Taylor v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
| Decision Date | 28 January 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:17-cv-02872-SHL-cgc,2:17-cv-02872-SHL-cgc |
| Parties | ANGELA CHERRY TAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. WAL-MART STORES, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee |
Before the Court is Magistrate Judge Charmiane Claxton's Report and Recommendation ("R&R"), dated September 28, 2020. (ECF No. 72.) In this matter, Plaintiff Angela Cherry Taylor alleges that Wal-Mart unlawfully terminated her employment based on her race and sex, and retaliated against her because she engaged in protected activity. (ECF No. 8.) Wal-Mart argues in its Motion for Summary Judgment that there are no disputes of material fact and that Ms. Taylor's evidence is insufficient to create a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation as a matter of law. (ECF No. 34.)
In the R&R, Magistrate Judge Claxton recommends granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. She concludes that Plaintiff failed to offer sufficient evidence of a similarly situated employee who was treated more favorably than her, thus failing to meet her burden as to a prima facie case of discrimination. In addition, Magistrate Judge Claxton concludes that Plaintiff does not provide sufficient evidence that she engaged in a protected activity prior to her termination or that Wal-Mart knew of any protected activity, if she did so engage, thus defeating the retaliation claim.
Ms. Taylor timely filed Objections to the Report on October 12, 2020, arguing that the Magistrate Judge overlooked submitted material that created genuine issues of material fact as to similarly situated individuals who were treated differently (thus supporting a prima facie case of discrimination) and as to her engagement in protected activity that Wal-Mart officials were aware of (thus supporting the retaliation claim). (ECF No. 73 at PageID 817-20.) Wal-Mart responded to these objections on October 26, 2020, arguing that there is no evidence supporting either objection. (ECF No. 74.) Because the Court finds that the evidence Plaintiff points to is insufficient to create a factual dispute for a jury to consider, the recommendations of the R&R are ADOPTED, and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
The following facts are a condensed version of those found by the Magistrate Judge in the R&R, the vast majority of which are not contested by Plaintiff. The Court notes where there is dispute.
Ms. Taylor worked for Wal-Mart from August 2013 to December 2015. (ECF No. 70-1 at PageID 648, 661.) She started as a Customer Service Manager, but, in 2014, became the Dairy Department Manager. (Id. at PageID 648, 651.) As Dairy Department Manager, Ms. Taylor was responsible for maintaining the presentation of the dairy merchandise; removing damaged or expired goods; organizing product displays; and signing and pricing merchandise. (Id. at PageID 651.) She was also responsible for removing out-of-date goods from the shelves to prevent health issues for customers. (Id. at PageID 651.)
In December 2015, Ms. Taylor's supervisor Ryan Robertson, who had just become the Store Manager that month, observed that there was a lot of dairy freight in the back refrigerator that had not been processed and moved to the sales floor. (Id. at PageID 653-54.) Mr.Robertson also found out-of-date products on the shelves, available for sale. (Id. at PageID 653-54.)
Mr. Robertson discussed these concerns with Ms. Taylor when she arrived at work and instructed her to address these issues during her shift. (Id. at PageID 654.) After Ms. Taylor left for the day, Mr. Robertson assessed the shelves and merchandise, and found "a large quantity of additional dairy products in the back cooler that needed to be marked down or disposed of." (Id. at PageID 655.) Ms. Taylor "does not dispute that dairy product was present in the back cooler, but she lacks sufficient knowledge to form a belief as to the age of the product." (Id. at PageID 655.)
Following this event, Mr. Robertson asked the assistant manager, Mr. Glover, to prepare a "Written Coaching," outlining how Ms. Taylor failed to meet her job obligations that day. (Id. at PageID 656.) When Mr. Glover accessed the Wal-Mart system to complete this task, he discovered that Ms. Taylor had already received her third "Written Coaching" in January of 2015 and was thus subject to termination, pursuant to the "Coaching for Improvement" Policy (CIP). (Id. at PageID 656.) Magistrate Judge Claxton summarized that policy in the R&R:
The CIP establishes a system of progressive discipline that begins with a First Written Coaching and then proceeds with a Second Written Coaching and a Third Written Coaching. Further, each time an associate receives a written coaching within twelve months of a prior written coaching, the level of discipline increases. An associate can clear her disciplinary history under CIP if she does not receive a new written coaching within twelve months of a prior written coaching. If an associate goes for twelve months without a new written coaching, regardless of whatever level she had reached, the associate would start over with a clean slate. However, if an employee engages in conduct or demonstrates performance that would otherwise warrant another coaching within twelve months of the issuance of the Third Written Coaching, the individual's employment is terminated.
(ECF No. 72 at PageID 805) (citations omitted.)
As the R&R states, the evidence submitted established that Ms. Taylor had a history of prior coachings:
(Id. at PageID 808-10.)
Based on the previous coachings and the applicable policy, Robertson instructed Glover to proceed with Ms. Taylor's termination. (ECF No. 70-1 at PageID 656.) She was terminated on December 30, 2015, with the following reason for termination: (Id. at PageID 661.)
The heart of this lawsuit is Plaintiff's contention that her previous coachings were discriminatory and retaliatory, and that other similarly situated individuals were treated more favorably than her, based on their race and sex. Specifically, she alleges that Melissa (LNU) and Laura (LNU), white, female coworkers, were situated similarly and treated more favorably, despite having similar work problems. (ECF No. 73 at PageID 818-19.) She also alleges that men were treated more favorably. (Id. at 819.) In support of these allegations, she points to the affidavit of Jarmain Barken, a former coworker, and her own deposition testimony. (ECF Nos.70-3, PageID 720 and 700, respectively.) In her Objection, she also relies on the allegations in the Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 73, PageID 818-820.)
As to her retaliation claim, she argues that her previous coachings were the product of retaliation for reporting discriminatory conduct to upper management at Wal-Mart. (ECF No. 73 at PageID 820-24.) She alleges that a previous supervisor, Mark Thomas, issued her first Written Coaching as a response to her formal and informal complaints about Mr. Thomas's discriminatory conduct. (Id. at 820-21.) She again points to her own testimony and the affidavit of Jarmain Barken, as well as an exhibit attached to Plaintiff's Response and Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as support. (Id. at PageID 820-21.) The exhibit contains an email conversation among upper management personnel at Wal-Mart regarding her coachings. (ECF No. 70-3 at PageID 757-65.)
District courts may designate magistrate judges to submit findings of fact and recommendations on various pretrial motions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). When a party timely objects to the magistrate judge's recommendation on a dispositive issue, the court must make a de novo determination before ruling on the motion. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The court is then free to accept, reject or modify the magistrate judge's recommendation. Id. The Court need not review, under de novo or any other standard, those aspects of the recommendation to which no specific objection is made. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). If there is no specific objection, the court need only review the recommendation for clear error. Id. at 151.
The motion before the Court is one for summary judgment. Summary judgment is proper if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Although hearsay evidence maynot be considered on a motion for summary judgment, Carter v. Univ. of Toledo, 349 F.3d 269, 274 (6th Cir. 2003), evidence need not be in a form that would be admissible at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Cartrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). The court is to "view facts in the record and reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those facts in light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Bible Believers v....
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