Taylor v. Taylor, 1231-91-4

• Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia
• Citation: 14 Va.App. 642,418 S.E.2d 900
• Docket Number: No. 1231-91-4,1231-91-4
• Parties: Frances H. TAYLOR v. Norman R. TAYLOR. Record
• Decision Date: 09 June 1992

Page 900

418 S.E.2d 900 14 Va.App. 642 Frances H. TAYLOR
v.
Norman R. TAYLOR. Record No. 1231-91-4. Court of Appeals of Virginia. June 9, 1992.

Page 901

[14 Va.App. 643] David L. Duff, Encinitas, Cal. (David L. Duff, P.C., on brief), for appellant.

Betsy M. Herbst, Alexandria (Costello & Hubacher, on brief), for appellee.

Present: MOON, WILLIS and ELDER, JJ.

WILLIS, Judge.

This appeal raises four issues. (1) Does the doctrine of laches operate to bar the collection of arrearages under a properly registered foreign support order? (2) Does the statute of limitations[14 Va.App. 644] on the collection of money judgments bar any portion of the appellant's claim for support arrearages? (3) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying an increase in spousal support and in terminating the appellant's right to future support? (4) Did the trial court err in denying the appellant an award of attorney's fees? We modify and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The parties were married on December 15, 1946. They separated in July, 1963, and were divorced March 11, 1974, in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County. The three children born of the marriage are all of age. On May 27, 1968, the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions, Domestic Relations Branch, ordered Norman Taylor to pay to Frances H. Taylor a unitary sum of $110 per month for spousal and child support. Mr. Taylor paid that support until July 1, 1972, but then ceased payment.

Mr. Taylor was granted the divorce. Service of process was obtained on Mrs. Taylor by order of publication. She did not appear in the divorce proceedings. Thus, the divorce court did not have in personam jurisdiction over her.

In 1976, pursuant to a URESA petition, the Fairfax County Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court awarded Mrs. Taylor $660 in support arrearages. Mr. Taylor paid this amount, but has made no payment since. The records of the URESA proceeding have been destroyed.

In 1990, Mrs. Taylor filed in the trial court a petition seeking registration of the May 27, 1968, support order pursuant to Code § 20-88.30:5. She also petitioned for an increase in spousal support and filed a motion for judgment in the amount of $24,420 based upon a claimed arrearage under the May 27, 1968 order. Mr. Taylor filed a petition to vacate the registration of the May 27, 1968 support order and another petition seeking a decrease in spousal support.

The trial court denied Mr. Taylor's motion to vacate the registration of the May 27, 1968, order. It denied Mrs. Taylor's motion for judgment for support arrearages. It denied Mrs. Taylor's "motion" for "an order of ongoing support and for an increase in that support." It granted Mr. Taylor's "motion" to "decrease and/or dismiss support" and terminated "any obligation of spousal support." [14 Va.App. 645] It denied the motions of both Mr. and Mrs. Taylor for attorney's fees and costs.

The trial court ruled that the URESA judgment of the Fairfax County Juvenile

Page 902

and Domestic Relations Court, entered April 19, 1976, was res judicata between the parties and determined their rights as of that date. That ruling is not on appeal. Thus, this appeal concerns the rights of the parties under the May 27, 1968 support order subsequent to April 19, 1976, and their ongoing rights and responsibilities with respect to each other.

I. LACHES

The trial court ruled that Mrs. Taylor's claim for support arrearages was barred by the doctrine of laches. Mrs. Taylor contends that the trial court erred in applying District of Columbia law, which permits the interposition of laches as a defense to a support arrearage, rather than Virginia law, which does not. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court ruled properly.

In Virginia, laches may not be interposed as a defense to a support arrearage.

Laches is an equitable defense, but "even a court of equity, in an effort to do equity, cannot disregard the provisions of a lawful decree...."

Richardson v. Moore, 217 Va. 422, 423-24, 229 S.E.2d 864, 866 (1976) (quoting Fearon v. Fearon, 207 Va. 927, 931, 154 S.E.2d 165, 168 (1967)).

[I]n the absence of statute, payments exacted by the original decree of divorce become vested as they accrue and the court is without authority to make any change as to the past due installments.

Id. 217 Va. at 424, 229 S.E.2d at 866 (quoting Cofer v. Cofer, 205 Va. 834, 838, 140 S.E.2d 663, 666 (1965)).

[I]t is the obligation of [the obligated party] to pay the specified amounts according to the terms of the decree and ... he should not be permitted to vary these terms to suit his convenience. [If conditions change] ... his remedy is to apply to the court for ... relief.

[14 Va.App. 646] Id. 217 Va. at 424, 229 S.E.2d at 866 (quoting Newton v. Newton, 202 Va. 515, 519, 118 S.E.2d 656, 659 (1961)). The rule applies to awards of spousal support or to unitary awards for spousal and independent child support. Id.

On the other hand, the District of Columbia permits the modification of past due support obligations, based upon circumstances arising after those obligations become due. Thus, laches is available in the District of Columbia as a defense against the collection of support arrearages. See Padgett v. Padgett, 472 A.2d 849, aff'd in part, vacated in part, 478 A.2d 1098 (D.C.1984).

We first consider whether this issue is to be determined by the law of Virginia or the law of the District of Columbia.

Upon registration, the registered foreign support order shall be treated in the same manner as a support order issued by a court of this Commonwealth. It has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses and...