Taylor v. United States
Decision Date | 07 January 2014 |
Docket Number | No. 13-467C,13-467C |
Parties | SHERYL TAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. Claims Court |
Pro Se Plaintiff; Motion to Dismiss;
Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction;
Failure to State a Claim.
Sheryl Taylor, Memphis, TN, pro se.
Douglas G. Edelschick, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. With him were Bryant G. Snee, Acting Director, Commercial Litigation Branch and Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division.
Pro se plaintiff Sheryl Taylor filed a pro se complaint in the United States Court of Federal Claims, alleging that she was wrongfully denied counsel in proceedings before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), despite defendant's "duty to release its federal funds" and "appoint or assign counsel to the Plaintiff."1 On the samedate she filed the complaint in this court, plaintiff filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The court granted Ms. Taylor's motion to proceed in forma pauperis.2
Plaintiff's complaint begins:
This is a suit brought by the Plaintiff, under the First Amendment,3 Fifth Amendment4 and Fourteenth Amendment5 of the Constitution of the United States, to recover just compensation for the Government's taking of federal funds and the denial of counsel without due process. This taking is the direct result of a denial of a hearing and a denial of a review of a mixed case complaint before the EEOC.
Ms. Taylor also alleges that, "[d]efendant, Jacqueline Berrien, Chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, was employed by the EEOC and was either committing or omitting [sic] to do all the acts of negligence that have been set forth and alleged in this complaint." Ms. Taylor claims that "[o]n or about June 20, 2013, the Plaintiff was denied counsel by the EEOC," and that "Plaintiff made a First (1st)Amendment petition for access to federal funds allocated through the EEOC to secure counsel." Plaintiff further alleges that "Plaintiff raised legal questions to the EEOC regarding the review of the mixed case complaint before the EEOC," and that the "EEOC refused and did not answer the legal questions of the Plaintiff."
Although not discussed by Ms. Taylor in her filings with this court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in Taylor v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 527 F. App'x 970 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g denied (Fed. Cir. 2013) provided some additional background about her employment and termination history. The Federal Circuit indicated that:
Id. at 971. Another recent Federal Circuit decision involving Ms. Taylor, Taylor v. Merit Systems Protection Board, No. 2013-3113, 2013 WL 5943153 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 7, 2013), reh'g en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2014), further explained that:
Following her removal, Taylor filed a formal EEO complaint at the Agency claiming that she was subjected to harassment that created a hostile work environment on the basis of race, age, sex, disability, and reprisal for prior EEO activities as a complainant. On December 12, 2011, the Agency issued a Final Agency Decision ("FAD") on Taylor's EEO complaint, finding that there was no discrimination relating to her removal.
Id. at *1 (internal citation omitted).6
In this court, plaintiff claims that, "[o]n or about June 20, 2013, the Plaintiff was denied access to federal funds by the EEOC," and "defendant interfered with the Plaintiff securing counsel with federal funds." Plaintiff further alleges she was "denied counsel by numerous lawyers," as well as "denied counsel by federally funded legal aid programs." Plaintiff alleges that the Plaintiff claims that the "defendant knew the Plaintiff could not properly provide any legal argument before the EEOC without counsel," and Ms. Taylor now seeks $50,000.00, as well as "declaratory relief, compensatory relief and injunctive relief to redress the denial of federal funds, denial of counsel, denial of a review of the mixed case complaint, denial of a hearing for Federal employees as required by the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States."7
After some delay on defendant's part, on November 14, 2013, defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1) (2013) and for failure to state a claim pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(6). Regarding its jurisdictional arguments, defendant argues that this court does not have jurisdiction "to entertain Ms. Taylor's claims for negligence, for violations of non-money mandating constitutional provisions, and for relief against defendants other than the United States." Regarding defendant's motion for failure to state a claim, defendant argues,
On December 13, 2013, plaintiff filed a response to the motion to dismiss, stating:
It is a fact, the Plaintiff cannot make a proper pleading before the Court without counsel. It is a fact, the defendant has interfered with the Plaintiff's right to sue before the Court. It is a fact, the defendant has engaged in exparte [sic] communication with the Court. It is a fact, the defendant has obstructed justice and impeded the judicial process. It is a fact, the defendant has a duty to appoint or assign counsel to the Plaintiff. It is a fact, the defendant has breached its duty. It is a fact the breach caused irreparable harm to the Plaintiff. It is a fact, the defendant has failed to articulate any legal basis for denying counsel to the Plaintiff and withholding federal funds from the Plaintiff. The defendant has a weak and defenseless argument before the Court. The Plaintiff does not have the legal expertise to understand the legal jargon of the defendant.
On December 16, 2013, defendant responded to plaintiff's filing, noting that "[i]n her opposition, Ms. Taylor denigrates our arguments as 'weak and defenseless' and she 'objects to the dismissal of the complaint,' but she does not elaborate upon these conclusory points at all." (internal citation omitted).
In addition to filing a response to the motion to dismiss, plaintiff has filed sixteen, additional separate filings with the court, including eleven motions and one petition for review. The motions include motions for entry of default, motions for relief from court Orders, a motion for recusal,8 a motion for "Appointment of Counsel through the Court's Civil Pro Bono Panel," a motion to "file the notice to the court and notarized letter," and a motion for "defendant to appoint or assign counsel to the Plaintiff by releasing itsfederal funds, equally distributing its federal funds for the sole purpose of counsel for the Plaintiff," among many others. Although the motions take various forms, Ms. Taylor repeats exactly the following two sentences in twelve of her filings: 9 Ms. Taylor also repeatedly indicates that:
The interest of the Plaintiff is not protected due to the fact that Plaintiff does not have counsel. However, the interest of the defendant is protected because it has secured counsel. The Plaintiff has many legal questions. However, the Clerk of the Court cannot answer legal questions. The legal questions remain unanswered due to the fact that Plaintiff is without counsel.
Ms. Taylor also has expressed frustration that the court has refused to schedule oral argument on plaintiff's many motions.
When determining whether a complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff is sufficient to invoke review by a court, pro se plaintiffs are entitled to liberal construction of their pleadings. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (, )reh'g denied, 405 U.S. 948 (1972); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1980); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977); Comer v. Peake, 552 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009). "However, '"[t]here is no duty on the part of the trial court to create a claim which [the plaintiff] has not spelled out in his [or her] pleading."'" Lengen v....
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