Taylor v. Taylor
Decision Date | 17 May 1982 |
Docket Number | 2-780A224,Nos. 582S191,s. 582S191 |
Citation | 436 N.E.2d 56 |
Parties | In re the Marriage of Jay Coy TAYLOR, Appellant (Respondent below), v. Juanita Marilyn TAYLOR, Appellee (Petitioner below). |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Charles D. Hankey, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Belle T. Choate, Indianapolis, for appellee.
This cause is before us upon the petition to transfer of petitioner-appellee, Juanita Marilyn Taylor. The Court of Appeals, Second District, reversed a lower court decision as to the property distribution in a dissolution decree. In Re Marriage of Taylor, (1981) Ind.App., 425 N.E.2d 649 (Buchanan, C. J., dissenting). We now grant transfer, vacate the opinion of the Court of Appeals, and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The facts from the record which are not in dispute show that Jay Coy Taylor (Jay) and Juanita Marilyn Taylor (Juanita) were married on March 20, 1960, and had one son, Jon Marc Taylor. Further facts were briefly summarized by the Court of Appeals:
"As of the date of the final hearing, the house was valued at $56,000 and the mortgage balance was reduced." In Re Marriage of Taylor, supra, at 650.
The majority of the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred as a matter of law and hence abused its discretion when it used the 1974 value of the house as a basis for the $2,000 equity award to Jay. The Court further found that since the statute in effect at that time was silent as to the date of valuation of the marital property, Ind.Code § 31-1-11.5-11(a) (Burns Supp.1979), it was up to the appellate court to determine:
The appellate court then held that a date certain for valuation was required and held that the correct date to use was the date the petition for dissolution was filed, in this case, June 5, 1979. The appellate court, therefore, reversed and remanded the cause to the trial court.
We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding respondent the sum of $2,000 as his share of equity in the marital residence. We further agree with the view expressed by Chief Judge Buchanan in his dissenting opinion that the courts have no authority to set a specific date for property valuation absent any statutory provisions for this action. It is clear that the regulation of marriage and divorce is strictly a function of the legislature and the courts do not have jurisdiction to exercise that function. As Chief Judge Buchanan explained:
"The courts of this State do have the inherent power, as common law courts, to regulate the proof and trial of actions at common law. But courts of common law have never been empowered to grant divorces. That power rested in medieval times with the ecclesiastical courts, which relied on civil codes, not the common law. See 24 Am.Jur.2d Divorce and Separation § 6, p. 180.
In Re Marriage of Taylor, supra, at 651.
The statute which was applicable in this case, Ind.Code § 31-1-11.5-11(b), supra, required the trial court to divide the property of the parties in a just and reasonable manner. However, the statute did not provide a specific date of valuation but only identified the property to be divided as that acquired "prior to final separation of the parties." Therefore, it is not within the jurisdiction of the reviewing court to designate a certain date for valuation. 1
It is well-settled law in Indiana that the trial court has broad discretionary power in determining the amount of property settlements. Loeb v. Loeb, (1973) 261 Ind. 193, 301 N.E.2d 349; Henderson v. Henderson, (1980) Ind.App., 401 N.E.2d 73; In re Marriage of Hirsch, (1979) Ind.App., 385 N.E.2d 193. On review, the court examines the division only for an abuse of discretion. The trial court will be reversed only where the result reached is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, including the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Loeb v. Loeb, supra; In re Marriage of Dreflak, (1979) Ind.App., 393 N.E.2d 773.
In the instant case, the trial court correctly exercised its discretion in considering the conduct and contribution of the parties toward the acquisition and maintenance of their property both before and after their separation in 1974. The fact that Juanita was awarded all the appreciation of the house after the 1974 separation was supported by the fact that she was responsible for maintaining the home during this period.
As Chief Judge Buchanan stated:
In Re Marriage of Taylor, supra, at 652.
The trial court was not limited to a specific date of valuation in this case, and the evidence shows that the court divided all of the marital property in a just and reasonable manner, under the circumstances. Several factors, including each spouse's contribution in maintaining the property and their conduct and economic circumstances, logically support the trial court's award. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's division of the property.
Respondent-appellant has presented four additional issues which were not considered in the Court of Appeals' majority opinion. We find no reversible error on any of these issues. First, respondent argues that the trial court abused its discretion in making the division of property by relying upon the improper factor of retroactive child support. During the period of separation, Jay had paid around $16,000 toward retiring preseparation marital debts. He also continued to pay on credit cards which remained in their joint names, but the record does not show what portion of these payments was for his own debts. The record does show that Jay's income earning capacity was greater than Juanita's although at the time of the final hearing he was out of work, had no savings, and was living on borrowed income. The trial court referred to these payments in its Finding of Fact, No. 21, and stated:
Although respondent characterizes this finding as an improper retroactive child support award, we do not find this is actually the case. As petitioner correctly points out, we have long recognized the common law duty and obligation of a father to assist in the support of his minor children. Crowe v. Crowe, (1965) 247 Ind. 51, 211 N.E.2d 164; Bill v. Bill, (1972) 155 Ind.App. 65, 290 N.E.2d 749. The trial court by its Finding of Fact, No. 21, found that Jay's common law duty and obligation to support his minor child had been satisfied, but this finding did not establish any retroactive child support.
Jay further argues that if his payments during the separation were regarded as a discharge of his obligations as a father, and not as a contribution to the marital estate, this would improperly decrease his share in the final property settlement. We find no abuse of discretion here and agree with Chief Judge Buchanan's analysis:
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