Taylor v. State

• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: ZARNOCH, J.
• Citation: Taylor v. State, 224 Md.App. 476, 121 A.3d 167 (Md. App. 2015)
• Decision Date: 27 August 2015
• Docket Number: No. 494, Sept. Term, 2014.,494, Sept. Term, 2014.
• Parties: Efrain TAYLOR v. STATE of Maryland.

224 Md.App. 476

121 A.3d 167

Efrain TAYLOR

v.STATE of Maryland.

No. 494, Sept. Term, 2014.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Aug. 27, 2015.

Daniel Kobrin (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellant.

Benjamin A. Harris (Brian E. Frosh, Atty. Gen., on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellee.

Panel: DEBORAH S. EYLER, ZARNOCH and NAZARIAN, JJ.

Opinion

ZARNOCH, J.

Appellant Efrain Taylor claims that police officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights when, after his arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), they searched his vehicle for containers of alcohol and instead, found illegal narcotics. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the ruling of the Circuit Court for Dorchester County that the search of his vehicle incident to his DUI arrest was constitutional. However, we also hold that the court incorrectly gave Taylor an enhanced sentence. Accordingly, we remand for resentencing.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS¹

Taylor was charged with possession with intent to distribute Controlled Dangerous Substance (CDS), Md.Code (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol., 2014 Supp.), Criminal Law Article (“CL”) § 5–602 ; possession of CDS, CL § 5–601; failure to stop at a lawful stop sign, Md.Code (1977, Repl.Vol.2012, 2014 Supp.), Transportation Article (TR) § 21–707 ; driving in excess of a reasonable and prudent speed, TR § 21–801 ; driving under the influence, TR § 21–902(a) ; and driving while impaired, TR § 21–902(b). Prior to trial, Taylor filed a motion to suppress evidence.

a. Facts presented at suppression hearing

Around 1:00 a.m. on March 1, 2013, Patrolman Chad Mothersell was on patrol in Cambridge. As he later testified, he “observed a SUV vehicle traveling southbound on Phillips [Street] at what appeared to be a high rate of speed,” which he estimated to be about 45 miles per hour in a 25 mile per hour zone. His conclusion was based on his “training and experience” in determining the speed of vehicles. Mothersell followed the vehicle and soon after, noticed that it failed to stop at a stop sign while making a left turn on to Bradley Street. Mothersell turned on his emergency lights, the SUV stopped, and he pulled up behind it.

Mothersell approached the vehicle, in which Taylor was the only occupant, and asked him for his driver's license. He stated that “[a]fter making contact with [Taylor,] I detected a minor odor of alcohol beverage from his breath and person.” He observed that Taylor's “speech was slurred, hard to understand at certain times. His eyes were bloodshot and glassy.” Mothersell asked Taylor where he was before he started driving. Taylor replied that he had been at the Point Break Beach Bar in Cambridge.

At that point, Mothersell asked Taylor to step out of the vehicle so that the officer could administer “standardized field sobriety tests: the horizontal gaze nystagmus, the nine-step walk-and-turn and the one-legged stand.”² Mothersell “determined that these weren't done successfully.”

Mothersell placed Taylor under arrest for suspicion of DUI. By that time, Mothersell's back-up officer, Officer Carroll, arrived at the scene and conducted a search of the vehicle, while Mothersell read Taylor his DR–15 Advice of Rights.³ At this time, Carroll reported back to Mothersell that he had found some “controlled dangerous substance” in the vehicle inside the center console, which Carroll had opened. Mothersell then went to the vehicle and he “observed a clear plastic baggy containing several knotted bags of what [he] suspected to be powder cocaine.”

Mothersell explained at the suppression hearing that the purpose of a “search of a vehicle is to locate any other alcohol, open containers, anything pertaining to the DUI arrest.” Taylor's attorney then asked:

Q: Were you able to make observations of the interior passenger compartment of the car in general?

A: Yes.

Q: And you described the lighting outside while all this is occurring? Obviously it's the middle of the night.

A: Middle of the night, it might be a couple of street lights, illuminated with my spotlight, take-down lights, my own flashlight....

Q: Did you have any reason to believe that there were any such open containers in the vehicle?

A: A good possibility, yes. I've had several DUI arrests where there's plenty of open containers left in the vehicle. And I want to make sure there's no other alcohol in the vehicle for the probable cause for my DUI stop.

