Taylor v. State

• Decision Date: 06 May 2011
• Docket Number: No. 02A03–1003–CR–194.,02A03–1003–CR–194.
• Citation: 943 N.E.2d 414
• Parties: James C. TAYLOR, Appellant–Defendant,v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

943 N.E.2d 414

James C. TAYLOR, Appellant–Defendant,

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff.

No. 02A03–1003–CR–194.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Feb. 22, 2011.Transfer Denied May 6, 2011.

Anthony S. Churchward, Deputy Public Defender, Fort Wayne, IN, Attorney for Appellant.Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Nicole M. Schuster, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

SULLIVAN, Senior Judge.

Appellant James C. Taylor appeals his convictions of burglary, a Class A felony, Indiana Code section 35–43–2–1 (1999); criminal deviate conduct, a Class B felony, Indiana Code section 35–42–4–2 (1998); and attempted rape, a Class B felony, Indiana Code sections 35–42–4–1 (1998) and 35–41–5–1 (1977). Taylor also appeals the jury's verdict that he is guilty but mentally ill of a second charge of criminal deviate conduct and of sexual battery, a Class D felony, Indiana Code section 35–42–4–8 (1998). Finally, Taylor appeals the jury's determination that he is a habitual offender, Indiana Code section 35–50–2–8 (2005), and the sentences that the trial court imposed for his convictions. We affirm.

On January 10, 2008, M.G., who was seven months pregnant, was at home with her daughter, who was less than two years old. Looking out a window, M.G. saw a man who was later identified as Taylor approach her house. M.G. opened the door to see what Taylor wanted. After a brief conversation, during which Taylor asked M.G. if her boyfriend was at home and was told that her husband was at work, Taylor forced his way into the house. Taylor pushed M.G. over and got on top of her. Taylor and M.G. struggled as M.G.'s daughter watched. Taylor forced M.G. to remove her clothes and took off his clothes.

Taylor groped, fondled and licked M.G. He attempted to put his penis in her vagina but could not maintain an erection. At that point, Taylor remembered that the front door was open. When Taylor got up and closed the door, M.G. got up and ran out of the house into the backyard. M.G.'s daughter remained inside the house. Taylor chased M.G., who ran to her neighbor's garage and screamed for help. Taylor and M.G. struggled, and Taylor mocked M.G.'s cries for help when no one responded. Taylor then tried to convince M.G. to come back inside. M.G. refused, and Taylor became angry. M.G. agreed to have sex with him if they stayed outside, but Taylor was unable to maintain an erection. As they continued to talk, M.G. convinced Taylor to walk around the side of her house towards the front. As they walked along the side of the house, Taylor stopped them and again attempted to vaginally penetrate M.G. but could not.

M.G. and Taylor walked around to the front of the house and moved towards the front door. M.G. sat down on her front porch, stating that she was unable to go any further. Taylor attempted to coax and physically force M.G. to go to the front door, but at that point M.G. attracted the attention of a nearby pedestrian and screamed for help. That person stopped several passing motorists, who called the police. During this time, Taylor did not flee. Instead, he told the pedestrian that he and M.G. were fine and that M.G. was his girlfriend. Taylor also contradicted M.G. when she screamed out her house's address and attempted to mislead people as to the correct address. Taylor continued to yell at the bystanders that everything was fine until he heard sirens. At that point he attempted to reenter the house to get his clothes but discovered that he had locked the front door earlier. The police arrived and took Taylor into custody.

The State charged Taylor with the offenses identified above. At trial, Taylor argued that he was not guilty by reason of insanity. The jury returned its verdict, and the court sentenced Taylor to an aggregate sentence of eighty years.

Taylor raises three issues, which we restate as:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing Taylor's tendered instruction on residential entry as a lesser included offense of burglary.

II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting into evidence a letter Taylor wrote to a judge.

III. Whether Taylor's sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.

I. JURY INSTRUCTION ON A LESSER–INCLUDED OFFENSE

The purpose of an instruction is to inform the jury of the law applicable to the facts without misleading the jury and to enable it to comprehend the case clearly and arrive at a just, fair, and correct verdict. Overstreet v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1140, 1163 (Ind.2003). When a defendant requests a lesser-included offense instruction, the trial court must apply a three-part analysis: (1) determine whether the lesser-included offense is inherently included in the crime charged; if not, (2) determine whether the lesser-included offense is factually included in the crime charged; and, if either, (3) determine whether a serious evidentiary dispute exists whereby the jury could conclude that the lesser offense was committed but not the greater. Hauk v. State, 729 N.E.2d 994, 998 (Ind.2000). The trial court should grant the defendant's request for a lesser-included offense instruction if it answers the third inquiry affirmatively. Id.

