Taylor v. Taylor
| Decision Date | 29 July 2015 |
| Docket Number | CV 313-069 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia |
| Parties | SHERRILYN TAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. RICHARD TAYLOR and CLARENCE SANDERS, in their individual capacities, and LYNDA WAMMOCK, Defendants. |
ORIGINAL
Before the Court is Defendant Richard Taylor's ("Deputy Taylor") and Defendant Clarence Sanders' ("Sheriff Sanders") motion for summary judgment. (Doc. no. 30.) For the reasons set forth herein, the motion is GRANTED.
On September 18, 2011, pro se Defendant Lynda Wammock ("Wammock") called the Montgomery County (Georgia) Sheriff's Office ("Sheriff's Office") and complained that Plaintiff Sherrilyn Taylor had been making harassing telephone calls to Wammock's home threatening to fight her if she saw her in public. (Deputy Taylor Dep., Ex. 6.) Although Plaintiff was calling from a blocked number, Wammock recognized Plaintiff's voice because they had known each other for twenty years. (Wammock Dep. at 25-26, 70-71.) Deputy Taylor investigated Wammock's complaint by interviewing Wammock at her home, confirming that blocked calls appeared on Wammock's home telephone, and interviewing Plaintiff. (Deputy Taylor Dep. at 41-44.) Plaintiff denied the allegations and Deputy Taylor decided not to seek an arrest warrant. Three days later, Wammock reported that Plaintiff's calls had continued and that Plaintiff had threatened, "I'm gonna burn your house down bitch." (Id. at 58-59 & Ex. 9.) Deputy Taylor investigated this second complaint by re-interviewing Wammock at her home and confirming that more blocked calls appeared on Wammock's home telephone. (Id. at 59.) Not finding Plaintiff at her home, Deputy Taylor arranged to meet her at a local convenience store to discuss this second complaint.
Prior to the meeting, Deputy Taylor informed Sheriff Sanders of the status of the case and of his intent to apply for arrest warrants. (Id. at 61-64.) Sheriff Sanders permitted Deputy Taylor to use his discretion regarding the warrants. (Id.) Deputy Taylor prepared affidavits for arrest warrants for harassing telephone calls in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-39.1 and terroristic threats in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-37. (Defs. Mot. for Summ. J., Exs. F & G.) The magistrate found probable cause and issued the warrants. (Id.) Aware of Plaintiff's public reputation for fighting. Deputy Taylor requested two back-up officers to accompany him to meet and arrest Plaintiff. (Deputy Taylor Dep. at 98, 104.)
Upon arrival at the convenience store, Deputy Taylor informed Plaintiff of Wammock's new allegations and that warrants had been issued for Plaintiff's arrest. (Deputy Taylor Dep. at 58, 98-99 & Ex. 7.) Plaintiff again denied the allegations and became argumentative. (Id., Ex. 7.) Several feet away, Plaintiff's friends in the car she had arrived in voiced their dissatisfaction with Deputy Taylor's attempt to arrest Plaintiff. (Id. at 72-73.) A disgruntled young adult male in the back seat of the car made eye contact with Deputy Taylor and motioned as if to exit the vehicle to confront him. (Id.) Deputy Taylor yelled at the young man, which had the desired effect of convincing him to remain in the vehicle and of alerting the back-up officers to possible trouble from Plaintiff's companions. (Id.) Plaintiff, still demonstrating a general attitude of noncompliance, stepped away from Deputy Taylor. (Id. at 98.) Deputy Taylor then grabbed her by the upper arms and slammed her into the side of one of the patrol cars. (Id.) The officers then brought Plaintiff to the Sheriff's Office for processing. (Id., Ex. 11.) During the drive, Plaintiff asked one of Deputy Taylor's back-up officers if her head was bleeding. (Id., Ex. 7.) Rather than answering, the officer advised Plaintiff to speak with Deputy Taylor. (Id.) At the Sheriff's Office, Deputy Taylor presented the arrest warrants to Plaintiff and provided her an opportunity to review them. (Id. at 97-98.)
The same day, pursuant to an agreement between Montgomery County and Irwin County, Plaintiff was transferred to the Irwin County Detention Center. (Pl. Dep. at 24; Deputy Taylor Dep. at 85-87.) The agreement between the two counties, which governs housing and maintenance of inmates, provides in relevant part:
5. TRANSPORTATION: Irwin County shall transport the Montgomery County inmates from the Montgomery County Jail or any other facility housing inmates for Montgomery County and deliver them to the Irwin County Detention Center. In addition, Irwin County agrees to provide all subsequent transportation for Montgomery County's inmates to and from the Irwin County Detention Center when the attendance of such inmates is required for any judicial or medical proceeding as requested by Montgomery County.
