Taylor v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 25 November 1940
• Citation: 11 S.E.2d 587
• Parties: TAYLOR et al. v. TAYLOR et al.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

11 S.E.2d 587

TAYLOR et al.

v.TAYLOR et al.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Nov. 25, 1940.

Appeal from Chancery Court of Richmond; William A. Moncure, Judge.

Suit by Floyd Brown Taylor, suing in her own right, and as executor under the will of Sallie F. Taylor, deceased, against Douglas E. Taylor and another, for a construction of the trust provisions in a certain deed, and for a declaratory adjudication respecting title thereunder. From an adverse decree, the defendants appeal.

Reversed with directions and cause remanded.

Argued before CAMPBELL, C. J., and HOLT, HUDGINS, GREGORY, EGGLESTON, and SPRATLEY, JJ.

Andrew J. Ellis, George B. White, and David Meade White, Jr., all of Richmond, for appellants.

Henry C. Riely and Williams H. King, both of Richmond, for appellees.

EGGLESTON, Justice.

The object of this suit is to obtain a construction of the trust provisions of a deed from Minna Keppler to H. Seldon Taylor, trustee, dated March 22, 1895, and duly recorded, and thus to have determined the title to and present ownership of the property thereby conveyed.

By this deed Minna Keppler, for a stated consideration, conveyed certain business property, which may be briefly described as number 322 East Broad street, in the city of Richmond, Virginia, to H. Seldon Taylor, trustee:

"In trust, nevertheless, for the following purposes, to-wit: That the said H. Seldon Taylor shall hold the same for the sole, separate and exclusive use and benefit of his wife, Sallie F. Taylor, with power, during the joint lives of the said H. Seldon and Sallie F. to sell, exchange, or encumber by mortgage or deed of trust, upon the written request of the said Sallie F. Taylor. Should the said property, or any taken in exchange therefor, not be alienated in any of the above modes, during the said joint lives, and the said Sallie F. Taylor should survive her husband, the said property shall be held by her for and during her natural life, for her sole and separate use, free from the debts, contracts and control of any future husband she may take, and at her death shall be equally divided among the children of the said H. Seldon Taylor, then living, including those by his first marriage, as well as those by his present marriage. In the event that the said H. Seldon Taylor shall survive his said wife, Sallie F. then the said property, or any taken in exchange therefor, and not alienated in any of the above modes, shall revert to the said H. Seldon Taylor, in fee simple, absolutely freed and discharged from all trusts whatever."

Since the deed became effective, no sale, exchange or encumbrance of this property has ever been made, and it is still held under and is now subject to the provisions of that instrument.

H. Seldon Taylor, the trustee, was a prominent citizen of Richmond and was engaged in the real estate business there for many years. He was twice married. His first wife, Julia Belle Green, died in the year 1881. Subsequently he married Sallie F. Brown, who was his wife when the deed in question was executed.

H. Seldon Taylor died on February 13, 1930. In addition to his widow, Sallie F. Taylor, he left surviving two children by his first marriage, Douglas E. Taylor and Belle Taylor Pettit, and two by his second marriage, H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., and Floyd Brown Taylor.

H. Seldon Taylor left a will by which he disposed of all of his right, title and interest in the property here involved. But since it is conceded by both sides that he acquired no interest in the property we are not here concerned with the terms of his will.

H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., died on October 25, 1936, testate, but since, as we shall presently see, he, too, acquired no interest in the property, we are not here concerned with the provisions of his will.

Sallie F. Taylor, the second wife of H. Seldon Taylor, mentioned in the deed of March 22, 1895, survived her husband and died on January 5, 1938. She left a will which was duly probated and recorded. This will made no specific mention of the property here involved, but under residuary clauses it was disposed of for the benefit of her children, H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., and Floyd Brown Taylor, with certain added provisions in favor of the latter should she survive her brother. Both children were named as executors, but since H. Seldon Taylor, Jr., was not living at the date of the probate of the will, Floyd Brown Taylor qualified as the sole "executor."

In July, 1938, Floyd Brown Taylor, suing "in her own right and as executor under the will of Sallie F. Taylor, deceased, " filed a petition in the court below against Douglas E. Taylor and Belle Taylor Pettit, her half-brother and half-sister, and other interested parties, setting out the above facts, praying for a construction of the trust provisions in the Keppler deed, and a declaratory adjudication that under the terms of that instrument Sallie F. Taylor acquired "an estate in fee simple absolute in said property, " that consequently the property had passed to her, the petitioner, as the sole beneficiary under the will of Sallie F. Taylor, and that she was likewise entitled to the income from the property accumulated since the death of Sallie F. Taylor.

All of the interested parties answered the petition. In their answer Douglas E. Taylor and Belle Taylor Pettit took the position that under a proper interpretation of the Keppler deed, Sallie F. Taylor acquired only a life estate in the property, that upon her death it passed to the children of H. Seldon Taylor then living, namely, Douglas E. Taylor, Belle Taylor Pettit and Floyd Brown Taylor, in fee simple, share and share alike, and that the income derived from the property and accumulated since the death of Sallie F. Taylor should be equally divided among the same parties.

After a consideration of the pleadings, the provisions of the deed in question, and the pertinent agreed facts, the lower court decreed that by the first sentence of the trust provisions in the Keppler deed, Sallie F. Taylor took an equitable estate in fee simple in the property; that the limitations over contained in the second and third sentences of the trust provisions were void and of no effect; and that accordingly the property had passed pursuant to the will of Sallie F. Taylor. The lower court reserved for later consideration and decision the question as to what person or persons were entitled to the property under that will.

From this decree Douglas E. Taylor and Belle Taylor Pettit have appealed.

The contention of the appellants is that a reading of the trust provisions as a whole discloses the unmistakable intention to vest in Sallie F. Taylor an equitable life estate, with power of appointment--the limited power to require a sale, exchange or encumbrance during her husband's lifetime; that H. Seldon Taylor took a vested remainder in fee simple, subject to be divested by his dying before his wife, Sallie F. Taylor; and that the children of H. Seldon Taylor, namely, Douglas E. Taylor, Belle Taylor Pettit and Floyd Brown Taylor, took contingent remainders, contingent upon Sallie F. Taylor surviving her husband and contingent upon their being living at the death of Sallie F. Taylor.

The contention of the appellee is twofold. First, she says that under the first sentence of the trust provisions Sallie F. Taylor was given an equitable fee simple title, and that the limitations over contained in the second and third sentences of the trust clause are void for repugnancy.

But she further contends that should it be decided that Sallie F. Taylor was given only a life estate by the first of the trust provisions, this was coupled with an unrestricted power of disposition, through the trustee, of the property, and an absolute ownership of the proceeds of sale which converted her life estate into a fee simple estate, and that the limitations over in the second and third sentences of the trust provisions were void for repugnancy, under the doctrine of May v. Joynes, 20 Grat. 692, 61 Va. 692.

Counsel for the respective parties agree that in arriving at the intent of the draftsman of the deed, all parts of the instrument should be taken and considered together, and all of its provisions should be given effect unless the expressed intention violates some principle of law. But each insists that the application of these rules leads to a different conclusion.

The appellee contends that when the trust clauses are read as a whole, they show that the parties intended by the first sentence to create an equitable fee simple estate in Sallie F. Taylor, and by the next two sentences to create limitations over after such fee, and that since this expressed...