Tazian v. Cline
| Decision Date | 26 September 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 02S03-9709-CV-512,02S03-9709-CV-512 |
| Citation | 686 N.E.2d 95 |
| Parties | In re Zohrab K. TAZIAN and Naomi Tazian, Appellants (Defendants below), and James A. Long, II and Mary Ann Long, Robert S. Warner and Malea A. Ramer, and Eleanor L. Doehla, Defendants (not participating in this appeal), v. Alice CLINE, Appellee (Plaintiff below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
This case is one of several lawsuits in our state in which the ownership of land formerly constituting railroad rights-of-way is contested. We agree with the Court of Appeals and the trial court that the nineteenth century deed at issue here conveyed fee simple absolute to the railroad.
Neither party disputes the following facts. Alice Cline purchased a 4.24 acre strip of land in Allen County from United Railroad Corporation/Penn Central Corporation by quitclaim deed on May 15, 1985, and duly recorded the deed. This strip of land abutted the property of Zohrab and Naomi Tazian. 1 United Railroad Corporation/Penn Central Corporation was the successor railroad in interest to the Fort Wayne Jackson & Saginaw Railroad Company ("Fort Wayne Railroad"). The Fort Wayne Railroad acquired its interest in the strip of land from S. Cary Evans and his wife through a handwritten deed dated February 10, 1873. The interpretation of this deed is the single issue on appeal. The handwritten deed from Evans to the Fort Wayne Railroad reads as follows:
This indenture made this 10th day of February AD 1873 between Cary Evans & wife of the first part and the Fort Wayne, Jackson & Saginaw Railroad Company of the second part. Witnesseth that the said parties of the first part in consideration of five hundred dollars to them in hand paid by the party of the second part the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged and in further consideration of the benefits anticipated from said railroad when constructed do grant and convey and warrant to the party of the second part and their successors and assigns a strip of land fifty feet in width on West side of railroad over, across, and through the following described tract of land situated in the County of Allen and State of Indiana, viz:
The South West Quarter of Section Two (2), Township Thirty-one (31) North, Range Twelve (12) East, formerly owned by William ... Hawley deceased deeded by Wm. E. Hawley to S.C. Evans recorded record 55, page 438 said strip of ground to be on and along the central line of said railroad as the same shall be finally located on such tract of land and of such width on each side of said central line as the final location of said railroad by said company shall determine. With the right also for the safety of said railroad to cut down standing timber on the outside of either outer line of said strip of ground which by falling would endanger said railroad or any of its structures to have and to hold all and singular the said premises in and by these presents released and conveyed unto the said Fort Wayne, Jackson & Saginaw Railroad Company and their successors and assigns forever for the uses and purposes therein expressed.
In witness whereof, the said parties of the first part have hereunto set their hands and seals this day and year first above written.
(R. at 70.)
Cline and the Tazians each filed cross motions for summary judgment to quiet title in the disputed land. The trial judge granted summary judgment in favor of Cline and later accepted Cline's proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree quieting title. The Tazians appealed and a divided Court of Appeals "affirmed the trial court in its entirety." Tazian v. Cline, 673 N.E.2d 485 (Ind.Ct.App.1996).
The Tazians seek transfer, contending the trial court and Court of Appeals erred in construing the deed from Evans to the Fort Wayne Railroad as conveying a fee simple absolute.
Indiana courts frequently face issues related to the ownership and use of parcels of land formerly used as railroad rights-of-way. This Court has recently done so in Consolidated Rail Corp., Inc. v. Lewellen, 682 N.E.2d 779 (Ind.1997); Calumet Nat'l Bank as Trustee v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 682 N.E.2d 785 (Ind.1997); and Hefty v. All Other Members of the Certified Settlement Class, 680 N.E.2d 843 (Ind.1997). Some such cases require the construction of nineteenth and early twentieth century deeds conveying interests to railroads. 2 Therefore, as we interpret the nineteenth century deed at issue in this case, we do so with the aid of nearly a century's worth of common law decisions dealing with conveyances to railroads.
Here we must determine whether the Fort Wayne Railroad held fee simple to the strip of land or whether the Fort Wayne Railroad held a mere easement. If the Fort Wayne Railroad held a mere easement, then summary judgment in favor of Cline would have been improper as that easement would have been extinguished upon abandonment by the United Railroad Corporation/Penn Central Corporation and United Railroad Corporation would have had no interest to convey to Cline. However, if the Fort Wayne Railroad held fee simple title to the parcel of land, Cline owns the strip of land and summary judgment in favor of Cline was proper.
In a quiet title action, one must recover upon the strength of his or her own title. Ross, Inc. v. Legler, 245 Ind. 655, 658, 199 N.E.2d 346, 347 (1964). In determining the interest conveyed to the railroad, a court will seek to give effect to the intent of the parties. Cleveland, Columbus, Cincinnati and Indianapolis Ry. Co. v. Coburn, 91 Ind. 557, 562 (1883).
Ross, Inc., 245 Ind. at 659, 199 N.E.2d at 348 (citing Claridge v. Phelps, 105 Ind.App. 344, 347, 11 N.E.2d 503, 504 (1937)) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, in construing a deed, a court should regard the deed in its entirety, considering the parts of the deed together so that no part is rejected. Brown v. Penn Central Corp., 510 N.E.2d 641, 643 (Ind.1987). Hefty, 680 N.E.2d at 853. Courts consider the "known use to which the property was to be subjected 3 and therefrom give the conveyance the effect intended by the parties." Ross, Inc., 245 Ind at 661, 199 N.E.2d at 349 (footnote in original).
We begin by looking at the granting clause of the deed. The deed states "in consideration of five hundred dollars to them in hand paid ... and in further consideration of the benefits anticipated from said railroad when constructed do grant and convey and warrant ... a strip of land ... over, across, and through the following described tract of land."
We agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the language "do grant and convey and warrant" is consistent with the controlling property statute in effect at the time of conveyance (and still in place today) which provides that any conveyance worded as: 4 However, as pointed out by Judge Staton in his dissent, that same statute also provides that "if it be the intention of the grantor to convey any lesser estate, it shall be so expressed in the deed." 5 Although the use of this language "grant and convey and warrant" favors the construction of the deed as conveying a fee simple absolute to the railroad company, such language is just a factor in determining whether the parties intended to grant a fee or an easement. We will look to other parts of the deed to see if the grantor expressed an intention to convey a lesser estate than fee simple.
The granting clause conveys a "strip of land fifty feet in width on West side of railroad ... over, across, and through" the described tract of land. (Emphasis added.)
A deed that conveys a right generally conveys only an easement. [Richard S.] Brunt Trust [v. Plantz], 458 N.E.2d [251,] 253 [Ind.Ct.App.1983]. The general rule is that a conveyance to a railroad of a strip, piece, or parcel of land, without additional language as to the use or purpose to which the land is to be put or in other ways limiting the estate conveyed, is to be construed as passing an estate in fee, but reference to a right of way in such conveyance generally leads to its construction as conveying only an easement. L. & G. Realty & Construction Co. v. Indianapolis, 127 Ind.App. 315, 322, 139 N.E.2d 580, 585 (1957).
The granting clause in the present deed does not appear to be limited to conveying only a right, 6 nor does the deed describe the interest conveyed as a right of way. Rather, the particular language provides that the Evanses "do grant and convey and warrant ... a strip of land." Applying the settled general rule of this state, this language supports construction of the deed as conveying fee simple to the railroad.
Arguing that "[t]he grantor intended to limit the railroad to a right to travel across, over, and...
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