(Sheriff Sanders Dep., Ex. 3.) Upon arrival at the Detention Center, Plaintiff received medical care for her bruised right hand. (Pl. Dep, Ex. 11.) A radiological consultation revealed no fractures, no dislocation or abnormality, and characterized her right hand as "normal." (Id.) On September 23, 2011, Plaintiff again sought treatment for injuries allegedly caused during her arrest. (Pl. Statement of Material Facts, Ex. 5.)
She was diagnosed with blunt trauma on her right hand, multiple contusions on her right hand, forearm, and right upper eyelid, and a contusion on the left side of her chest wall. (Id.) The treatment plan included a splint on her right hand and pain medication. (Id.) The clinician observed no obvious fractures, but noted a need for x-rays as soon as possible. (Id.)
At the time of her arrest, Plaintiff was on parole for an earlier felony charge. (Pl. Dep. at 36; Defs. Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. I.) Because her arrest violated the conditions of her parole, the State Board of Pardons and Paroles issued, on the date of her arrest, a warrant and order for Plaintiff's arrest for parole violation. (Defs. Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. I.; Deputy Taylor Dep. at 91.) That warrant states "[a]s a parole violator this subject is not bondable under any circumstances." (Defs. Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. I.) After Deputy Taylor arrested Plaintiff, a parole officer called the Sheriff's Office and informed the Sheriff's staff that a parole hold had been placed on Plaintiff. (Sheriff Sanders Dep. at 42.) Due to the parole hold, Sheriff Sanders waited for the Superior Court of Montgomery County to set bond in Plaintiff's case rather than promptly presenting Plaintiff before a Magistrate. (Id.)
On September 30, 2011, the Superior Court of Montgomery County set a $15,000.00 property bond for Plaintiff. (Pl. Dep, Ex. 5.) On October 6, 2011, Plaintiff through counsel requested that the Superior Court hold a bond hearing on October 18, 2011. (Pl. Dep., Ex. 6.) On October 12, the Sheriff's Office released Plaintiff to her family on bond. (Pl. Dep., Ex. 9.) Thus, Plaintiff was detained for twenty-one days without being brought before a magistrate. On February 6, 2012, the district attorney presented Plaintiff's case before a grand jury in Montgomery County, Georgia, for terroristic threats and harassing phone calls. (Pl. Statement of Material Facts, Ex. 7.) The grand jury returned a "no-bill." (Id.)
On October 13, 2011, one day after Plaintiff was released, she sought further medical treatment at the Lower Oconee Community Hospital. (Id., Ex. 5.) X-rays revealed a healing fracture of her right hand, but no determination was made regarding when the fracture occurred. (Id.) Pain medication was prescribed and instructions given to follow up with orthopedic staff for further problems. (Id.)
On November 9, 2011, Plaintiff returned to the hospital complaining of pain related to injuries she sustained during her arrest. (Id.) X-rays of her right hand, wrist and elbow showed a spiral fracture of her hand. (Id.) Plaintiff was prescribed pain medication and instructed to wear a splint for four to six weeks. (Id.)
On September 19, 2013, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for (1) malicious prosecution against all Defendants; (2) excessive use of force and denial of due process against Deputy Taylor; and (3) supervisory liability against Sheriff Sanders. In the complaint, Plaintiff also alleged state law claims for false arrest against all Defendants and assault and battery against Deputy Taylor. All claims against Deputy Taylor and Sheriff Sanders are against them in their individual capacities only.
On October 2, 2014, Deputy Taylor and Sheriff Sanders filed a motion for summary judgment. (Doc. no. 30.) The Court granted Plaintiff's consent motion to extend the response deadline from October 27, 2014, to November 4, 2014. (Doc. no. 46.) The Court then granted Defendants' consent motion to extend the reply deadline from November 21, 2014, to December 5, 2015. (Doc. no. 54.)
Defendant Wammock, who is not represented by counsel, filed an answer to Plaintiff's complaint in which she denies all allegations, states that she was not acting under color of law, and requests that all claims against her be summarily dismissed. (Doc. no. 8.) She has not filed a motion for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is appropriate only if "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Facts are "material" if they could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986), and must draw "all justifiable inferences in [its] favor." U.S. v. Four Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc)(internal punctuation and citations omitted)...
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