Taylor v. State, 268

• Citation: 209 A.2d 595,238 Md. 424
• Decision Date: 28 April 1965
• Docket Number: No. 268,268
• Parties: Floyd TAYLOR v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland

Page 424

238 Md. 424

209 A.2d 595

Floyd TAYLOR v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 268.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

April 28, 1965.

Robert V. Lazzaro, Baltimore, for appellant.

John C. Cooper, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore (Thomas B. Finan, Atty. Gen., Charles E. Moylan, Jr., and Stanley S. Cohen, State's Atty., and Asst. State's Atty., respectively, for Baltimore City, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Before PRESCOTT, C. J., and HORNEY, MARBURY, SYBERT and BARNES, JJ.

PRESCOTT, Chief Judge.

Appellant, whose 'nom de plume' is 'killer' and who went to the sixth grade 'in the street' and to the ninth 'in the penitentiary,' was convicted in the Criminal Court of Baltimore by Judge Grady, sitting without a jury, of two cases of robbery with a deadly weapon, one case of assault with intent to murder, one case of carrying a concealed weapon, and one case of receiving stolen goods.

He contends that the court erred: (1) in admitting several confessions made by him because (according to his brief) (a) he was not advised of his right to have the assistance of counsel, of his right to remainsilent, or that any statement he made could be used against him, (b) he was interrogated over a period of 2 1/2 days, during which time he made four separate statements, and (c) the statements were taken during a period of illegal detention, because he had been illegally arrested and he was not taken before a magistrate in a reasonable time after his arrest; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of assault with intent to murder.

It will not be necessary to set forth the facts at great length, for the appellant recognizes that, even with his assumption of facts in his favor (which, in reality, were uncontradicted statements that he was advised of his right to have counsel and also advised that he had a right to remain silent) in order for him to prevail in this appeal it would require our overruling several previous decisions of this Court.

The State produced evidence of three armed robberies. The first, on January 6, 1964, occurred at Schwartz's Delicatessen. The operator of the establishment identified appellant as one of the participants. The second, on January 15, 1964, took place at the Maryland Restaurant. The third, on January 16, 1964, was effectuated at the Sportman's Bar. The victim testified that 'two colored persons' entered the bar and robbed him at pistol point. A gun fight ensued in which the victim was shot in the chest and he, in turn, fired four shots at the robbers while they were running away. He believed his shots had struck, at least, one of them. He immediately called the police.

Sgt. Hartnett responded to the call. He testified that he and other officers found bloodstains in the snow, and followed the trail of blood to 1632 Miller St. A knock on the door was answered by the appellant, and inside the small house were two other Negroes, a Melvin Cornelius and a William Belton. Belton was in bed suffering from a gunshot would in his shoulder. He was arrested and taken to the hospital. Not knowing how many persons were involved in the robbery, Sgt. Hartnett made no other arrests at that time, but returned to the scene of the hold-up. There, he was informed by Lt. Kummer, who was leading the investigating force, that four persons had participated in the robbery--two inside and two outside--and by a woman bystander he was informed that they were 'colored males.'

Sgt. Hirsch, who accompanied Hartnett when appellant was placed under arrest, said that he had information that four persons were involved in the robbery. He questioned 'various people throughout the neighborhood.' From one particular female, he learned that two men were 'standing immediately outside the door,' at about the time of the robbery. Upon approaching the door of the bar one woman was told by one of the two males outside, 'just go on about [your] business, not [sic] worry about what [is] happening inside the tavern.'

After receiving this information, Sgts. Hartnett and Hirsch returned to 1632 Miller St., where, after waiting a short time for him to return, they arrested appellant at 12:20 a. m. on January 17th.

Appellant was questioned 'only for a few minutes' after he was brought in. Thereafter, according to Lt. Kummer, who conducted the interrogations of appellant together with Sgts. Hartnett and Hirsch, he was questioned on January 17th from 7:00 a. m. until 10:20 a. m., on January 18th from 3:55 a. m. until 4:15 a. m., and on January 19th from 9:55 a. m. until 11:10 a. m., when appellant, after he had been confronted by Belton and Cornelius, began the first of our confessions which were taken and transcribed through 4:25 p. m., of that day. ¹ During all of the period of his detention, appellant was fed the regular prison meals at the standard times, and he was given extended periods when he could rest and sleep.

Lt. Kummer testified that he informed appellant of his right to have an attorney and his right to remain silent, that appellant made no request for an attorney, and the statements were freely and voluntarily made. There was no contradiction of these statements. Appellant's statements were taken in question and answer form, and the first three show that before he made any criminating statements he was stopped and specifically told that 'before you say anything' the interrogator wanted him to know that anything he said 'must be free and voluntary on your part,' also the interrogator could 'not promise [him] anything,' the appellant was not being threatened in any manner, and anything he said might be used for or against him in court. After being so informed and asked if he understood what the officer was saying, he was asked, 'Do you still want to tell us about the holdup?' He replied, 'Yes, sir.' There is no contention that these statements were not taken in the precise manner that they purport to have been taken, and it would scarcely seem necessary, after three such admonitions in the course of one afternoon, to require its repetition to the traverser, who was no novice in the commission of crime, having had two previous convictions of robbery and one of the larceny of an automobile, before taking his fourth statement.

I

(a)

This contention requires no elaborate discussion. It is based entirely upon the false premise that the evidence established that appellant had not been informed of his right to the assistance of counsel, of his right to remain silent, or that his statements could be used against him. It is not necessary here to state our views as to effect (if any) upon the result of our decision that a failure to inform appellant of any one or more of the matters mentioned might have had. An examination of the evidence, as we set it forth above, discloses there was credible testimony, not denied or contradicted by anyone, sufficient to support a finding by the trial court that the appellant had been informed on all three of the matters. We find no error here. (As a matter of fact, this point was not seriously pressed below. The stress was placed upon an alleged illegal arrest of the appellant, which we consider below.)

(b) and (c)

Appellant here contends that his arrest was illegal; hence his statements were inadmissible. We have repeatedly held that the admissibility, vel non, of a confession is to be determined by whether, under the totality of the attendant circumstances, the confession was freely and voluntarily given. If freely and voluntarily given, it is admissible; if not, it is inadmissible. And neither the legality nor illegality of the arrest, although properly considered in the totality of circumstances, is critical in a determination of the voluntariness of a confession. Prescoe v. State, 231 Md. 486, 191 A.2d 226; Mefford and Blackburn v. State, 235 Md. 497, 201 A.2d 824, cert. den., 85 S.Ct. 944. The general rule regarding the admissibility of confessions is correctly stated in Abbott v. State, 231 Md. 462, 190 A.2d 797, but we do not deem it necessary to repeat it here.

However, if the alleged illegality of the arrest were pertinent here, we think the undisputed facts disclose that the arrest was lawful. We have, on many occasions, stated the rule as to when an officer may legally arrest a person, without a warrant, for a felony. See, for examples, Mulcahy v. State, 221 Md. 413, 158 A.2d 80; Edwardsen v. State, 231 Md. 332, 190 A.2d 84; Drouin v. State, 222 Md. 271, 160 A.2d 85. Our decisions thereon, in the main, are based upon what was said in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879. When the police, working in co-ordination in an attempt to solve a reported crime, have acquired sufficient information (by facts within their own knowledge and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information) to establish in the mind of a prudent man a brlief that the alleged crime has probably been committed and that the arrestee was probably involved therein, and this information is transmitted to the arresting...