Taylor v. United States

• Decision Date: 28 July 1917
• Docket Number: 1512.
• Parties: TAYLOR et al. v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

244 F. 321

TAYLOR et al. v. UNITED STATES.

No. 1512.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

July 28, 1917

Arthur R. Young, of Charleston, S.C. (Hagood, Rivers & Young, of Charleston, S.C., and E. L. Asbill, of Leesville, S.C., on the brief), for plaintiffs in error.

Francis H. Weston, U.S. Atty., of Columbia, S.C. (J. Waties Waring Asst. U.S. Atty., of Charleston, S.C., on the brief), for the United States.

Before PRITCHARD, KNAPP, and WOODS, Circuit Judges.

PRITCHARD Circuit Judge.

The defendants were indicted in the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of South Carolina charged with a violation of sections 37 and 269 of the Penal Code of 1909. The sections in question are in the following language:

'37. If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such parties do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.'

'269. Whoever holds, arrests, returns, or causes to be held arrested or returned, or in any manner aids in the arrest or return of any person to a condition of peonage, shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.'

The first indictment contains three counts, charging the defendants, Taylor and Hayes, with conspiring to return Cook to a condition of peonage. The second indictment contains three counts, in which the defendant Hayes is charged with violating section 269 of the Criminal Code, to wit, causing Cook to be arrested for the purpose of placing him in a condition of peonage. The third indictment also contains three counts, charging the defendant Taylor with having Cook arrested with felonious intent, for the purpose of placing Cook in a condition of peonage; that is, compelling him to work and labor for Taylor in carrying out a certain pretended contract. These indictments were consolidated at the time the defendants were placed upon trial.

Evidence was introduced to the effect that Willie Cook, a young white man, about 22 years of age, in the latter part of December, 1915, entered into an agreement with J. G. Taylor as laborer upon his farm during the year 1916, and was to receive as compensation therefor $10 per month and a house in which to live. Under this agreement Cook moved on the plantation of Taylor the latter part of 1915, where he remained until the last of February, 1916, at which time he left Taylor and went to the home of his father-in-law. Shortly thereafter Cook, accompanied by his father-in-law, returned to the home of Taylor with a view of securing his release from any further obligation on his contract, upon the ground that he found it impossible for himself and wife to live on the wages which Taylor had agreed to pay him. Cook and his father-in-law testified that they urged this view of the case to Taylor, and insisted that he relieve Cook of any further obligation under the contract. Taylor declined to grant this request unless he was paid all that Cook owed him, together with $25 additional for damages. It was shown that Cook, independent of the contract to work, owed Taylor $13. The learned judge who heard this case, referring to this phase of the testimony, said:

'According to the testimony, Taylor had, prior to Cook's making the contract for service, loaned Cook some thirteen dollars (but wholly independent of the contract), Cook stating he desired to get it in order to get married.'

Cook was unable to reach an agreement with Taylor and returned to the home of his father-in-law. Taylor then conferred with the defendant Hayes, who was a magistrate, and instituted a prosecution against Cook for failing to work under his contract. Thereupon Hayes wrote the father-in-law of Cook, who, accompanied by Cook, went to see Hayes. At that time Hayes told them that Taylor must be satisfied before he could do anything, and unless the matter was adjusted with Taylor that he would at once proceed with the prosecution. Cook and his father-in-law then went to see Taylor, who again refused to allow him to stop working, and the defendant Hayes said to Cook that he must work for Taylor or go on the chain gang. Accordingly, a warrant was sworn out by Taylor against Cook, whereupon the defendant and his constable went to the house where Cook was residing, to execute the same. Finally an agreement was reached by which Cook was to plead guilty and pay the sum of $25, which was to end the matter. Cook entered a plea of guilty, and Hayes was paid $25. Cook and his father-in-law departed, thinking the matter was ended. However, a few days afterwards Hayes, under pressure from Taylor, issued a second warrant for Cook. An interview followed between Cook, his father-in-law, and Hayes, in which Hayes said that Taylor had required him to prosecute under the contract, and that Cook must either work for Taylor or work on the chain gang for the rest of the year. Cook was tried under this warrant, sent to the chain gang, put in shackles, fined, and required to work for 30 days.

