Taylor v. State, 19416

Citation188 S.E.2d 850,258 S.C. 369
Decision Date11 May 1972
Docket NumberNo. 19416,19416
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesWillie James TAYLOR, Appellant, v. The STATE of South Carolina, Respondent.

Francis B. Register, Jr., Lexington, and Edward A. Harter, Jr., Columbia, for appellant.

Atty. Gen., Daniel R. McLeod, and Asst. Atty. Gen., Emmet H. Clair, Columbia, for respondent.

BRAILSFORD, Justice:

The appellant Taylor and two codefendants, Mitchell and King, were indicted for the murder of one Lorenzo Thomas. Before the commencement of the trial, Mitchell pled guilty to manslaughter. At the close of the State's evidence, King pled guilty to accessory after the fact to murder. Taylor was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to serve twenty-four years. Upon appeal to this Court we affirmed, holding that the evidence was sufficient to raise a submissible issue as to guilt and refusing to consider a number of exceptions charging error in particulars which had not been raised in the trial court, 255 S.C. 147, 177 S.E.2d 550. Thereafter, the defendant filed a petition for postconviction relief as permitted by the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act enacted by the General Assembly in 1969, Code of 1962, Section 17--601 (Cum.Supp.), et seq. The grounds of the petition, quoted below, were substantially the same as those which we refused to entertain on the prior appeal, except ground 8.

'1. It was error for the Court to allow the Solicitor to introduce evidence gained through an illegal search and seizure.

'2. The Court's failure to dismiss the jury after the co-defendant Earl King changed his plea from 'not guilty' to 'guilty of accessory to murder after the fact' denied Mr. Taylor of his Constitutional rights to trial by a fair and impartial jury (guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment) and to due process of law (guaranteed under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).

'3. It was error not to sentence the co-defendant Mitchell before he testified for the State against Mr. Taylor.

'4. The Court erred in permitting the Solicitor to cross-examine the appellant about earlier parole violations, prior escape convictions, the existence of a juvenile record, and the type of weapons used by the appellant in two armed robbery charges on his record.

'5. It was in error to permit the Solicitor to cross-examine the appellant about his failure to give an exculpatory statement to the investigating and/or arresting officers.

'6. It was error to permit the Solicitor to argue to the jury the tacit admission theory and thereby penalize the defendant's assertion of his right not to incriminate himself.

'7. It was in error to allow the Solicitor to attack the character of the defense witness Lucille Dunmore by asking her, 'How long have you been in the County Jail now?'

'8. Mr. Taylor's attorneys were so incompetent as to deny him his Constitutional right to assistance of counsel (guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment).'

We find no merit in grounds 1, 2, 3, 5 or 6, none of which was raised in the trial court.

The fragments of glass and of a burned garment, which appellant claims to have been the products of an unreasonable search and seizure, were not connected with him and had no tendency to incriminate him. Hence, there was no prejudice to appellant, even if the point had not been waived by failure to object to the admission of the evidence. Cf. McCreight v. MacDougall, 248 S.C. 222, 149 S.E.2d 621 (1966).

The facts relied upon in grounds 2 and 3 simply do not support appellant's conclusion that his constitutional rights were violated or that the court erred in allowing Mitchell to testify before sentencing him. As to the latter, see State v. Lewis, 255 S.C. 466, 179 S.E.2d 616 (1971).

When appellant elected to testify, he waived his right against self-incrimination, and became subject to cross-examination like any other witness. Inquiry as to why he had not related the substance of his self-exculpatory testimony to the investigating officers when the opportunity first presented itself was a legitimate attack upon the credibility of his trial testimony. It did not impugn his right to remain silent when interrogated.

The record does not support the claim, made by ground 6, that the solicitor argued 'the tacit admission theory' to the jury.

Ground 7 has been waived by failure to argue it in the brief.

Ground 4 raises a more serious question. It is well settled that when the defendant in a criminal prosecution becomes a witness in his own behalf, he places his reputation for truth and veracity in issue and may be cross-examined about any of his past transactions tending to affect his credibility, but his general character is not put in issue and may not be assailed by cross-examination or otherwise. State v. Knox, 98 S.C. 114, 82 S.E. 278 (1914); State v. Bolin, 177 S.C. 57, 180 S.E. 809 (1935); State v. Corn, 215 S.C. 166, 54 S.E.2d 559 (1949). In the light of this rule, we are convinced that the solicitor exceeded the bounds of propriety in examining the appellant concerning a 1961 conviction for possessing an unlawful weapon, resulting in a parole revocation, an escape from confinement in 1961, flight to New York, return to South Carolina, and 1963 sentence for escape, a 1965 manslaughter conviction and sentence therefor, a 1967 parole revocation for possession of unlawful weapons and, finally, about the fact that appellant had 'trouble' as a juvenile. These episodes had no bearing on appellant's credibility, and it would have been error to allow this line of cross-examination over proper objection. No such objection was interposed at the trial, and the solicitor's excesses in this respect are not ground for collateral attack on the conviction. We have commented at some length because this point, and the others argued in the brief, are relevant to appellant's claim that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.

The representation afforded appellant by his retained trial counsel is vigorously assailed by counsel, who, we infer, were appointed to represent him in seeking post-conviction relief. In the brief, twelve specifications are set forth as 'instances where (counsel) should have acted to protect Mr. Taylor's rights, but did not.' Specifications 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 correspond with like numbered grounds of the petition which are quoted in the forepart of this opinion. In each instance, the charge is that counsel should have made the objection or point during the trial but failed to do so. Since we have found these grounds to be without merit, no blame is attributable to counsel for failing to raise them.

The seventh specification is that counsel erred in bringing out appellant's past record. The reference is to the following questions and answers which came early in appellant's direct examination.

'Q. Mr. Taylor, have you ever been in trouble before?

'A. Yes, I have.

'Q. You do have a record?

'A. Yes, I have.'

While the solicitor did use these responses as an introduction of his cross-examination of appellant as to his record, they were not needed for this purpose. Appellant in fact had two prior convictions for robbery. These offenses, involving moral turpitude and tending to discredit appellant's credibility, were legitimate subjects of inquiry without any introduction. The voluntary elicitation of the information that appellant had a record was obviously intended to soften the impact of what was certain to...

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  • People v. Allen
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Michigan
    • March 8, 1988
    ...People v. Miles, 153 Cal.App.3d 652, 200 Cal.Rptr. 553 [1984] ); Idaho (Idaho R.Civ.P. 43[b] ); South Carolina (see Taylor v. State, 258 S.C. 369, 188 S.E.2d 850 [1972] ).23 The states barring any impeachment of a criminal defendant by prior convictions are: Georgia (Ga.Code Ann., § 38-415)......
  • State v. Young
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • May 2, 2005
    ...witness. The accused may thus be cross-examined about any of his past transactions tending to affect his credibility. Taylor v. State, 258 S.C. 369, 188 S.E.2d 850 (1972). Secondly, where the accused offers evidence of his good character, thereby putting his reputation in issue, he may be c......
  • State v. Gilbert
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • October 2, 1979
    ...Brown v. U. S., 356 U.S. 148, 78 S.Ct. 622, 2 L.Ed.2d 589, reh. den. 356 U.S. 948, 78 S.Ct. 776, 2 L.Ed.2d 822 (1958); Taylor v. State, 258 S.C. 369, 188 S.E.2d 850 (1972); 8 Wigmore, Evidence, § The appellants were never compelled to testify against themselves; rather they elected to testi......
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    • March 21, 1990
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