Teachers' Tenure Act Cases

• Decision Date: 31 January 1938
• Docket Number: 366,349,350,10,5,351,179,3
• Citation: 197 A. 344,329 Pa. 213
• Parties: Teachers' Tenure Act Cases
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

197 A. 344

329 Pa. 213

Teachers' Tenure Act Cases

Nos. 179, 3, 5, 10, 349, 350, 351, 366

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

January 31, 1938

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] [Copyrighted Material Omitted] [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Argued: January 3, 1938

Appeals, No. 179, March T., 1937, in case of Roy Malone v. D. Ray Hayden, President, et al., directors of the School District of Georges Township; Nos. 3, 5 and 10, March T., 1938, in cases of Preston A. Ditty v. David H. Weiss, President, et al., directors of School District of City of Monessen; Adele Norkus v. The Board of Directors of the School District of Franklin Township et al.; and W. A. Swick v. Board of School Directors of the School District of the Borough of Tarentum et al.; Nos. 349, 350, 351 and 366, Jan. T., 1937, in cases of Dorothy Hollenback v. School District of the Borough of Moscow et al.; John D. Storm v. School District of the Borough of Moscow et al.; Evelyn A. Horosko v. The School District of the Township of Mount Pleasant et al., and Gilmore v. Vanderslice et al. Decrees affirmed.

In all of the appeals the decrees of the courts below are affirmed; costs to be paid by appellants; separate orders to be sent out in each case.

J. K. Spurgeon, for appellants, in No. 179.

C. W. Martin, filed a brief for appellee, in No. 179.

John E. Evans, Sr., of Pugliese & Evans, for interested parties, under Rule 61, in Nos. 179, 3 and 5.

John B. McGurl, with him Cyril C. Kilker and Cletus C. Kilker, for interested party, under Rule 61, in No. 179.

Clement J. Clarke, Jr., Joseph S. Conwell, Jr., and Pepper, Bodine, Stokes & Schoch, filed a brief for interested party, under Rule 61, in No. 179.

Abraham Koppelman and Wesley Hurst Caldwell, filed a brief for interested party, under Rule 61, in No. 179.

Robert von Moschzisker, filed a brief for interested party, under Rule 61, in No. 179.

George D. Wick, of Campbell, Wick, Houck & Thomas, with him George H. Frich, Vincent R. Smith and George Walter Smith, for appellants, in No. 3.

James Gregg, of Gregg & Copeland, with him Frank Whitsett and Nicholas Polkabla, of Polkabla & Whitsett, and W. J. McDowell, for appellee, in No. 3.

Crowell & Whitehead, filed a brief for appellants, in No. 5.

Carroll Caruthers and Alex McConnell, filed a brief for appellee, in No. 5.

Russell J. Esler, filed a brief for appellants, in No. 10.

S. M. Hazlett, of Hazlett, Gannon & Walter, filed a brief for appellee, in No. 10.

M. J. Martin, with him James W. Scanlon and Esdras F. Howell, for appellants, in Nos. 349 and 350.

Joseph P. Brennan, for appellees, in Nos. 349 and 350.

L. B. Maxwell submitted a brief for appellants, in No. 351.

William C. Johnston, Harold G. Teel and R. S. Hemingway, filed a brief for appellants, in No. 366.

C. E. Kreisher, filed a brief for appellee, in No. 366.

G. W. Moon, filed a brief for Bloomsburg School District, in No. 366.

Charles J. Margiotti, Attorney General, with him Edward Friedman, Deputy Attorney General, and H. Thompson, Special Deputy Attorney General, for Commonwealth.

Before KEPHART, C.J., SCHAFFER, MAXEY, DREW, LINN, STERN and BARNES, JJ.

OPINION

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE KEPHART:

The Teachers' Tenure Act, No. 52, of the General Session of 1937, was approved April 6, 1937, P.L. 213, by the Governor; it amended certain important sections of the Act of May 18, 1911, P.L. 309, and its supplements. ^[1] Section 1 of the Tenure Act amended section 1201 by defining "professional employees" of the school district. ^[2] Section 2 provides that all school districts shall, within 30 days after the enactment of the law, tender to all such professional employees, then "employed," new contracts drawn in accordance with a form therein prescribed. ^[3] The new contract differs materially from the previous agreement in several particulars. The old contract provided for renewal from year to year unless terminated by either party at the end of any term, by 60 days' written notice. The school board could terminate it without cause. The new Act permits termination of the contract only for certain valid causes. ^[4] It provides for public hearings before the board, and an appeal to the court of common pleas by the employee. ^[5]

It will be seen, therefore, that the principal changes made by the Teachers' Tenure Act not only preserve the contractual status of teachers in new contracts but place emphatic limitations on their removal and demotion. The purpose of the Act is to preserve the system of employment in the educational field free from any interference, and by that action it takes away the heretofore discretionary power of school boards to oust employees without cause.