It appears that a third party then intervened in the interest of Cook, who interviewed Hayes in regard to the matter, but Hayes again declared that Cook must either work for Taylor the rest of the year or spend the rest of the year working on the chain gang; that the contract was a monthly one, and that he would issue a fresh warrant every month. In the meantime the attention of the United States government was directed to this condition of affairs, and Hayes and Taylor were arrested.

The defendants were tried, and the jury found them guilty, whereupon the court entered judgment, to which the defendant excepted, and the case now comes here upon a writ of error.

While it appears that plaintiff failed to enter a motion in arrest of judgment, it does appear that a motion for a new trial was made, on the ground that the evidence did not disclose any element of peonage.

It is insisted by counsel for the government that this court will not entertain a writ of error where the court below refuses to grant a new trial, inasmuch as the granting or refusing of a motion of that character is within the discretion of the trial judge. This is undoubtedly the general rule. However, in a case of this importance, where it is apparent on the face of the record that an error has been committed, which is determinative of the questions involved therein, the court will consider the same.

In the case of Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632, 16 Sup.Ct. 1127, 41 L.Ed. 289, the Supreme Court said:

'No motion or request was made that the jury be instructed to find for defendants or either of them. Where an exception to a denial of such a motion or request is duly saved, it is open to the court to consider whether there is any evidence to sustain the verdict, though not to pass upon its weight or sufficiency. And although this question was not properly raised, yet if a plain error was committed in a matter so absolutely vital to defendants, we feel ourselves at liberty to correct it.'

Also in the case of Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 25 Sup.Ct. 429, 49 L.Ed. 726, in referring to this point, the court said:

'While no motion or request was made that the jury be instructed to find for defendant, and although such a motion is the proper method of presenting the question whether there is evidence to sustain the verdict yet Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632 (16 Sup.Ct. 1127, 1197, 41 L.Ed. 289), justifies us in examining the question in case a plain error has been committed in a matter so vital to the defendant.'

Thus it will be seen that the Supreme Court has expressly affirmed the ruling of the court in the case of Wiborg, supra.

In order to reach a correct conclusion as to the guilt or innocence of these defendants, it becomes necessary to ascertain the meaning of the term 'peonage.' In the case of Clyatt v. United States, supra, the Supreme Court affords us a clear definition of the term in the following language:

'What is peonage? It may be defined as a status or condition of compulsory service, based upon the indebtedness of the peon to the master. The basal fact is indebtedness. As said by Judge Benedict, delivering the opinion in Jaremillo v. Romero, 1 N.M. 190, 194: 'One fact existed universally; all were indebted to their masters. This was the cord by which they seemed bound to their master's service.' Upon this is based a condition of compulsory service. * * * That which is contemplated by the statute is compulsory service to secure the payment of a debt.' This definition is also approved in the cases of Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 31 Sup.Ct. 145, 55 L.Ed. 191; United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 35 Sup.Ct. 86, 59 L.Ed. 162; Peonage Cases (D.C.) 136 F. 707; United States v. Clement (D.C.) 171 F. 974.

It clearly appears from the evidence that Cook was prosecuted because of his failure to comply with his contract, to wit, his failure to work the balance of the term for which he was employed. In referring to the conference Cook and his father-in-law had with Taylor we find the following in the evidence, which is reported in narrative form:

'At this conference Taylor positively declined to release Cook, warned Cook that if he did not voluntarily perform his work under the contract he would be compelled to, but finally said that he would release him provided he, Taylor, was paid up all that Cook owed him, together with $25.00 additional for damages. According to the testimony Taylor had, prior to Cook's making the contract for services, loaned Cook some

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