Taylor v. Werlich
| Decision Date | 22 April 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 16-cv-1032-NJR |
| Parties | DUWAYNE TAYLOR, #14895-026, Petitioner, v. T. G. WERLICH, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois |
Petitioner Duwayne Taylor, an inmate in the Bureau of Prisons, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). In 2009, Taylor was sentenced to a 180 month term of imprisonment after pleading guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). His sentence was enhanced pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA") based, in part, on two prior Illinois felony convictions: robbery pursuant to 720 ILCS 5/18-1(a), and aggravated discharge of a firearm pursuant to 720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(2). 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Taylor now invokes Mathis v. United States, — U.S. —, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) and Johnson v. United States, — U.S. —, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) to challenge this enhancement based on these prior convictions and to argue that he is entitled to be resentenced without the ACCA enhancement.
For the reasons discussed below, Taylor is not entitled to habeas relief.
Taylor pleaded guilty to one count of Felon in Possession of a Firearm pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) on May 27, 2009. United States v. Taylor, Case No. 08-cr-20059-MPM, Doc. 15 (C.D. Ill. May 27, 2009). In his plea agreement, Taylor agreed that he had three prior convictions which qualified him as an Armed Career Criminal under the ACCA and agreed that the ACCA's mandatory minimum sentence of 180 months imprisonment was appropriate. Id. While neither party has provided the Presentence Report ("PSR") to the Court, there is no dispute that two of the ACCA predicate convictions were an Illinois robbery conviction under 720 ILCS 5/18-1(a) and an Illinois aggravated discharge of a firearm conviction under 720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(2). (Doc. 1, pp. 5-6; Doc. 6, pp. 8-9). Taylor did not object to the plea agreement or PSR, and he was sentenced to 180 months' imprisonment on July 22, 2009. United States v. Taylor, Case No. 08-cr-20059-MPM, Doc. 20 (C.D. Ill. July 22, 2009).
Taylor did not file a direct appeal. He did, however, file a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the Central District of Illinois. He asserted, among other things, that the ACCA was unconstitutionally passed by Congress and applied to his sentencing, that applying the ACCA enhancement violated his constitutional due process rights, and that his counsel provided ineffective representation in connection with his sentencing. The motion was denied in all respects. Taylor v. United States, Case No. 10-cv-2109-MPM-DGB, Doc. 11 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 20, 2010). The Seventh Circuit denied Taylor's request for a certificate of appealability, Taylor v. United States, Case No. 10-3900, Doc. 10 (7th Cir. May 26, 2011), and the Supreme Court denied Taylor's petition for certiorari. Id. at Doc. 15.
In 2015, Taylor filed a Section 2241 petition in this district relying on Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). That petition was denied without prejudice, and the Court informed Taylor that the appropriate vehicle for challenging his sentence pursuant to Johnson was to request authorization from the Seventh Circuit to file a second or successive motion under Section 2255. Taylor v. Cross, Jr., Case No. 15-cv-0735-DRH, Docs. 12, 16 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 2015 and Oct.23, 2015). Taylor proceeded to do just that, filing a motion with the Seventh Circuit requesting leave to file another Section 2255 petition in the Central District of Illinois in September 2015. Taylor v. United States, No. 15-3038, Doc. 1 (7th Cir. Sept. 17, 2015).
The Seventh Circuit denied Taylor's motion on the merits, however, finding that "Taylor's status as an armed career criminal is not affected by Johnson['s invalidation of the ACCA's residual clause]" because Taylor's predicate convictions were violent felonies that "unquestionably contain as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force" pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Id. at Doc. 8, pp. 1-2. Several months later, Taylor again filed a motion for authorization to file a successive Section 2255 petition on nearly identical grounds that was also denied by the Seventh Circuit. Taylor v. United States, No. 16-2555, Doc. 7 (7th Cir. July 18, 2016).
