Taylor v. U.S. Probation Office, 03-5370.

• Decision Date: 03 June 2005
• Docket Number: No. 03-5370.,03-5370.
• Citation: 409 F.3d 426
• Parties: Milton Joseph TAYLOR, Appellant v. UNITED STATES PROBATION OFFICE, et al., Appellees
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Page 426

409 F.3d 426

Milton Joseph TAYLOR, Appellant v. UNITED STATES PROBATION OFFICE, et al., Appellees

No. 03-5370.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued April 4, 2005.

Decided June 3, 2005.

Appeal from the United States District Court (USDC) for the District of Columbia. (No. 03cv02134).

Paul S. Berman, appointed by the court, argued the cause as amicus curiae in support of appellant.

Milton J. Taylor, pro se, was on the briefs of appellant.

Megan L. Rose, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for appellee United States Probation Office. With her on the brief were Kenneth L. Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, and Michael J. Ryan, Assistant U.S. Attorney. R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

Stacy L. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the cause for appellee M.L. Brown. With her on the brief were Robert J. Spagnoletti, Attorney General for the District of Columbia, and Edward E. Schwab, Deputy Attorney General.

Before: EDWARDS, ROGERS, and ROBERTS, Circuit Judges.

EDWARDS, Circuit Judge.

Milton J. Taylor appeals from the District Court's dismissal of his civil rights action for damages arising out of his allegedly unlawful confinement at the District of Columbia Central Detention Facility ("CDF"). Taylor does not challenge any conviction or sentence. Rather, he contends that his placement at CDF was unlawful in light of orders of the federal District Court and the local Superior Court prescribing that he be confined at a halfway house.

Before responsive pleadings were filed, the District Court, on its own motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (2000), dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. The court concluded that Taylor had failed to satisfy the so-called "favorable-termination" or "prior-invalidation" requirement of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), which bars actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) seeking "damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid," unless the plaintiff "can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated."

We reverse. Heck and subsequent Supreme Court decisions make it clear that Heck's application is limited to suits that, if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff's conviction or sentence, i.e., suits challenging the fact or duration of confinement. Because Taylor's complaint challenges only the fact that he was confined at one facility rather than another and, thus, does not challenge the fact or duration of his confinement, the rule of Heck is inapplicable.

I. BACKGROUND

In June 2001, following an allegation that Taylor had violated the terms of his supervised release imposed after a prior criminal conviction, see United States v. Taylor, Crim. No. 97-0035 (D.D.C. Nov. 14, 1997), the District Court revoked the supervised release and sentenced Taylor "to be imprisoned for a term of ... SIX (6) months to be served in Hope Village Halfway House for intensive residential drug counselling and treatment." United States v. Taylor, Crim. No. 97-0035 (D.D.C. June 19, 2001), reprinted in App. of Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae ("App.") at 3. Taylor was directed to surrender himself to the halfway house when space became available and to report to his probation officer for drug testing in the interim. Id.

On July 31, 2001, before space had become available at the halfway house, Taylor was arrested and charged in the District of Columbia Superior Court with an unrelated drug offense. Three days later, the Superior Court ordered that Taylor be released to a halfway house on work release pending trial. Pursuant to this order, Taylor was transferred from CDF (where he had been confined since his arrest) to a local halfway house.

On August 14, while Taylor was at the halfway house, the United States Marshals Service issued a detainer against Taylor to the District of Columbia Department of Corrections. See United States Marshals Service Detainer of 8/14/2001, reprinted in App. for Appellee Brown ("Supp.App.") at 1. "A detainer is a request filed by a criminal justice agency with the institution in which a prisoner is incarcerated, asking the institution either to hold the prisoner for the agency or to notify the agency when release of the prisoner is imminent. Detainers generally are based on outstanding criminal charges, outstanding parole- or probation-violation charges, or additional sentences already imposed against the prisoner." Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719, 105 S.Ct. 3401, 87 L.Ed.2d 516 (1985) (citations omitted).

The detainer at issue in this case requested the Department of Corrections to notify the Marshals Service when Taylor was released from the Department's custody, so that the Marshals could take Taylor into custody. See Detainer, Supp.App. at 1. The detainer referenced the docket number of Taylor's criminal case in the District Court and included the following notation: "6 Mths Halfway House." See id. On August 15, however, the day after the detainer was issued, Taylor was removed from the halfway house and taken to CDF, where he remained until January 2002. It is unclear whether Taylor was taken from the halfway house by the U.S. Marshals, local authorities, or others. Nor is it clear at whose direction and on what authority Taylor was moved.

In October 2001, Taylor filed two actions in the District Court challenging his confinement at CDF as inconsistent with the Superior Court's order that he be placed in a halfway house pending his local trial and the District Court's order that he serve his federal sentence at a halfway house. Taylor sought damages as well as his release back to the halfway house. The District Court construed both actions as petitions for habeas corpus, and, because Taylor had been released by the time the petitions were considered, dismissed the petitions as moot on September 27, 2002. See Taylor v. U.S. Prob. Office, Civil Nos. 01-2132, 01-2133 (D.D.C. Sep. 27, 2002), reprinted in App. at 5-8. It appears that Taylor did not appeal these dismissals.

In September 2003, Taylor commenced the instant civil action for money damages against the CDF warden, the U.S. Probation Office, and his federal probation officer. Taylor's complaint alleges that the defendants unlawfully detained him at CDF in violation of the orders of the District Court and Superior Court.

Before responsive pleadings were filed, the District Court dismissed the case on its own motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (requiring court to dismiss in forma pauperis action "at any time if the court determines that ... the action ... fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted"). The court concluded that Taylor's claim "goes to the fact or duration of his confinement," and was therefore barred under Heck because Taylor had not established prior invalidation. See Taylor v. United States Prob. Office, Civil No. 03-2134 (D.D.C. Oct. 16, 2003), reprinted in App. at 14-16.

This appeal followed. Professor Paul Schiff Berman was appointed by the court as amicus curiae to present arguments in support of Taylor's position.

II. ANALYSIS

As noted above, the District Court dismissed Taylor's action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. We review such dismissals de novo. See Davis v. Dist. of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1348 (D.C.Cir.1998). Dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate only if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). We must accept all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true and give Taylor the benefit of all inferences that can reasonably be drawn from those allegations. Kaempe v. Myers, 367 F.3d 958, 963 (D.C.Cir.2004). We also remain mindful that complaints filed by pro se plaintiffs, like Taylor, are "h[e]ld to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (per curiam).

The gravamen of Taylor's complaint is that his confinement at the CDF location rather than at a halfway house was unlawful, because it contravened the orders of the District Court and the Superior Court. The District Court concluded that this claim "goes to the fact or duration of his confinement" and, thus, that Taylor was required under Heck to establish that his "conviction or sentence ha[d] already been invalidated," see Heck, 512 U.S. at 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364. Because Taylor made no such showing, the District Court dismissed the case. We hold that the District Court erred in dismissing this action, because, as we explain below, Taylor's claim is not subject to Heck's prior-invalidation requirement.

* * * * * *

In Heck, a state prisoner brought an action for damages pursuant to § 1983, challenging the conduct of state officials who, the prisoner alleged, had unconstitutionally caused his conviction by improperly investigating his crime and destroying evidence. Heck, 512 U.S. at 478-79, 114 S.Ct. 2364. Pointing to "the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments," the Court held:

[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a ...