Taylor v. State, 771S210

• Citation: 284 N.E.2d 775,31 Ind. Dec. 709,259 Ind. 25
• Decision Date: 11 July 1972
• Docket Number: No. 771S210,771S210
• Parties: Joe TAYLOR, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
• Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Page 775

284 N.E.2d 775

259 Ind. 25

Joe TAYLOR, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 771S210.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

July 11, 1972.

Thomas M. McDonald, Rogers, Gregory & McDonald, Bloomington, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Robert F. Colker, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

PRENTICE, Justice.

Defendant (Appellant) was convicted upon both counts of the affidavit charging Second Degree Burglary and Theft. On the burglary charge, he was sentenced to imprisonment for an indetermineate period of not less than two nor more than five years and disfranchised for two years. Upon the theft cound, he was sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate period of not less than one year nor more than ten years. The only error assigned by this appeal is the sufficiency of the evidence.

The State's evidence disclosed that Deputy Sheriff Davis had arrived home from his work shortly after midnight on May 21, 1970 and had dressed for bed when he received a call from the Sheriff's office that a burglary was in progress at Harmon's automobile service station, located one and one-half blocks from the Davis residence in Stinesville. He immediately dressed and went to the service station, arriving at approximately 12:50 a.m. No one was there, but the station had been broken into. Deputy Sheriff Martindale received the same call at 12:44 a.m., at which time he was in the city of Bloomington. He proceeded in his automobile towards the service station and at approximately 12:55 a.m., at a point approximately seven miles from the service station, he was forced off the road by an on-coming automobile driven by one Adolph Schultz. He turned his vehicle around and pursued the Schultz vehicle with siren running full alert, red light on and headlights on high beam. Schultz did not stop when the deputy drew close behind him, so the deputy attempted to pass but was blocked by Schultz's veering into the left side of the road. To avoid a collision, the deputy turned to his right and drew up along side the Schultz automobile. It was apparent that Schultz was not going to stop, so the defendant turned his vehicle into Schultz's vehicle, to force him off the road. Both vehicles were traveling at high speed, and a collision between them resulted. In the vehicle with Schultz was the defendant and one Richard Nicholson. Also in the Schultz vehicle was the property that had been stolen from the service station. This evidence was not refuted.

We hold that the foregoing evidence is sufficient to sustain the defendant's convictions. It is his contention that the convictions must have been based upon his unexplained possession of recently stolen goods and that the evidence was insufficient upon that ground. He argues that three factors are critical in determining the validity of convictions for the offenses charged based entirely upon the circumstances of possession of recently stolen property, to-wit:

(1) Distance from the scene of the crime when arrested with the property.

(2) Time lapse from the commission of the crime to the arrest of the defendant.

(3) Exclusive possession until the arrest.

Defendant relies upon Finch v. State (1967), 249 Ind. 122, 231 N.E.2d 45 in support of his argument. However, in Finch, the court reversed for insufficient evidence on the whole and not simply because the defendant was one and one-half miles from the scene of the crime when found. Finch was arrested nine and one-half hours after the crime could have been committed, and it was not established that the goods in his possession were the stolen goods. In this case, as well as in Finch (supra) and other cases where the possession of recently stolen goods...