Generally, petitions for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 may not be used to raise claims of legal error in conviction or sentencing, but are instead limited to challenges regarding the execution of a sentence. See Valona v. United States, 138 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 1998).
Aside from the direct appeal process, a prisoner who has been convicted in federal court is generally limited to challenging his conviction and sentence by bringing a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the court that sentenced him. A Section 2255 motion is ordinarily the "exclusive means for a federal prisoner to attack his conviction." Kramer v. Olson, 347 F.3d 214, 217 (7th Cir. 2003). And, a prisoner is generally limited to only one challenge of his conviction and sentence under Section 2255. A prisoner may not file a "second or successive" Section 2255 motion unless a panel of the appropriate court of appeals certifies that such motion contains either(1) newly discovered evidence "sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense," or (2) "a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).
It is possible, however, under very limited circumstances, for a prisoner to challenge his federal conviction or sentence under Section 2241. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) contains a "savings clause" which authorizes a federal prisoner to file a Section 2241 petition where the remedy under Section 2255 is "inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). See United States v. Prevatte, 300 F.3d 792, 798-99 (7th Cir. 2002). The Seventh Circuit construed the savings clause in In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 1998): "A procedure for postconviction relief can be fairly termed inadequate when it is so configured as to deny a convicted defendant any opportunity for judicial rectification of so fundamental a defect in his conviction as having been imprisoned for a nonexistent offense."
The Seventh Circuit has explained that, in order to fit within the savings clause following Davenport, a petitioner must meet three conditions. First, he must show that he relies on a new statutory interpretation case rather than a constitutional case. Secondly, he must show that he relies on a decision that he could not have invoked in his first Section 2255 motion and that case must apply retroactively. Lastly, he must demonstrate that there has been a "fundamental defect" in his conviction or sentence that is grave enough to be deemed a miscarriage of justice. Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2013). See also Brown v. Rios, 696 F3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2012).
Since Davenport, the Seventh Circuit has made it clear that See Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1136 (7th Cir. 2015).
Initially, the Court must consider whether Taylor's claim can be brought within the narrow gate of the savings clause. Taylor's petition invokes both Johnson v. United States, — U.S. —, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), and Mathis v. United States, — U.S. —, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), as separate bases for his requested relief. The Court will address these theories in turn.
In Johnson, the Supreme Court held that "imposing an increased sentence under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act violates the Constitution's guarantee of due process." Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2563. As Taylor correctly points out (Doc. 1, pp. 3-4), Johnson announces a new rule of constitutional law, not a rule of statutory construction. See Price v. United States, 795 F.3d 731, 734 (7th Cir. 2015). To properly fit within the savings clause under Davenport, a petitioner's argument must rely upon a new rule of statutory construction. Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d at 586. Because Johnson announced a new rule of constitutional law, the holding of Johnson cannot be the basis for a Section 2241 petition. Thus, the proper avenue for Taylor to seek relief pursuant to Johnson is by filing a motion pursuant to Section 2255.
Normally, the Court would dismiss Taylor's petition without prejudice with instructions to seek permission to file a successive Section 2255 motion with the Seventh Circuit in order to pursue his theory under Johnson. But Taylor has twice already requested permission from the Seventh Circuit to do so, and the Seventh Circuit denied both of his requests. Taylor v. United States, No. 15-3038, Doc. 8 (7th Cir. Oct. 16, 2015); Taylor v. United States, No. 16-2555, Doc. 7 (7th Cir. July 18, 2016). The Seventh Circuit did not merely dismiss Taylor's request as improperunder Section 2255—it did so after considering the merits of Taylor's argument that Johnson invalidated his classification as an armed career criminal. The panel determined that "Taylor's status as an armed career criminal is not affected by Johnson['s invalidation of the ACCA's residual clause]" because Taylor's predicate convictions were violent felonies that "unquestionably contain as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force" pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Taylor, No. 15-3038, Doc. 8 at pp. 1-2 (7th Cir. Oct. 16, 2015).
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