Taylor v. The Board of Health

• Decision Date: 01 February 1855
• Citation: 31 Pa. 73
• Parties: Robert Taylor <I>versus</I> The Board of Health.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

31 Pa. 73

Robert Taylor versus The Board of Health.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

February 1855.

CERTIFICATE from the court of Nisi Prius.

Dallas, for plaintiff, referred to the following authorities, Broom's Maxims 129-130; 1 Selw. N. P. (10th ed.) 84; 1 Steph. N. P. 335, note 51; 3 Cush. 567; Doug. 696; 2 Queen's B. 845; 10 How. U. S. 256; 2 Barn. & C. 729; 2 Barn. & Ad. 562; 8 Exch. R. 625; Cowp. 807; 4 T. R. 485; 2 Exch. 723; 13 How. U. S. 52, note; 12 Pick. 7; 4 Met. 181; 6 Id. 506; 9 Johns. 201-210-370; 7 Greenl. R. 134; 1 Root 91; 6 W. & S. 179.

J. A. Phillips, for defendant, cited Doug. 455; 8 T. R. 575; Cowp. 414; 4 T. R. 553; 6 Barn. & C. 671; 5 Taunt. 144; 4 Ad. & Ellis 858; 2 Inst. 483; Bac. Ab. tit. Duress; 10 Pet. 137, 155; 1 Dall. 148; 9 Watts 462; 3 Id. 327; 1 Barr 29; 3 Id. 109; 5 Id. 516; 10 S. & R. 219; 2 Gall. 137; 8 Harris 421.

The opinion of the court was delivered (February 1855), by LOWRIE, J.

If the case of The Borough of Allentown v. Saeger, 20 State R. 421, was decided upon a proper principle, then the judgment at Nisi Prius, upon this reserved point, is very plainly right. In that case the taxing officers had no authority at all for imposing the tax complained of; and, as it was paid without objection, it was presumed to have been expended for public purposes, and held to be irrecoverable from the district whose officers imposed it.

In the present case, the legislature imposed a poll tax on all foreign immigrants coming by sea into the state, and committed the duty of collecting and expending it for public purposes to the Board of Health. After the law had been thirty years in operation, it was declared to be contrary to the Federal Constitution, and the plaintiff seeks to recover back the taxes voluntarily paid by him under it.

We state the case as one of a voluntary payment of taxes, because there is no pretence that the defendant's officers did any more than demand the tax under a supposed authority of the law; and this is no more a compulsion than when an individual demands a supposed right. The threat that is supposed to underlie such demands is a legally harmless one; that, in case of refusal, the appropriate legal remedies will be resorted to. It is supposed that there was real compulsion, because no certificate would be granted by the health officer to the ship without the payment of the tax, and without the certificate no entry would be allowed by the custom house officers. If this be the compulsion relied on, it is vain; for it proceeded from the federal officers, and not from the defendant, who could have nothing to do with it.

When officers demand fees or other compensation illegally, the state compels them to refund, even though there was no other influence used than that attending their official position. But this is a sort of moral control which the state exercises over those to whom it intrusts part of its functions. It is not pretended, however, that there can be any such moral control over the state itself, for no superior power invests it with functions, or supervises its exercise of them.

If the matter complained of here was a wrong, then the state did it in the only way a state can do wrong — by its public functionaries. The suit is not against the state, and could not be; but it is against the executive officer of the state; for, in this matter, the Board of Health was nothing else. A state imposes certain taxes, and orders a certain officer to collect them and apply them in a given way; and he does so. How can the state compel him to refund them to the tax-payer? Will it be said that, in this case, the order was void, and therefore the officer acted on his own authority and at his own risk? The plaintiff cannot well say that, seeing that he paid voluntarily and without attempting to deny the duty, or to warn the officer that he must proceed at...