Taylor v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

• Citation: 376 F.Supp.2d 653
• Decision Date: 11 July 2005
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 4:03cv86.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
• Parties: Scott Ross TAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. WAL-MART STORES, INCORPORATED & Divisions and Subsidiaries, Defendant.

Page 653

376 F.Supp.2d 653

Scott Ross TAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. WAL-MART STORES, INCORPORATED & Divisions and Subsidiaries, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 4:03cv86.

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Norfolk Division.

July 11, 2005.

Scott Ross Taylor, New Port News, VA, Pro Se Plaintiff.

Constantinos George Panagopoulos, Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

KELLEY, District Judge.

Plaintiff Scott Ross Taylor brought this action pro se against defendant Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., alleging that the termination of his employment violated the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54, and various Virginia statutes. The matter is before the Court on Wal-Mart's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docket No. 29.) For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED.

I. Procedural Background

As required by Local Rule 56(B) of this Court, Defendant Wal-Mart included a Statement of Undisputed Material Facts along with its summary judgment motion. (Docket No. 31.) In compliance with Local Rule 7(K), Wal-Mart warned Mr. Taylor that he must specifically identify those facts, if any, that he disputes. Despite this warning, Mr. Taylor explicitly contested only Wal-Mart's assertion that he never actually filed a request for leave under the Family Medical Leave Act.

If Mr. Taylor had been represented by counsel, then his failure to contest all but one of Wal-Mart's items of undisputed fact would be dispositive. Local Rule 56(B) allows the Court to "assume that facts identified by the moving party in its listing of material facts are admitted" unless the non-moving party controverts the facts in a counter statement supported by citations to the record. However, the Fourth Circuit has cautioned that pro se litigants are to be treated with deference. See Ballard v. Carlson, 882 F.2d 93, 96 (4th Cir.1989).

Mindful of this admonition, the Court conducted a two hour and twenty-five minute hearing on Wal-Mart's motion. The Court questioned Mr. Taylor about each enumerated "undisputed" fact asserted by Wal-Mart in its pleading. The questioning revealed that Mr. Taylor has many seemingly legitimate complaints about the way Wal-Mart handled his on-the-job injuries and the resulting workers' compensation claims. However, the facts material to Wal-Mart's Motion for Summary Judgment on the causes of action raised in this suit are not in dispute.

II. Factual Background

Scott Ross Taylor began working as a Wal-Mart Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning ("HVAC") Technician in March 1995. Mr. Taylor was, in his words, a "fix-it" for his area — whenever a store had trouble with its heating, cooling, or refrigeration, the store manager would call on Mr. Taylor to fix the problem. Ultimately, Mr. Taylor was responsible for maintaining hundreds of compressors used for the heating, cooling, and internal grocery refrigeration at more than a dozen Wal-Mart Supercenters and Sam's Clubs spread across a broad geographic area. Mr. Taylor testified that he loved the challenge of being a Wal-Mart HVAC Technician, and the job allowed him to provide well for his family both financially and medically.

Serving as a Wal-Mart HVAC Technician is physically demanding work. Mr. Taylor was initially able to handle the physical job requirements of a Wal-Mart HVAC Technician, including the stated job requirement of handling components weighing up to one hundred (100) pounds. This changed when he injured himself at a Sam's Club near Raleigh, North Carolina on April 8, 1999. While attempting to repair a compressor, Mr. Taylor injured his ankle when he tripped over a gate closure ball and fell to the pavement.

Mr. Taylor's recovery was difficult. Mr. Taylor consulted with many doctors about his ankle injury, including a podiatrist, a neurologist, and a surgeon. A fourth doctor concluded that Mr. Taylor's ankle had not healed properly and therefore required additional treatment and intensive physical rehabilitation.

While recovering from his ankle injury, Mr. Taylor was on "light duty." Mr. Taylor has no complaints about his work status during this period of time.

Mr. Taylor had to take medical leave again in March 2000, this time for hernia surgery. Mr. Taylor had an additional surgery on August 8, 2001 to repair a new hernia.

