Taylor v. Turley
| Decision Date | 20 January 1871 |
| Citation | 33 Md. 500 |
| Parties | NATHANIEL G. TAYLOR v. WILLIAM H. TURLEY. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Howard County.
This was an action brought by the appellee against the appellant upon a promissory note executed in Carter County, Tennessee during the ascendancy of the Confederate Government; the consideration was a loan of Confederate money. The case was tried before the court by consent, and judgment was rendered for the plaintiff for the full amount of the fact of the note, with interest.
The defendant appealed.
The cause was argued before BARTOL, C.J., STEWART, MAULSBY and ROBINSON, JJ., and re-argued before BARTOL, C.J., STEWART BRENT, MAULSBY, GRASON, ALVEY and ROBINSON, JJ.
Wm. Reynolds, Jr., and Thomas Donaldson, for the appellant.
Fielder C. Slingluff and James Mackubin, for the appellee.
Suit was instituted in the Court below, by the payee against the maker, to recover upon the promissory note of the following tenor:
The signature of the defendant to the note was admitted. The plaintiff maintained that he is entitled to recover the nine thousand dollars, with interest, in the currency of the United States. The defendant, on the contrary, insists--1st. That the contract was void, because made upon a loan of Confederate money; 2nd. That it was a wagering contract, and, therefore, not enforceable; 3rd. That the holder of the note, in any event, is only entitled to be paid according to the value of Confederate money, at the time and place where the note was given, compared with United States legal tender currency.
The case was tried before the Court below, without the intervention of a jury, by consent of the parties. The Court, after finding the facts, was of the opinion that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the debt in the currency of the United States, and on the 1st of November, 1869, ordered judgment to be entered for the plaintiff. To this the defendant has excepted.
Where the suit is referred to the determination of the Court below, without the aid of a jury, our review is confined to the decision of the law upon the facts agreed to, or found by the Court, it is not our province to determine whether the Court below has correctly found the facts, but whether the law has been applied to the facts. When the case is thus determined below and brought here, the facts should be distinctly found and stated, in order that the questions of law arising thereon may be disposed of by this Court. See Tinges v. Moale, 25 Md. 484.
The right of the plaintiff to recover, and to what extent, depends upon the legal sufficiency of the facts found to constitute a contract obligatory upon the parties, and the character of the contract.
The well settled principles governing contracts and their construction, will enable us to dispose of this case. We will first consider the defendant's objection, that the note was a nullity, because the consideration was a loan of Confederate notes.
The Confederate Government, consisting of the eleven States, under whose direction and authority civil war was carried on for upwards of four years, was recognized as supreme in most of the territory embraced within their limits. It was the government de facto, during the time, within its military lines. The rights and obligations of a belligerent, in its military character, were recognized by the United States.
In all matters of government therein, its power could not be questioned. Civil obedience to its authority was not only a necessity, but the duty of the inhabitants, without which civil order was impossible. This was the government that issued the Confederate notes, which were not made a legal tender, and were only payable "after the ratification of a treaty of peace between the Confederate States and the United States of America." These notes were used as money, in the transactions of the people, within the military limits of these States.
From its actual supremacy within the territory where this currency circulated, and the necessity of civil obedience of all who remained in it, it must be regarded by the Courts of Law as if it had been issued by a foreign government temporarily occupying a part of the United States.
From these considerations, it results that contracts, stipulating for payment in that currency, are binding and operative to the extent of their just obligation.
These plain principles of public law in relation to the legality of contracts under such circumstances, are unquestionable. So far from the state of war existing at the time, rendering contracts, made during its pendency, nullities, it is the duty of the Courts, in expounding them, strictly to maintain their validity. In aid of the preservation of social order and civil government, and the maintenance of individual obligation and good faith, they must regard the governing power prevailing at the time, as having authority sufficient for this purpose.
It would, without reason, add to the calamities of war, if the mere fact of its pendency annihilated the contracts of parties made under the same governing authority. Such is not the rule in regard to the contracts of individuals disconnected from the belligerent operations.
No civilized Court of justice has ever sanctioned such a doctrine. On the contrary, the bona fide and legitimate contracts made under governments of every description, in war as well as peace, are enforceable in our courts, unless contra bonos mores--against public policy or some positive law.
The Confederate States having held the occupancy and actual supremacy, at the time the note in question was given, of that part of Tennessee where the parties contracted, the currency allowed by that authority could constitute a sufficient consideration to support the contract between these parties.
These principles of public law were fully discussed and clearly announced by the Supreme Court of the United States, in the recent case of Thorrington v. Smith, 8 Wallace, 1, which was a bill in equity to enforce the vendor's lien, for the balance of the purchase money for the sale of lands in the State of Alabama, for $45,000, proved to have been worth, in gold, but $3,000, upon which $35,000 had been paid in Confederate money, and a note for the remaining $10,000 given, to be paid one day after date, which the Supreme Court, under the circumstances of that case, where there was no specific description of the currency in which the note was to be paid, said, must be understood and construed as intending Confederate notes. The court below had disaffirmed the legality of the contract and dismissed the bill, but the Supreme Court reversed this ruling, and recognized the contract--thus deciding the very question involved here. There is no difference between that case and this, as to the legality of the contract; both were made within the Confederate limits, and in reference to Confederate money.
But the defendant also objects that this was a wagering contract, because made to depend upon the contingencies of war, and, therefore, void.
A contracting party may oblige himself to pay, in any commodity not prohibited by law, or contra bonos mores, however fluctuating its value. Because the value, at the time of payment, may be uncertain, is no reason, per se, why the contract should be set aside. If this were so, but few contracts could be sustained, for the great mass of contracts depend upon contingencies.
If parties make contracts upon contingencies equally uncertain to both of them, or with equal means of information, upon what ground can the Courts undertake to set them aside? All articles of trade and merchandise, with the currency itself, are subject to great uncertainty in the values, but where there is no fraud, parties are bound by their contracts in relation thereto.
A speculating contract, as to the price of stocks at a future day, is not a wager, inconsistent with the policy of the law. Ridgely v. Riggs, 4 H. & J. 358.
If the maker of the note here, contracted in reference to the uncertainty of the currency at the maturity of the note, and promised to pay the debt in whatever might then be "current bankable funds," with his eyes open, and full knowledge of the surrounding circumstances, upon what sound principle, is the contract to be avoided? It was competent for him so to contract, and it is not the duty of the Court to vacate the contract, or to make a different one for the parties.
But it is urged, that however the parties may have made their contract, that there is such inadequacy between the consideration and the amount to be paid, occasioned by the subsequent events, that it would be unjust to hold the maker bound. Assuming the contract to be subsisting, is there any force in this objection? It was perfectly...
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