In this case, Taylor tendered a jury instruction that would have informed the jury that residential entry is a lesser included offense of burglary. The trial court declined to give that instruction, stating “I cannot see how there could be a serious dispute as to the evidence.” Trial Tr. p. 310. Therefore, our review is limited to whether the trial court properly determined that there is no serious evidentiary dispute whereby the jury could conclude that the lesser offense was committed but not the greater. In deference to trial courts' proximity to the evidence, we review a finding as to the existence or lack of a serious evidentiary dispute for an abuse of discretion. McEwen v. State, 695 N.E.2d 79, 84 (Ind.1998).

In Wilson v. State, 697 N.E.2d 466, 474 (Ind.1998), Wilson was convicted of murder and other offenses, and he appealed the trial court's rejection of his tendered jury instruction identifying reckless homicide as a lesser included offense of murder. Wilson argued that he was mentally ill, and his intent was therefore in dispute. Our Supreme Court disagreed, noting, “[a]ny dispute raised by the insanity defense concerns whether a defendant had any culpable intent at all.” Id. at 475. “Because a successful insanity defense would make Wilson nonculpable for any offenses he may have committed, the insanity defense cannot be the mechanism to demonstrate dispute entitling him to a lesser included instruction.” Id. Consequently, the Court concluded that Wilson had not established an evidentiary dispute over which offense he may have committed, and the trial court correctly refused Wilson's instruction on reckless homicide. Id.

We are bound by our Supreme Court's determination that reckless homicide is an inherently included offense of murder. Id. at 474 (citing Wright v. State, 658 N.E.2d 563, 567 (Ind.1995)). These two cases so hold premised upon the concept that the only thing distinguishing the greater from the lesser crime is the “lesser culpability required to establish the commission of Reckless Homicide.” Wright, 658 N.E.2d at 567. However, Wilson defined the concept a bit differently, stating that the only distinguishing feature is “the mens rea required of each offense.” Wilson, 697 N.E.2d at 474. In so stating, the Wilson court construed the Wright decision to equate the “lesser culpability” language used with the “different mens rea required of each offense” as phrased in Wilson. In any event, neither Wilson nor Wright saw any significance in the fact that conduct which is merely reckless is incompatible with conduct which must be knowing or intentional. It would seem that a reasonable trier of fact might well conclude that a death was caused not by a knowing or intentional killing but rather was caused by conduct which was merely reckless. Nevertheless, again we are bound by the previous pronouncements of our Supreme Court.

Our perceived uncertainty with respect to the holdings of Wilson and Wright does not address the issue directly presented in the case before us. Here, Taylor focuses upon the proposition that the jury could have reasonably determined that although he knowingly or intentionally entered M.G.'s residence, the State had not established that when he did so he had the specific intent to sexually assault M.G. He thus concludes that his “mental state and his mens rea were significant issues of fact, which were disputed at trial.” Appellant's Br. p. 19. In the abstract, this argument carries a degree of cogency.

However, our analysis does not end with this argument. It is a given that just as reckless homicide is an inherently included offense of murder, so residential entry is inherently included in the offense of burglary. Campbell v. State, 732 N.E.2d 197, 207 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). Accordingly, we must apply the third prong of the test set forth in Wright, supra, and look to the evidence submitted in our particular case. Having done so and giving due deference to the determination of the trial court, we agree that there is no serious evidentiary dispute as to Taylor's intent to commit a felony when he knowingly or intentionally entered M.G.'s residence.

For this reason and without regard to what may or may not be a correct reading of the Wilson and Wright decisions, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give the tendered instruction on residential entry.

II. ADMISSION OF TAYLOR'S LETTER

The admissibility of documents as exhibits is a matter within the trial court's discretion and will be reversed only upon a showing of an abuse of that discretion. Herrera v. State, 710 N.E.2d 931, 938 (Ind.Ct.App.1999).

At trial, the court admitted as an exhibit a ten-page letter that...