Taylor v. State, 45S00-8809-CR-843
| Decision Date | 07 March 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 45S00-8809-CR-843,45S00-8809-CR-843 |
| Citation | 567 N.E.2d 98 |
| Parties | Robert TAYLOR, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Daniel L. Bella, Appellate Public Defender, Crown Point, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Geoff Davis, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
A jury trial resulted in the conviction of appellant of Rape, a Class A felony; Criminal Confinement, a Class B felony; and Battery, a Class C felony. Appellant received fifty (50) years for Rape and twenty (20) years for confinement, the sentences to be served consecutively. The court ruled that no sentence should be imposed for the battery as it merged with the other counts.
The facts are: The victim, J.K., and her husband lived in one side of a double. The other side was occupied by appellant and his wife. The two women became good friends. On December 10, 1986, J.K. was in her home preparing to go to the home of her in-laws for a birthday party. Appellant knocked on her door and asked her to come over and look through some catalogues to choose Christmas presents for his wife. After a few minutes of looking at catalogues, J.K. advised appellant that she would have to leave.
As she approached the front door, appellant grabbed her and started kissing her. She resisted his advances, and when he stated his intention to have sexual intercourse with her, she reminded him that they both were married and again attempted to leave. However, appellant picked her up and carried her into the living room. As they passed the Christmas tree, J.K. grabbed it and pulled it over. Appellant grabbed her by the hair and pulled her into the kitchen where he grabbed a knife and held it to her side. He then pulled her back into the living room where he placed her face down on the couch and sat on her head.
During this time, she was begging appellant to let her sit up and talk with him. However, he insisted she was not leaving until they had sexual intercourse. He again grabbed her around the chest and held the knife to her side. He stood her up and told her to take off her pants. She informed him she was menstruating; however, he pulled her pants down, removed the tampon from her vagina, and threw it across the room. When she started struggling with appellant, he struck her and knocked her down several times. She received several blows to the head, face, and eyes. At one point, he grabbed her head and hit her in the mouth with his knee causing her to bleed. He also grabbed her by the head and snapped her neck from side to side. He then strangled her until she became unconscious. During the altercation, appellant raped the victim.
When J.K. regained consciousness, she was lying on the floorboard of appellant's truck which he was driving down the street. When she sat up on the seat, appellant shouted at her that she was going to cause a scene. He then grabbed her by the hair and slammed her forehead into the dashboard twice. The victim was able to put her foot under the door lever as the truck was slowing to turn a corner. As the truck turned, she flipped the door open and threw herself out of the truck and landed in a ditch. She remembered getting up and starting to run but remembered nothing else until she woke up in the hospital.
Stanton Mezo testified that he observed what he at first thought was a small boy with his shirt off on the side of the road. When he pulled his truck over, he discovered that the person was female and that she was very shaky and frightened. He told her he would help her, and as he started to assist her, he heard a gunshot. He said that when he and the victim both fell to the ground, he heard a second shot. He observed a pickup truck, which later was identified as appellant's, being driven slowly down the road.
At that moment, a police car appeared and the officer, who also had heard the shots and observed appellant's pickup truck, got both Mezo and the victim in his squad car and called for assistance. An ambulance arrived shortly and transported the victim to the hospital where it was discovered that she had severe wounds. At first, she was hysterical and kept calling the name of her husband. However, as she began to regain lucidity, she was able to give the hospital attendants and police officers her attacker's identity and further told them that she feared for the life of appellant's wife. Upon receiving this information, the police officers went to appellant's home and forced entry, fearing that an emergency might exist concerning the life of appellant's wife.
In the meantime, appellant's wife had returned home, discovered the house in disarray with blood on the carpet and in the bathroom, and found a bloody tampon beside the television set. Appellant was arrested shortly thereafter but refused to talk to police.
At trial, he admitted that he and the victim had sexual intercourse on the day in question but that it was consensual, that she "flipped out" after the intercourse, that she obtained the knife and attacked him, and that he was forced to hit her in the mouth to protect himself. He claimed that when she jumped from his truck, he had been taking her to a clinic for treatment of the injury to her mouth.
Appellant claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized in a search of his truck and by allowing admission of the evidence found therein. Appellant takes the position that the police had total control of the truck, that there was no emergency involved, and that they should have obtained a search warrant before entering the truck. Therefore, he argues, any evidence obtained by the search of the truck was inadmissible, citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 and Mapp v. Ohio (1961), 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081.
Before the truck was ever opened, police were able to view blood on the dash and the floor on the passenger side and a bloody purple sweater later identified as belonging to the victim. These items were in plain view and their discovery by the police did not constitute an illegal search. Texas v. Brown (1983), 460 U.S. 730, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502; Marsh v. State (1985), Ind., 477 N.E.2d 877. Having discovered this evidence without opening the truck, and further being informed that two shots were fired from the truck shortly after the victim escaped from the truck, the officers had probable cause to conduct a complete search of the truck. Chambers v. Maroney (1970), 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419. The fact that the officers waited until they had towed the truck to the police station was of no moment. Texas v. White (1975), 423 U.S. 67, 96 S.Ct. 304, 46 L.Ed.2d 209; see Cobb v. State (1980), 274 Ind. 342, 412 N.E.2d 728.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the search of the truck was improper, we can find no reversible error. The evidence found in the truck was entirely consistent with appellant's testimony at trial. He testified that the victim was bleeding from the mouth, that he was transporting her to a clinic for treatment, and that before he could prevent her from doing so, she jumped from his truck. He also testified as to the presence of a gun and ammunition in the vehicle. Any error in the admission of evidence is rendered harmless by the subsequent admission of the same facts by the defendant. See Morrison v. State (1987), Ind., 516 N.E.2d 14; Vaden v. State (1978), 270 Ind. 29, 383 N.E.2d 60. We find no reversible error.
Appellant contends the trial court erred when it reversed its previous ruling granting his motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of appellant's residence. At the time the officers entered appellant's residence, they possessed the information that he was the victim's attacker and that his wife might well be in danger. Thus, they had probable cause coupled with exigent circumstances allowing them to enter the home out of concern for the safety of appellant's wife. Coolidge, supra....
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Glover v. State
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