When Mr. Taylor returned to work from his first hernia surgery, Wal-Mart attempted to place him on "salary continuance status" in accordance with company policy. Salary continuance status would allow Mr. Taylor to receive his base salary while he focused on his recovery. However, Mr. Taylor objected to the salary continuance status and negotiated a set of light duty policies and guidelines that would govern his work status following surgery. Because Mr. Taylor's manager did not assign him work during his time on this negotiated status, Mr. Taylor was forced to find work on his own. In addition to not having the opportunity to earn overtime pay due to the lack of work, Mr. Taylor did not receive an annual pay raise during the time that his work was restricted.

In July 2000, approximately three months after the first hernia surgery, Mr. Taylor received medical clearance to return to regular, unrestricted work status. One month later, Mr. Taylor requested that his doctor place him back under a medical restriction. Mr. Taylor felt occasional pain in his ankle and feared that he would need additional surgery if he continued working without restriction. Mr. Taylor underwent a functional evaluation in September 2000 and, as a result, was restricted from lifting or carrying any item weighing more than fifty (50) pounds.

Mr. Taylor testified that he was able to compensate for his fifty (50) pound lifting and carrying restriction. For example, in order to use a thirty-two (32) foot ladder, he would tilt one end at a time off the side of the truck and then "walk" the ladder to the side of the store. On other occasions, Mr. Taylor would commandeer shopping carts to move his tools to the roof via an electric winch with a sling attached to the shopping cart. To install certain heavier compressors, Mr. Taylor brought a one-and-a-half ton chainfall from home. He also employed jib cranes, fork lifts, and other mechanical devices to accomplish the heavy lifting required by his work. To avoid carrying heavy objects, Mr. Taylor employed slide boards, dollies, and shopping carts to push or pull them instead.

In addition to the routine use of mechanical aids, Mr. Taylor was assisted by Wal-Mart HVAC Technicians from other areas. However, for most large lifting requirements, Mr. Taylor hired outside contractors at Wal-Mart's expense to assist him.

Mr. Taylor believed that the various arrangements he used to compensate for his lifting restriction worked quite well. Nevertheless, he was unable to fulfill Wal-Mart's expectations of him, and he could not meet his own prior benchmarks. The situation became more difficult in January 2002 when Wal-Mart management prohibited Mr. Taylor from hiring outside contractors in certain situations.

Mr. Taylor worked under the fifty (50) pound lift restriction from September 2000 until January 22, 2002. On the latter date, Mr. Taylor injured his abdomen while pushing a compressor at work. This second on-the-job accident caused Mr. Taylor's doctor to place him under an even more cumbersome medical restriction. In addition to being barred from lifting or carrying heavy items, Mr. Taylor was now barred from lifting, carrying, pushing, or pulling more than forty (40) pounds.

The new medical restriction made it difficult, if not impossible, for Mr. Taylor to perform his job. On April 23, 2002, Mr. Taylor met with his two Wal-Mart supervisors to review the job requirements of a HVAC Technician and to discuss strategies that would permit Mr. Taylor to continue working despite his new medical restriction. The only potential solutions that the trio identified were either to hire outside contractors or to enlist the assistance of Wal-Mart technicians from other areas whenever objects heavier than forty (40) pounds needed to be lifted, carried, pushed, or pulled. The Wal-Mart supervisors decided that neither alternative was reasonable.

At the conclusion of the April 23, 2002 meeting, Wal-Mart notified Mr. Taylor that the company would terminate his employment as a HVAC Technician, but would continue to pay him his base salary for thirty days, i.e., until May 23, 2002. During this period Wal-Mart's personnel department worked with Mr. Taylor to find a position within the company for which he was qualified, both physically and in terms of skill. Wal-Mart ultimately offered Mr. Taylor an Assembler position, but he declined the offer.

Mr. Taylor's employment by Wal-Mart ended on May 23, 2002. Mr. Taylor's managers recommended that Wal-Mart rehire him should he choose to re-apply for a new position. Mr. Taylor filed this action on June 25, 2003.

III. Standard of Review

The standards courts apply in their consideration of motions for summary judgment are well-established. Summary judgment is appropriate only when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 549, 119 S.Ct. 1545, 143 L.Ed.2d 731 (1999); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Seabulk Offshore, Ltd. v. American Home Assurance Co., 377 F.3d 408, 418 (4th Cir.2004); Walton v. Greenbrier Ford, Inc., 370 F.3d 446, 449 (4th Cir.2004).

An otherwise proper summary judgment motion will not be defeated by a mere factual dispute between...