Prior to the adoption of the Teachers' Tenure Act, various of the school boards throughout the State gave to many teachers the sixty days' notice required by the School Code of 1911, as amended, terminating their contracts at the end of the school year 1936-1937. These teachers having been denied contracts under the Tenure Act, instituted mandamus proceedings to compel the school boards to execute the new contracts as provided in Section 2. The courts below held that as the school boards were given no discretion in the execution of these contracts, mandamus was unquestionably the proper proceeding to compel the school directors to perform their statutory duty. This conclusion was correct: Kaine et al., School Directors, v. Commonwealth ex rel. Manaway, 101 Pa. 490; Commonwealth ex rel. Short v. Woodward, 84 Pa.Super. Ct. 124; Commonwealth ex rel. Middleton v. Commissioners of Allegheny County, 37 Pa. 237; High, Extraordinary Remedies (2d ed., 1884), Sections 13, 41.

Appellants opposed the issuance of writs of peremptory mandamus chiefly on the ground that the Teachers' Tenure Act is unconstitutional and because appellees, having received notice of termination, were not within its scope. The courts below overruled all objections and in each case ordered the writ of mandamus to issue, to compel appellants to execute new contracts with appellees for the ensuing school year.

In the appeals before us the argument has taken a wide range. The principal constitutional objections urged against the Tenure Act are that it violates Article I, Section 17, ^[8] relating to the impairment of the obligations of contract, and that it abridges the right of future legislatures to enact appropriate laws in the exercise of the governmental function as prescribed by Article X, Section 1. ^[9] These two objections may well be discussed together, but before doing so, it will be necessary to review the position of public education in our form of government.

We had occasion to discuss the origin of our present public school system in Wilson v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 328 Pa. 225, 195 A. 90. The Constitution of Pennsylvania, by Article X, Section 1, not only recognizes that the cause of education is one of the distinct obligations of the State, but makes of it an indispensable governmental function. The power of the State over education thus falls into that class of powers which are made fundamental to our government. In the abstract it is not an absolute essential to government as taxation, law enforcement and preservation of the peace are essential, but by the express provision of the Constitution it ranks with them as an element necessary for the sustenance and preservation of our modern State. Education is to-day regarded as one of the bulwarks of democratic government. Democracy depends for its very existence upon the enlightened intelligence of its citizens and electors. When the people directed through the Constitution that the General Assembly should "provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of public schools," it was a positive mandate that no legislature could ignore. The power over education is an attribute of government that cannot be legislatively extinguished. It cannot be bargained away or fettered. Its benefits to a free government cannot be placed on the auction block or impeded by laws which will ultimately weaken, if not destroy, the underlying constitutional purpose. To permit such legislative incursion would relegate our State back to the days when education was scarce and was secured only through private sources, as a privilege of the rich.

In considering laws relating to the public school system, courts will not inquire into the reason, wisdom or expediency of the legislative policy with regard to education, but whether the legislation has a reasonable relation to the purpose expressed in Article X, Section 1, and whether the fruits or effects of such legislation impinge the Article by circumscribing it, or abridging its exercise by future legislatures within the field of "a thorough and efficient system of public schools." So implanted is this section of the Constitution in the life of the people as to make it impossible for a legislature to set up an educational policy which future legislatures cannot change. The very essence of this section is to enable successive legislatures to adopt a changing program to keep abreast of educational advances. The people have directed that the cause of public education cannot be fettered, but must evolute or retrograde with succeeding generations as the times prescribe. Therefore all matters, whether they be contracts bearing upon education, or legislative determinations of school policy or the scope of educational activity, everything directly related to the maintenance of a "thorough and efficient system of public schools," must at all times be subject to future legislative control. One legislature cannot bind the hands of a subsequent one otherwise we will not have a thorough and efficient system of public schools. What...