Q: But on this particular case, you had had an opportunity to approach the vehicle on the passenger's side, look inside the vehicle, and see what was going on; is that right?

[State's Attorney]: Objection.

The Court: What's your objection?

[State's Attorney]: Your honor, he already answered the question.

The Court: Well, it is asked and answered. Go ahead.

A: At that point I didn't observe anything during my initial contact with him, my concern was also more directed to him, himself.

Taylor's counsel later argued that Mothersell lacked “independent probable cause” for the search, because “[t]here was [sic] no observed potential open containers. There was no odor of alcohol identified by the law-enforcement officer emanating from the vehicle itself as opposed to Mr. Taylor.”

After considering this argument, the court denied his motion, stating:

[O]n a stop for speed, a subsequent odor of alcohol, glassy eyes, and failure of field sobriety tests, the search of the vehicle incident to the arrest under those circumstances could have revealed a pint of whiskey in the glove compartment, who's to say. So I feel the search was lawful as well. So the motion is denied.

b. Facts presented at trial

At trial on March 13, 2014, Officer Carroll testified that as Mothersell was reading Taylor his DR–15 Advice of Rights, Carroll approached the two and explained that he had “located some controlled dangerous substance.” Carroll later explained that during his search, he noticed the vehicle's center console was closed, but not “fully latched down,” as a piece of paper stuck out of it. He opened the console and observed a bag containing seventy-six smaller baggies of what was later tested to be 34.3 grams of cocaine hydrochloride (powder cocaine). Mothersell then approached the driver's side of the SUV, looked inside the cabin, observed the bags on the driver's seat, and seized them. Later, at the stationhouse, Mothersell searched Taylor's person and discovered $1,045 in cash in his pocket and wallet.

Taylor testified that on the night of the arrest, he had drunk one twelve-ounce can of Bud Ice at the Point Break Beach Bar. He stated that he was on his way home at the time of arrest and “he did not own the SUV and that instead[,] another man, Leroy Roberts, owned it.” Taylor said he had borrowed the SUV to travel somewhere the following day, and that the morning of the arrest was the first time he had entered the vehicle, so he was ignorant of the contraband inside. As to the cash, Taylor said he was purchasing and investing in tax liens, and that he had been paid the balance of one lien that evening. He said that he had another check from one of those liens on the night of the arrest and tried to show it to Mothersell, who said “it wasn't necessary.”

Taylor also tried to explain his sobriety test failures. He stated that he wore contact lenses and told this to the officer.

He explained that he failed the one-legged stand test because of a past fracture in the tested foot. However, Taylor claimed he had passed the “step test” as instructed. He stated that he was not under the influence of alcohol on the night he was arrested. The record does not indicate that Taylor provided any corroboration of his claims regarding the tax liens or his medical ailments.

At trial, a jury acquitted Taylor of driving at an unreasonable speed, but convicted him of all other charges. On July 7, 2014, the court then sentenced Taylor as a subsequent offender. He received a sentence of forty years of incarceration, with twenty years suspended, for the possession with intent to distribute charge, to be served consecutively to a sentence from a prior conviction. He was also sentenced to one year of incarceration for driving or attempting to drive a vehicle under the influence of alcohol, to be served concurrently with the possession with intent to distribute sentence.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Taylor presents the following questions, which we have rephrased:⁴

1. Did the circuit court err in denying his motion to suppress the narcotics found in his vehicle?

2. Was he properly sentenced as a second-time offender?

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

We review a denial of a motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a warrantless search based on the record of the suppression hearing, not the subsequent trial. State v. Nieves, 383 Md. 573, 581, 861 A.2d 62 (2004). We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, here, the State. Gorman v. State,

168 Md.App. 412, 421, 897 A.2d 242 (2006) (Quotation omitted). We also “accept the suppression court's first-level factual findings unless clearly erroneous, and give due regard to the court's opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses.” Id. “We exercise plenary review of the suppression court's conclusions of law,” and “make our own constitutional appraisal as to whether an action taken was proper, by reviewing the law and applying it to the facts of the case.” Id. “Although the underlying command of the Fourth Amendment is always that searches and seizures be reasonable, what is reasonable depends on the context within which a search takes place. ” State v. Alexander, 124 Md.App. 258, 265, 721 A.2d 275 (1998) (Emphasis added in Alexander ) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) ). On that issue, “the ultimate questions of reasonable suspicion and probable cause to make a warrantless search should be reviewed de novo.” Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 385, 735 A.2d 491 (1999) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 691, 116...