Taylor v. Wright

• Decision Date: 27 September 1887
• Citation: Taylor v. Wright, 121 Ill. 455, 13 N.E. 529 (Ill. 1887)
• Parties: TAYLOR v. WRIGHT.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

121 Ill. 455

13 N.E. 529

TAYLOR

v.WRIGHT.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September 27, 1887.

Appeal from Ford county.

Stephen R. Moore, for appellant.

Cook & Moffett, for appellee.

SCHOLFIELD, J.

This was ejectment by appellant against appellee for a certain tract of land in Ford county.Appellee on the trial gave in evidence a tax deed, and numerous questions have been discussed in argument in relation to the sufficiency of that deed.We have given these questions as careful consideration as we can, and the following are our conclusions thereon:

1.Counsel for appellant makes a calculation showing, as he claims, that the amount for which the land was sold at the tax sale was too large by 44 cents.There is an error in counsel's addition of 10 cents.His figures really make when added, only 34 instead of 44 cents; and that 34 cents in authorized by section 18 of the act of March 29, 1872, which both sides agree is applicable to this sale, thus--

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
                ¦Making list delinquent land for judgment,                           ¦03¦
                +--------------------------------------------------------------------+--¦
                ¦Making list delinquent land on precept, sale, and redemption record,¦03¦
                +--------------------------------------------------------------------+--¦
                ¦Making list to auditor of land sold,                                ¦03¦
                +--------------------------------------------------------------------+--¦
                ¦Issuing certificate of sale,                                        ¦25¦
                +--------------------------------------------------------------------+--¦
                ¦Total,                                                              ¦34¦
                +-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
                

Sess. Laws 1871-72, pp. 432, 433.These shall, by the express language of the statute, ‘be charged as costs against the delinquent property, and be collected with the delinquent taxes thereon.’

2.It is contended it nowhere appears that the land was sold at the time and place required by law.But section 224 of the revenue law (Rev. St.1874, p. 895) provides that tax deeds executed pursuant to its provisions ‘shall be prima facie evidence, in all controversies and suits in relation to the rights of the purchaser, his heirs or assigns, to the real estate thereby conveyed, of the following facts: * * * Fourth, that the real estate was advertised for sale in the manner and for the length of time required by law; fifth, that the real estate was sold for taxes or special assessments, as stated in the deed; sixth, that the grantee in the deed was the purchaser or assignee of the purchaser; seventh, that the sale was conducted in the manner required by law.’The deed here appears to have been executed pursuant to the provisions of this statute, and the burden is therefore upon appellant to overcome the prima facie case made by the deed.He has not proved that the land was not sold at the time and place required by law.

3.It is contended the description is void for uncertainty.It is: ‘W.side N. 1/2S. E. N. W., 10 acres, sec. 8 T. 23, R. 10; quantity sold, 10 acres.’We think on the authority of Law v. People, 80 Ill. 268, andFowler v. People, 93 Ill. 116, this was sufficient.It is not a question of what possible construction might be put upon these initials, but what construction would be given them by person familiar with descriptions of real estate.They are to be construed with reference to the known customs of those whose duties are to describe real estate for purposes of taxation.We are to assume that some tangible and definite quantity was intended to be described, and we are not to be ignorant as a court of what we would understand as individuals.We cannot, therefore, understand that W. side means, as counsel contends we might, ‘wrong side,’ or ‘wet side,’ because such words are never used in describing real estate for taxation.Such words in that connection would be utterly senseless.We can take notice that by custom there is always given to the initial ‘W,’ in a connection like the present, the meaning of ‘west.’Any one familiar with tax-books understands this as well as if the word ‘west’ were written in full; and, this being so, the description is sufficient for all purposes.

4.Some objection is urged that it does not appear that the east side of the described subdivision of the congressional survey was sold.It appears from the record that the N. 1/2 S. E. 1/4 N. W. 1/4 above described contained only seventeen acres, and that after judgment, and before sale, the amount charged against the east seven acres was paid.So, necessarily, it left to be sold only the ten acres on the west side of the tract.This, we think, appears sufficiently from the memorandum on the judgment record, ‘E. 7, Pd., amount paid before sale, 6 dol., 60 cents.’But, waiving this, we have seen that the presumption from the deed is that the sale was conducted in the manner required by law, and so necessarily that the part sold was properly sold, and there is nothing before us to overcome this presumption.

5.It is contended that the notice of the expiration of the time when the right to redeem will expire is insufficient in not clearly designating R. Pollock as the purchaser, and also because it omits to state for what year the land was taxed.The notice reads thus: ‘ To Whom it may Concern: You are hereby notified that at a sale of real estate made by the county treasurer at the court-house, in Paxton, in the county of Ford and state of Illinois, we did, on the nineteenth day of June, A.D. 1877, purchase the following described real estate for the taxes and costs thereon for the year 1876, and that the time for redeeming said real estate will expire on the nineteenth day of June, A.D. 1879, to-wit;’ here follows a description of the real estate.Then the notice proceeds thus: ‘Also that, at the place aforesaid, we did, on the twentieth day of June, A.D. 1877, purchase the following real estate, and that the time for redeeming said real estate will expire on the twenty-second day of June, A.D. 1879, to-wit: Description, subdivision of sections, W. side N. 1/2 10 acres;S. E. N. W. 10 acres;section 8; town 20; range 10; to whom assessed, James Mix, E. F. Earl, and E. F. Earl, assignee of John P. Day, H. McCulloch, L. Dunlap, R. Pollock, J. S. Frederick, Chas. Bogardus, and E. F. Asay.’

It is quite apparent that the year for which the property thus described is taxed is not stated.There is no reference, directly or indirectly, after the word ‘also,’ to the word ‘1876;’ and the statements with reference to the different tracts of land are as distinct as if they were in different affidavits.The statute provides (section 216, Revenue Act, Rev. St. 1874) that it shall be stated in this notice when the land or lot was purchased, in whose name taxed, the description of the land or lot, for what year taxed or specially assessed, and when the time of redemption will expire.This notice is to be given by the purchaser or the assignee of the purchaser, but it is not required that it shall describe who was purchaser; and what the statute requires, but no more, it is essential that the notice shall contain.This notice, it will thus be seen, is defective and insufficient in omitting to state for what year this land was taxed.But it omits also to state to whom it was taxed; it states that it was assessed to James Mix, which, in that connection, we deem equivalent in meaning.

Numerous objections are urged against the sufficiency of the affidavit of compliance with the statute.That these objections may be clearly understood, it will be necessary to repeat the constitutional and statutory provisions under which they are urged.It is provided by section 5, art. 9, of our state constitution, that ‘the right of redemption from all sales of real estate for the nonpayment of taxes, or special assessments of any character whatever, shall exist in favor of owners and persons interested in such real estate for a period of not less than two...