Taylor v. State, 385S95

Decision Date13 April 1987
Docket NumberNo. 385S95,385S95
Citation506 N.E.2d 468
PartiesDavid G. TAYLOR, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

Larry W. Van Briggle, Anderson, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Michael Gene Worden, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

PIVARNIK, Justice.

Defendant-Appellant David G. Taylor was convicted by jury of Robbery, a class B felony, and Conspiracy to Commit Robbery, a class B felony. The Court sentenced him to twenty years on Count I and twenty years on Count II, and found that the sentences should run consecutively. The Court found as aggravating circumstances the risk that Defendant will commit another crime, the fact that Defendant was on parole at the time of the commission of the offenses, and Defendant's prior criminal record. The Court further found that, due to his past criminal record, there is no possibility of Defendant's rehabilitation and that a shorter period of incarceration would depreciate the seriousness of the crime. Taylor raises a single issue in this direct appeal: whether the trial court erred in admitting testimony which referred to subsequent criminal activity allegedly committed by him.

The facts are as follows. On April 10, 1984, at approximately 1:22 a.m., the Bake-Mart in Madison County was robbed by a man with a handgun. The man entered the store and made a purchase before robbing the sole employee. A second man entered the store during the robbery and fled with the gunman. The gunman wore a dark toboggan. Only money from the cash register was taken.

At about 4:30 a.m. on April 10, 1984, two men entered a Waffle and Steak restaurant in Johnson County and had coffee until the other customers left. The two men then initiated a robbery of the two employees, using a handgun. One of the men wore a dark stocking hat. Again, money from the cash register was taken.

Taylor, David Adams, and his brother, Danny Adams, were charged in the April 10, 1984, robbery of the Bake-Mart. At trial, the victim of the Bake-Mart robbery, Donald Dante Thornbury, identified David Adams as the robber who held the gun on him. Mr. Thornbury, however, was unable to positively identify the second man who entered the Bake-Mart during the robbery and fled with the gunman. The defense sought to show that Danny Adams, David Adams' brother, committed the Bake-Mart robbery alone, although Taylor entered the store while the robbery was in progress.

Identification was a material issue at the trial. In order to establish identification and to demonstrate that all three defendants were involved, the State offered evidence of the Waffle and Steak robbery. Taylor filed a Motion in Limine regarding the admissibility of testimony concerning that crime. In a hearing out of the presence of the jury, the trial court was presented with the facts of the Waffle and Steak robbery. The trial court ruled that the State's witnesses could testify to the events of the Waffle and Steak robbery only, and ruled inadmissible any testimony concerning the subsequent abduction, assault and rape of the two Waffle and Steak waitresses. One victim of the Waffle and Steak robbery then identified Taylor and Danny Adams as the robbers. Evidence was also presented regarding the police investigation of the Waffle and Steak robbery.

Taylor objects to the evidence of other crimes, presented to show he is guilty of the crime charged. He argues the trial court abused its discretion in permitting testimony regarding the Waffle and Steak robbery. He maintains that the two robberies were not sufficiently similar to qualify under the common scheme or plan exception to the general rule regarding the inadmissibility of other crimes as evidence. Taylor claims the testimony did not tend to add probative value to the case, but only served to prejudice and confuse the jury as to the actual crime charged.

Evidence of other criminal activity by a defendant is highly prejudicial and generally inadmissible. The basis for this general rule is to prevent indiscriminate proof of other criminal activity beyond that specifically charged from compelling a defendant to meet accusations without notice or from negating the presumption of innocence. Malone v. State (1982), Ind., 441 N.E.2d 1339, 1346. However, evidence of other unrelated criminal activity may be admissible in certain cases to prove identity, knowledge, intent, purpose, motive or a common scheme or plan. Hobbs v. State (1984), Ind., 466 N.E.2d 729, 733; Montgomery v. State (1980), 274 Ind. 544, 412 N.E.2d 793, reh. denied. To be admissible, the testimony must possess substantial probative value and must be so specifically and significantly related to the charged crime in time, place and circumstance as to be logically relevant to one of the particular accepted purposes. Hobbs, 466 N.E.2d at 733; Malone, 441 N.E.2d at 1346. For instance, evidence of other criminal activity is commonly allowed to prove the identification of an accused according to the common plan or scheme exception. Malone, 441 N.E.2d at 1346.

The record in this case revealed that Taylor was with the Adams brothers prior to the Bake-Mart robbery. David Jones testified he saw the three leaving a party together in a truck around 8:00 p.m., on April 9, 1984. Jones saw the three together again at approximately 2:00...

To continue reading

Request your trial
5 cases
  • Witte v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • February 12, 1990
    ...to the general rule that evidence of independent crimes is inadmissible. Both the rule and its exception are discussed in Taylor v. State (1987), Ind., 506 N.E.2d 468. Appellant argues that the two crimes were so separated in time and modus operandi that the evidence of the killing of appel......
  • Green v. State, 10S00-9011-CR-706
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • March 12, 1992
    ...a mistrial. Although it is true that evidence of other criminal activity by a defendant is generally inadmissible, Taylor v. State (1987), Ind., 506 N.E.2d 468, 470, the question asked here regarding trouble with other bank accounts did not rise to the level of such evidence. Furthermore, t......
  • Taylor v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • October 22, 2014
    ...at the time of sentencing.Facts On April 10, 1984, Taylor committed an armed robbery in Madison County at about 1:22 a.m. See Taylor v. State, 506 N.E.2d 468, 469 (Ind. 1987). At about 4:30 a.m. on the same date, Taylor committed another armed robbery in Johnson County. See id.; Taylor v. S......
  • Ritchie v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • August 3, 1988
    ...such evidence. Appellant nevertheless claims the reference to such material by the prosecutor was reversible error, citing Taylor v. State (1987), Ind., 506 N.E.2d 468, for the proposition that evidence of charges of which the defendant has not been convicted is highly When the trial court ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT