Tazewell Coal Co. v. Indus. Comm'n

Decision Date14 April 1924
Docket NumberNo. 15860.,15860.
PartiesTAZEWELL COAL CO. v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Error to Circuit Court, Tazewell County; C. V. Miles, Judge.

Proceeding by Paul Quinn under the Workmen's Compensation Act to obtain compensation for personal injuries, opposed by the Tazewell Coal Company, the employer. There was an award of compensation, which was confirmed by the circuit court, and the employer brings error.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

William A. Potts, of Pekin, for plaintiff in error.

Dailey, Miller, McCormick & Radley, of Peoria, for defendant in error.

DUNN, J.

Paul Quinn, a young man 19 years old, was an employee of the Tazewell Coal Company as a mule driver, and on September 29, 1919, received an injury in the course of and arising out of his employment, caused by a collision of cars. The injury occurred about 1 o'clock, and he finished the day's work, which ended at 3:30, and did not work for two days. He returned to work on the third day, October 2. On October 9, 1920, he filed with the Industrial Commission an application for an award of compensation, and upon a hearing before an arbitrator an award was made on November 15, 1920, that he was entitled to receive all necessary first aid medical, surgical, and hospital services, as provided in paragraph (a) of section 8 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. c. 48, § 145). Upon his petition the Industrial Commission reviewed the award, made a finding that as a result of his injury the applicant will be partially incapacitated for work for a period of 377 weeks, beginning July 1, 1921, and awarded compensation at the rate of $6.50 a week for that period. Upon a review of the record by certiorari the circuit court of Tazewell county confirmed the award, and a writ of error has been allowed to review this judgment.

[1] It is argued that a demand for compensation was not made within the time required by law. No demand was made within 6 months of the injury, but the application for an award was filed within 18 months after the return of the employee to work, as provided by the provisoto section 24 of the Compensation Act (section 161). The absence was for 2 days, only, but in Omaha Supply Co. v. Industrial Com., 306 Ill. 384, 138 N. E. 106, the proviso was held to apply where the absence because of the injury was 6 days, and the length of the absence does not affect the principle where there has been an injury and partial incapacity, though, as was held in Swift & Co. v. Industrial Com., 299 Ill. 587, 132 N. E. 801, and American Glyco Metal Co. v. Industrial Com., 306 Ill. 421, 138 N. E. 176, the proviso does not apply where the injury is so slight that the employee loses no time except the few minutes occupied in having his injuries treated by the employer's physician.

[2] The plaintiff in error argues that Quinn's injury did not result in any disability which prevented him from working, but the testimony shows that he did receive an injury to his chest which required treatment; that he went to a doctor for that purpose after he left the mine, was bandaged, and remained bandaged for a day or two. At the expiration of that time he went to Dr. Niergarth and said that he thought he could go to work, and the doctor told him to go to work. The evidence shows that he did quit work for two days on account of the injury, and it may fairly be inferred that he was justified in quitting for that time on account of disability occasioned by his injury.

It is argued on behalf of the plaintiff in error that no disability of the plaintiff was shown as the result of an accident occurring while in the employment of the plaintiff in error. It is not denied that an accident occurred in the course of and arising out of the employment for which necessary first aid medical assistance was due and was furnished, but it is claimed that no permanent or temporary incapacity for work followed as a result of the injury. It appears that as the result of the collision Quinn was caught and bruised about the chest and back. He testified that after he quit work the day of the injury he went to the office of Dr. Niergarth, the company's physician, but the doctor was not in, and after waiting about an hour and a half he went to Dr. Watson. He said that he had two cuts clear across the chest on the side and one in the back and was suffering pain in his chest and back; that Dr. Watson laid him on a table, pressed all over him, and told him he had a dislocation in his chest. The doctor took him out to the hospital and took a picture and then bandaged him. He testified that two days later he saw Dr. Niergarth, who told him he could take the bandage off and go to work, and he did go to work the next day. He further testified that he had never sustained any previous injury to his chest or back, and that this injury resulted in a permanent depression of his chest, which he had never had before; that his chest was sore, and there was a hole in the right side, right at the breast bone, which was not there before he got hurt.

Dr. Niergarth testified that he made no examination but Quinn told him that he was injured, that some ribs had been broken and he had been attended to, and said he was all right and thought he could go to work, and the doctor told him to go. Quinn said it did not hurt. The work which Quinn did after he went back on October 2 required him to be active and quick and to use his arms and body in checking the speed of the cars while going downhill, each one loaded with 3,200 or 3,300 pounds of coal, by muscular strength holding the cars back by pressing against the front car and the mule. He worked steadily until about October 22. Physicians testified that it would have been practically impossible for him to have done so if any of his ribs had been broken, because of the intense pain which the work would have caused. Dr. Watson did not testify, and the picture which he took at the hospital was not introduced.

About October 22, at 10 o'clock in the morning, while at work, Quinn had a fainting spell. He described it as follows:

‘It wasn't a faint, neither. It was something I couldn't get out of. I knowed where I was but I couldn't...

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8 cases
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    ...490, 142 N.E. 396; Zwaduk v. Morris & Co., 109 Kan. 186, 197 P. 868; Studebaker Corporation v. Warner, 76 Ind.App. 515; Tazewell Coal Co. v. Ind. Comm., 312 Ill. 145. To sustain such an award the burden was upon respondent to show further that the alleged total disability was caused by his ......
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    ...142 N.E. 396; Zwaduk v. Morris & Co., 109 Kan. 186, 197 Pac. 868; Studebaker Corporation v. Warner, 76 Ind. App. 515; Tazewell Coal Co. v. Ind. Comm., 312 Ill. 145. (b) To sustain such an award the burden was upon respondent to show further that the alleged total disability was caused by hi......
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