional guarantees of free speech and press have been repeatedly and extensively explained; the structural role and societal functions of unfettered and informed public debate have been recently and thoroughly detailed. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Virginia, (1980) 448 U.S. 555, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 65 L.Ed.2d 973; see also, Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., (1979) 443 U.S. 97, 99 S.Ct. 2667, 61 L.Ed.2d 399; Nebraska Press Assoc. v. Stuart, (1976) 427 U.S. 539, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683; Sheppard v. Maxwell, (1966) 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600; Matter of Chase (Fam.Ct.1982) 112 Misc.2d 436, 446 N.Y.S.2d 1000. Often it has been recognized that the guarantees reflect and perpetuate the nation's profound commitment to the proposition that the integrity of public proceedings is preserved by public access thereto; concomitantly, it has been reiterated that the educative aspects of public exposure to the judicial process serve only to enhance public confidence in the system. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Assoc. v. Stuart, supra; Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra; Estes v. Texas, (1965) 381 U.S. 532, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 14 L.Ed.2d 543; Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., (1950) 338 U.S. 912, 70 S.Ct. 252, 94 L.Ed. 562. This Court recognized the significance of these considerations in Brown v. State, (1969) 252 Ind. 161, 172-3...