TBG, INC. v. Bendis
Decision Date | 17 February 1994 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 89-2423-EEO. |
Citation | 845 F. Supp. 1459 |
Parties | TBG, INC., Plaintiff, v. Richard A. BENDIS, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
J.D. Lysaught, Mustain, Higgins, Kolich, Lysaught & Tomasic, Kansas City, KS, Herbert E. Milstein, Lisa M. Mezzetti, and Daniel S. Sommers, Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll, Washington, DC, for TBG, Inc. and George A. Bridgmon.
Bruce Keplinger, John Benge, Michael G. Norris and Michael B. Lowe, Richard G. Norris, Payne & Jones, Chtd., Overland Park, KS, for Richard A. Bendis.
Karen J. Halbrook and John R. Cleary, Husch & Eppenberger, Kansas City, MO, for W. Terrance Schreier.
Anthony F. Rupp, Shughart, Thomson & Kilroy, Overland Park, KS, John M. Kilroy, R. Lawrence Ward, Shughart, Thomson & Kilroy, P.C., Kansas City, MO, and Emmett E. Eagan, Jr., Ernst & Young, Cleveland, OH, for Ernst & Whinney.
J.D. Lysaught, Mustain, Higgins, Kolich, Lysaught & Tomasic, Kansas City, KS, Herbert E. Milstein, Lisa M. Mezzetti, Daniel S. Sommers, Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll, Washington, DC, and Martin E. Karlinsky, Scheffler, Karlinsky & Stein, New York City, for Richard S. Masinton and Continental Healthcare Systems, Inc.
J.D. Lysaught, Mustain, Higgins, Kolich, Lysaught & Tomasic, Kansas City, KS, M. Michael Gill, Tamara Wilson Setser, Julia A. Riggle, Hillix, Brewer, Hoffhaus, Whittaker & Wright, Kansas City, MO, Herbert E. Milstein, Lisa M. Mezzetti and Daniel S. Sommers, Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll, Washington, DC, for Paul R. Billington.
This matter is before the court on motions to reconsider the court's Memorandum and Order dated December 21, 1993, 841 F.Supp. 1538, by defendant Richard Bendis (Doc. # 963), Terrance Schreier (Doc. # 965), and defendant Ernst and Whinney (Doc. # 966). For the reasons set forth below, defendants Bendis and Schreier's motions will be granted and defendant Ernst's motion will be denied.
The decision of whether to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is committed to the court's discretion. See Hancock v. City of Oklahoma City, 857 F.2d 1394, 1395 (10th Cir.1988) ( ). It is well established that a motion for reconsideration is the opportunity for the court to correct manifest errors of law or fact and to review newly discovered evidence or to review a prior decision when there has been a change in the law. Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1171, 106 S.Ct. 2895, 90 L.Ed.2d 982 (1986). Appropriate circumstances for a motion to reconsider are where the court has obviously misapprehended a party's position on the facts or the law, or the court has mistakenly decided issues outside of those the parties presented for determination. Anderson v. United Auto Workers, 738 F.Supp. 441, 442 (D.Kan.1990); Refrigeration Sales Co. v. Mitchell-Jackson, Inc., 605 F.Supp. 6, 7 (N.D.Ill.1983). A party's failure to present its strongest case in the first instance does not entitle it to a second chance in the form of a motion to reconsider. Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir.1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 89, 121 L.Ed.2d 51 (1992); Renfro v. City of Emporia, 732 F.Supp. 1116, 1117 (D.Kan.1990) ( ).1
Defendants Bendis and Schreier suggest that the court reconsider the portion of our prior order which discussed the contractual limitation on liability of Paragraph 9 of their respective stock purchase agreements with TBG. Defendants do not submit any new authority, but argue that the court misconstrued and/or misapplied New York law, which governs interpretation of the agreements, as set forth in Soviero Bros. Contracting Corp. v. New York, 286 A.D. 435, 142 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1955), Agristor Leasing-II v. Pangburn, 162 A.D.2d 960, 557 N.Y.S.2d 183 (1990), and Grumman Allied Ind., Inc. v. Rohr Ind., Inc., 748 F.2d 729 (2d Cir.1984).
142 N.Y.S.2d at 514 (emphasis added). Defendants also quote from Agristor Leasing-II, "a party may not avoid an agreement on grounds of fraud if, after acquiring knowledge of the fraud, he affirms the contract by accepting a benefit under it." 557 N.Y.S.2d at 185. From this, defendants conclude that because TBG has chosen to affirm the contracts and sue for damages, instead of rescinding based on fraudulent inducement, TBG is bound by the damage limitation provision in Paragraph 9 of the agreements.
Bendis argues that Edwards v. North American Van Lines, 129 A.D.2d 869, 513 N.Y.S.2d 895, 897 (1987) ( ), a case cited in our prior order, supports his position because the court held that the plaintiff had failed to make a prima facie showing of fraud and enforced the arbitration clause in the contract. See id. The Edwards court held that the provision requiring arbitration was not procured by fraud because there were no allegations that the arbitration clause was hidden in the fine print or otherwise concealed from the plaintiff by the defendant and the plaintiff's failure to read the contract did not relieve him from application of the arbitration provision. Id.; see also Grumman Allied Ind., Inc. v. Rohr Ind., Inc., 748 F.2d 729 (2d Cir.1984) ( ). In the instant case, TBG admits it was aware of and negotiated the limitation on liability in Paragraph 9. Consequently, the limitation provision in the contract may not be avoided on the grounds of fraud in the inducement.
Even if TBG could allege facts entitling it to rescind the contract for fraud, the rule against partial rescission of a contract mandates enforcement of the limitation with regard to TBG's claims on the contract. See Soviero, 142 N.Y.S.2d at 514; Agristor Leasing-II, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 185. We, therefore, conclude that the liability limitation of Paragraph 9 will be enforced to limit defendants' liability on TBG's claims for breach of contract and indemnity.
However, the liability limitation will not be similarly enforceable to shelter defendants from liability for the consequences of their own intentional wrongdoing. In Novak, the court considered the enforceability of a contractual limitation disallowing damages for delay "from any cause" and declined to enforce the provision as a matter of law at the summary judgment stage. 480 N.Y.S.2d at 409-12.
Novak, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 407. The court referred to Judge Rabin's dissent in Soviero, which distinguished between an action on the contract and an independent action for misrepresentation, as having "risen to the fore." Id.
58 N.Y.2d 377, 461 N.Y.S.2d 746, 749-50, 448 N.E.2d 413, 416-17 (1983); see also Jackson v. State, 210 A.D. 115, 205 N.Y.S. 658, 661-62 (1924) ( ); Young Fehlhaber Pile Co. v. State, 177 Misc. 204, 30 N.Y.S.2d 192, 194-95 (N.Y.Ct.Cl.1941) ( ).
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